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This thesis is unusual in that it represents only part of
the work that has been carried out in pursuance of the degree. The
chapters that are presented here as prolegomena to an account of
the language of mind appeared in draft form as the first three of
eleven making up that account. The further chapters dealt with
thoughts, experiences, incorrigibility, perception, belief and
knowledge, and intentional action, before reaching conclusions
about mind and the body and some more tentative speculations about
the self. Inclusion of all this matter would have made the
thesis unreasonably long and would have delayed its presentation
beyond this present date, which is already late enough.
It is my hope that the present three chapters do form, as an
introductory group laying the foundation for the approach to
specific areas of mental language, a coherent whole. To further
this end, I have introduced into chapter 2 matter that might
otherwise have been retained for chapters 10 and 11. This seemed
to be good policy, even though it has the disadvantage that the
matter must seem more highly speculative in this context than it
would have at the conclusion of the whole work.
In my bibliography I have adopted the policy of including
only those works that I have actually mentioned; but, with this
in mind, I have in the body of the thesis tried to refer to all
those writings which have contributed substantially to this part
of my work. I hope, therefore, that I have not omitted any that
are relevant here but which might otherwise have been mentioned
only in a later chapter. I realise, however, that, having secured
a place In the bibliography for Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical
Investigations' through its provision of the epigraph, I should do
the same for Everett Hall's 'Our Knowledge of Pact and Value' and
Romane Clark's 'Sensuous Judgements' through their mention here.
Though my own views were formed independently of either, I should
recognize the former as a distant forerunner, and the latter as
the closest current approach to my own ideas.
How that this thesis is complete, I should like to thank
Professor Sir Alfred Ayer for supporting my application to be
admitted as a candidate despite my failure as a student of his:
Dr Geoffrey Madell, my supervisor, for coping with the early
manifestations of my return to philosophy: Mr Errol Bedford,
Mr Stanley Eveling and Dr Madell for seminars which further aided
the recovery of philosophical fluency: Professor Peter Heath for
his valuable distaste for the original beginning of chapter 1:
Professor Ronald Hepburn for his friendly interest: Mr David
Carroll for helping with the proof reading: Mrs Hilary Fieller
for her competent typing and cheerful encouragement in the final
days: and Elisabeth, my wife, for reading all of the final draft
and making innumerable suggestions for the improvement of its
wording, as well as making all the difference between wordlessness
at Oxford and loquacity at Edinburgh.
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The concept of mind suggests a reality that is non-objective; but
the idea that mental language does not have the descriptive function of
objective language has often been taken to imply a lack of ontological
force. Can the language of mind be shown to have a valid ontological
role even though it is non-descriptive?
Linguistic forms need not always have the same role; so, while
language originates as an adjunct of our response to the material
environment, it is not restricted to roles so developed. Description
is, however, the original function which arises directly out of the
structure of perception, the unity of predicates in the descriptive
subject term corresponding to the unity of qualities in immediate per¬
ceptual recognition.
Descriptive predicates correspond to properties that are based in
reality but identified in relation to language, while the subject terms
indicate not bare but clothed particulars. These, however, have the
status of Kantian appearances. In particular they lack any absolute
principle of identity over time. The ontological weakness is further
illustrated in terms of events and of the limitations revealed by Science
There is room, therefore, for another mode of language to establish its
ontological value, and for another aspect of being to provide an
alternative principle of identity to the objective.
II
The Identity Theory is an example of a inscriptive theory of mind.
Its difficulty in coping with mental predicates might lead one to a
double aspect theory. The topic-neutral account of experiences,
including experiences of colours, can be defended against some criticisms
but it fails to cover the "colourfulness" of experiences. This does
not consist in descriptive properties but is a bearer of intentional
vii
meaning. This "aspect" of reality must therefore be represented in a
non-descriptive language - the language of mind. Uhile Central State
Materialism provides specifications of corresponding elements in the
descriptive aspect, Punctionalism comes close to formulating the role of
mental language but fails to convey its ontological import.
Ill
Quotation is proposed as a model for the language of mind. It
is not descriptive. Direct quotations do not indicate words but
meaningfully reproduce them, with singular terms retaining their
referential power in this opaque context. Similarly, indirect quotations
do not indicate meanings, but convey meaning through reporductions of
the originals adapted to the new context. It is insignificant, there¬
fore, that the oratio obliaua 'that' attaches itself to the words
following. The subject term and verb introducing quotations can also
be seen to function in a way close to quotation. Quotation treats the
original speaker as a "samesayer" and as an originator of meaning with
oneself. It therefore meets the demands of the previous chapter.
CHAPTER 1
Mind and Description: a possible incompatibility
I
To write on mind is to go in search of one's subject. What
it is or, indeed, whether it is, can only be found at the end of a
long investigation® For a starting place, our only sure knowledge
is that a distinction has been drawn: mind has been set on one side
over against matter®
In the course of man's attempt to understand reality, it is
natural that he should have set himself in a position of priority,
considering himself, from a privileged point of view, with an
interest that he would not bestow on other objects such as dogs or
stones. Personal interest would not of itself, however, justify
him in claiming himself to be essentially different from all those
other objects that he found about him® He has, none the less,
proposed that there is an essential duality in nature realised only
in some beings: in himself certainly, in dogs possibly, and in
stones certainly not® He has seen himself, that is, as containing
a second element drawn from an entirely different realm of being to
that of physical existence, to that of the matter of which common
objects and his own body are formedo The weight that he has placed
on this other element as a constituent of his being has varied.
Sometimes he has given it equal weight with his physical being while
at other times he has gone so far as to claim that it forms his
essential being, reducing the body to a quite subordinate role.
Through all its forms, however, this belief has played the central
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role in man's conceptualization of himself and of his relation with
the world. 'Mind' is just one of the names by which the second
element in man has been known. Others are 'soul' and 'spirit',
but 'mind' is the most appropriate to the present context though,
as I shall explain shortly, it is not ideal for the purpose.
The account of a second element of reality in man was developed
to meet various needs. With names such as 'soul' and 'spirit' a
prominent purpose was to facilitate expression of a belief in an
after-life for the individual when, as a body, he had died. The
term 'mind' has, however, scarcely any connection with this role.
It is tied firmly to the living person through its connection with
two other purposes for which the second element was introduced.
The first of these purposes was to provide an explanation for man's
remarkable abilities which seemed far beyond the imaginable capacities
of a mere material object; the other, and the more important, was
to provide a way to express what it was like to live as a man. In
that life a man seemed to be acquainted with himself in quite other
ways than those in which he was acquainted with other objects. He
could, it is true, see and touch the surface of his body as he could
the surfaces of other objects; but, much more remarkable, he
continually lived through a great range of states and activities. His
awareness of these conditions seemed far more intimate and was quite
unparalleled in his relation to any other objects. Thinking, taking
deliberate action, suffering, enjoying, took priority in man's view
of himself over any of the facts that he could note about himself as
he could about other objects. These conditions, too, could be taken
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as providing the required explanation of his remarkable abilities,
for did he not live through the planning and execution of the
activities that revealed those abilities?
Introduced, as it was, for such diffuse purposes, this concept
of a second being of man did not embody clearly defined limits.
What pertained most essentially to this second being were those
powers that seemed to render man most distinct from other objects.
Thus, its core was generally taken to lie in the intellectual or
cognitive powers, thinking, reasoning, judging, comprehending, knowing,
etc., which were supposed to distinguish man from other animals as
well as from inanimate objects. These powers lead with little
apparent break into the linguistic powers, speaking, describing,
explaining, understanding, etc., which have always been taken as
prime evidence of mind. The intellectual powers also seem closely
linked with initiation of human behaviour other than linguistic.
Close connections can also be found with man's sensory powers, though
here we come to the periphery of what has been considered to belong
to this second element in man. Successful seeing, feeling, tasting,
smelling and hearing depend on recognition, the identification of what
is sensed; but, cognitive as they are, these powers may be shared by
animals. Another reason, though, for including these in the powers
of mind is the very lively contribution that they make to man's lived
experience of himself.
Philosophical discussion about the nature of this second element
of man has been in general agreement about the range of powers to be
attributed to it. Certainly there have been differences, as some
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point of view brought forward one or another particular aspect; but
these have been mainly differences of emphasis. There seems little
truth, for instance, in the recent suggestion by Anthony Kenny that
the map of mind and matter was completely redrawn at what is generally
regarded as the beginning of modern philosophy. Kenny tells us that
Descartes set the boundary of mind between 'consciousness and clock¬
work', while for Aquinas it had been set between 'intellect and
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sense'o The evidence he provides, however, is only that they
differed over what was to be regarded as essential to the soul. Aquinas
did believe that there could be no sensation in the soul when it was
detached from the body, and Descartes, attributing to the soul what he
could not doubt belonged to himself, did naturally include in the first
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rank not only thoughts but sensations as well. If one is concerned,
however, as it seems one should be, with functions of the mind, or
soul, in living men, then, for Aquinas as for Descartes, they do include
sensations. "The soul in man is one in number", he says, "at once
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sensory, intellectual and nutritive".
The contrasting emphases displayed by Aquinas and Descartes
do correspond, however, to a general division between approaches to the
problem of this second being of man. Sometimes it is his distinctive
powers that take foremost position and sometimes the lived through
1 'Cartesian Privacy', pp. 352-3.
2 Since they rest on two quite different notions of essentiality,
these two positions are quite compatible. Thus it could still
be true for Descartes that he could only be in pain if he had
a body, even if his knowledge that he was in pain was prior to
his knowledge that he had a body.
3 'Summa Theologicae', 1a, 75-83, p»63« This does, of course, point
to a difference, but that consists in Descartes' exclusion of
'nutrition' rather than his inclusion of the sensory.
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experience of himself. Which it is depends largely on the point of
view adopted, whether that of an external observer or that of the
self-expounder. The two approaches need to be combined, though,
for the intended distinction between the two modes of being can be
realised in its full complexity only when it is recognized that the
mental life, that which the individual takes himself to live through,
is mainly characterized in terms of its objective context and results.
What the first-person approach discovers is highly dependent on the
teachings of the observational approach.
The choice of the word 'mind' to stand for the second element
of being is inevitable in the present context of philosophical
discussion. It should be recognized, however, that it does carry
connotations that would naturally push one towards certain inter¬
pretations of what it is used to stand for. These tendencies must
be resisted, for I am not interested in what is, as it happens, meant
by the word 'mind' but in the puzzling combination of features of
man for which it is the most convenient word at hand. Whatever
specific interpretations the word may bring with it must therefore
be set aside, if the whole problem is to be approached from an unbiased
position.
It must first be recognized, therefore, that the word 'mind' is
distinctly intellectual in its sympathies. It is most at home in
those accounts that place great weight on man's rationality. It
also gives encouragement to those who look to language to provide a
criterion for the presence of the second element. Despite these
biases drawn from its common use, it has not, however, been taken in
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philosophical discussion to exclude sensation. None the less, the
question, 'Have other animals minds?', has been likely to receive a
negative answer on the grounds that animals axe incapable of rational
thought and lack the use of language. At the same time it was, to
say the very least, doubtful that they lacked sensation. It appears,
therefore, that following the sense of the word 'mind' too closely
may lead one into contradictions in the main investigation. If 'mind*
is intended to mark a crucial division of reality, then sensation
cannot fall on one side of the divide in man and on the other in animals.
Even if the undertaking is described in less high-flown terms, attention
to niceties of meaning in relation to 'mind' would still seem to
divert one from giving an orderly comprehensive account of man and
the other animals.
I wish to leave open the question of "where the boundaries should
be drawn, whether between the intellectual and the sensory, between
the linguistic and the non-linguistic, between man and all other animals,
or along entirely different lines. There is, too, another dimension
in which we must be on our guard against having our options decided for
us by the word 'mind'. Other words which have filled the same role,
such as 'soul', suggest that they actually stand for the self or at
least the self in one of its aspects; but not so 'mind'. What it
suggests is rather that it stands for a part of our being somewhat
apart from the self, for we speak of 'my mind' as we do of 'my body'.
Ferhaps, though, this similarity of form is delusive. The latter
expression suggests that I, the soul, do possess the body as something
distinct; but the latter may suggest only that I, a combination of
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mind, and body, have the mind as a part of me. Whatever it may suggest,
however, this form of words clearly does not have the power to rule
out the identification of what 'mind' stands for, or indeed of what
'body' stands for, with the self or with some aspect of the self.
The tendency is there, though, and should be noted.
There are many other common idioms in which 'mind' makes a
puzzling appearance. Many of these were recently collected together
by Roger Squires as ammunition for an onslaught on the concept of
mind.'' One can 'give someone a piece of one's mind', or 'take a
load off someone's mind' or 'have an idea running through one's mind'.
Not all such expressions convey so blatantly materialistic an. impression
and they differ considerably in the degree to which they are obviously
metaphorical; but their general effect is to suggest that the mind
is an object lodged in the body in a way not comprehensibly different
from the heart or the brain. In the course of his entertaining
article, Squires argues that there is no place for minds conceived of
in this way as parts of persons. He therefore concludes that "minds
(and if the halo fits, souls) should be written off as an intellectual
2 3
loss", and dismisses mentalism as "the metaphysics of the Stone Age",
of which the common idioms he adduces are the detritus.
This particular assault is not perhaps to be taken very seriously
as an attack on mind rather than on a particular view of mind; but it
1 'On One's Kind'
2 Op. cit., p. 355«
3 Op. cit., p. 356.
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does bring vividly to notice the problem of treating mind as an
object. One can understand the temptation of treating this other
being of man on somewhat the same lines as his body; for objects
are what we are used to dealing with, what our perceptions inform
vis of and what our language is designed to facilitate talk of. To
succumb to this temptation, however, is surely to be profoundly
unimaginative. The distinction between mind and matter cuts deeper
than any distinction between flesh and bone and should place all
flesh and bone and their like on one side. It seems an evasion to
suggest that only material objects are then left behind rather than
the objective in its totality. We should move instead into another
dimension, take completely different conceptual bearings as some
thinkers have indeed done. Here one might again contrast Aquinas
and Descartes. The latter did conceive the mind rather as an object
in causal interaction with another object, the body; but Aquinas
thought in terms of what was in this context a more sophisticated
notion: the Aristotelian conception of the soul as the form of the
body.
One factor in the development of the concept of mind that must
not be ignored is the concurrent lack of understanding of the human
body. The growth of man's knowledge of the workings of his own body
and in particular of the brain and the nervous system is a recent
occurrence. We now understand sufficient of the incredible complexity
of the brain to believe it capable of materially causing all our
behaviour; and, giving further substance to this belief, we have
created objects that are capable of reproducing, and indeed surpassing,
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some of man's most treasured abilities. During most of the period
with which we are concerned, however, man was unable to recognize his
body's capacities. It was, therefore, plausible to introduce some
other non-material object which, because its workings need not be
visualized, could be thought to make up somehow for the supposed
incompetencies of the body.
Now, however, that we do have a juster appreciation of the
body's capacities, this must play a part in determining the way in
which we conceive of mind. One possible outcome that must be faced
is that, should there prove no need of mind to explain objective
human capacities, parsimony might demand a denial that there was
any such reality as mind. Many are indeed willing to take this
step; but, even if all the behavioural powers were physically
explicable, there would still be the manner in which a man lives
through his states and activities that would require explanation.
What is needed to meet that demand, however, is not another object
or another range of objective occurrences, but reality in an altogether
different guise. If the accumulating evidence points to the con¬
clusion that the body is objectively competent, mind, if it is to
hope for a role at all, must mesh into the corporeal being of man
after some more sophisticated model than cog into cog.
What I wish to argue, therefore, is that mind is non-objective,
but none the less real. It has to be recognized, however, that this
thesis is not clear enough in itself to provide a goal in relation to
which all discussion can be organized. There are direct arguments
that can be presented in its favour; but we need also an intermediary
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claim, the establishment of which could fill out the meaning of the
other. What this claim might be should be quite apparent if we
reflect that what we are arguing about has not only been a subject of
philosophical discussion for centuries but appears informally from
day to day in the speech of millions. The language in which men
speak of their thoughts, their experiences and their emotions is the
language of mind; and, in proposing that mind is non-objective, I
do not believe that I am proposing a revolution in this on-going
scheme. That I am at variance with most philosophers is true, but
it is part of my complaint against them that they have misinterpreted
the common function of this mental language. Thus, the intermediary
claim that it is proper for me to make contends that the language
of mind is non-objective: that is, that the logical form of this
language and the way it functions are not those of the descriptive
language proper to speech about objects. This contention clearly
supports the claim that mind is non-objective - the first part of
my original thesis; but the conclusion of that thesis, that mind is
none the less real, would also benefit from a similar linguistic
intermediary. This must be the claim that the language of mind,
despite its non-objective, non-descriptive character, has none the
less genuine ontological force.
II
The contention that mental language is net descriptive has been
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with us for some time. An early pointer was provided by G.A. Paul's
•Is there a Problem about Sense Data?'. There he argued that the
language of sense data did not provide a fresh range of objective
descriptions but only another form of words for talking about how
1
things seem to us. In so far, however, as Paul can be seen as
undermining only a deviant philosophical jargon, his argument cannot
be taken as showing that genuine mental language is not descriptive -
and might even gain force from the assumption that it is. A much
more genuine example is provided by Austin's analysis of 'know',
where he suggested that the purpose of the expression 'I know' is
not to describe myself as being in some sort of objective mental
condition but to give an assurance of my credentials for making a
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statement. Another aspect of mental language then received much
the same treatment when H.L.A. Hart considered the ascription of
actions to persons. Against the traditional view that saying someone
did something involves the descriptive assertion that some mental
event occurred in addition to the physical movement, he argued that
the additional function was not descriptive. In his view, this
function was the social one of ascribing responsibility to the person
3
for the physical movement and its results.
Though Austin's context gives his argument wider application
than Hart's, both these accounts are of comparatively limited scope.
1 Ibid., Flew (il), pp. 103-108.
2 'Other Minds', Flew pp. 123-47.
3 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights', Flew (l), pp.
160-167.
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For a general theory of the non-descriptive character of mental
language we can turn to Ryle. In 'The Concept of Mind' he attacked
the conception of mind on the analogy of the body, arguing that to
bring mind under a common framework of concepts such as 'thing', 'stuff1,
'attribute', 'state', 'process', 'change', 'cause' and 'effect1'' was
to commit a "category mistake". By a category mistake he meant the
misuse of expressions in such a way as to misrepresent their relations
and the ways in which assertions containing them were to be validated.
In this case his target was the misuse of mental terms involving
logically improper "operations with the concepts of mental powers
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and processes". Revealing this misuse, he thought, would dissipate
"the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter", and not "by either
of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter
by Mind" but by showing that the two areas of discourse could not be
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merged. He therefore provided extensive illustrations of the use
of mental language which he took to show both that mental language is
functionally quite distinct and also that, however separate its role,
it does relate to events drawn from the same sum total as those
mentioned in an objective description of human behaviour. He
therefore reaches the more substantive claim that "(a person's) life
is not a double series of events talcing place in two kinds of stuff;
1 Ibid., p. 19»
2 Op. cit., p. 8. Note the appearance of 'process' as both a
favoured and, above, a forbidden concept. This is indicative
of the linguistic difficulties of presenting the distinction, but
Ryle would argue that 'process' had different meanings in the two
contexts: Op. cit., p. 22.
3 Op. cit., p. 22.
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it is one concatenation of events, the differences between some and
other classes of which largely consist in the applicability or
inapplicability to them of logically different types of law-propositions
and law-like propositions".'' Mental language is seen here, therefore,
as providing law-like propositions that classify some cf the common
store of events in their own peculiar non-descriptive way.
Mental language as portrayed by Ryle is obviously full of life,
but the denial of descriptive force does make its rationale seem
somewhat problematic. Theories such as those of Austin and Hart
give an effect of devaluing their subject matter. Just as ethical
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theories that stress approval rather than what is approved, seem to
undermine the activity they discuss, so theories which stress the
social function of mental language seem to remove its foundation.
¥ords are, of course, used to convey assurance and to ascribe respon¬
sibility, but their grounds for doing this seem largely destroyed
if it is denied that they also ascribe conditions justifying the
assurance or sustaining the responsibility. Ryle's account is more
complex and less forthright, but it may none the less give rise to
the same doubts.
The negative side of Ryle's programme is reasonably clear, but
it is not nearly so evident what positive account of the merfal he was
offering. Having exorcised what he called "the Ghost in the
1 Op. cit., p. 16?«
2 J. ¥. Cornman, who brings together all these examples of 'use
analysis' of mental language, adduces Novell-Smith, 'Ethics':
•Metaphysics, Reference and Language', pp. 227-39*
Machine",' it may well seem that he was left with only the machine.
He has therefore been accused of behaviourism, but while this does
undoubtedly contribute one thread to his thought - Warnock called it
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"the Ghost in 'The Concept of Mind'" - his more general insistence
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on the autonomy of mental language, as well as his explicit denials ,
shows that this is not his real doctrine. Assertions in mental terms
are not, on his account, translatable into objective descriptions of
physical behaviour. This does not bestow any autonomy on mind, as
against mental language, however, for he does not provide the assertions
with any alternative ontological role. The law-like propositions
that they express are, he says, "inference tickets" which licence one
to move "from asserting factual statements to asserting other factual
statements"^. Therefore, while he does insist on talking of persons
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rather than of bodies , it is hard to see how persons are anything but
bodies treated in a rather ornate fashion. One is not saved from the
prejudice that what exists is describable and that description is the
linguistic mode of approach to reality. The different linguistic
manoeuvres that are carried out in mental language are on this view,
therefore, irrelevant to ontology. The single range of events upon which
mental terminology imposes its idiosyncratic classifications are then
1 Op. cit., pp. 15-6.
2 'English Philosophy since 1900', p. 101.
3 Op. cit., pp. 327-30.
4 Op. cit., p. 121.
5 Op. cit., pp. 76-82, 189-90.
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really defined by objective description.
In his discussion of this approach to the problem of mind,
Cornman suggests that writers such as Ryle need to establish the
premise that "sentences logically unlike indicative sentences of the
form 1 x is blue' in respects A, B, C, . . . are not descriptive"."'
This demand can be interpreted as going beyond the need to draw
distinctions between the logical forms of descriptive and mental
language. Such distinctions, by themselves, will lead only to the
isolation of mental language at the likely cost, as we have seen, of
its ontological force. This would run counter to our natural
intuitions and is to be avoided if possible. We are free, however,
to interpret Cornman's request as requiring a circumstantial
explanation of description which will set it and its logical form
in the context from which it naturally arises. Given this account,
the way would be open to giving a similar account of mental language
showing the different context from which it gains both its logical
form and its distinctive natural force.
Ill
I do not wish to argue only that the language of mind is non-
descriptive. My second aim is to show that, even so, it still possesses
1 'Metaphysics, Reference and Language', p. 249*
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ontological value. I shall not, therefore, rely on the logical
structures of objective description and of mental language to establish
the distinction. I shall also attempt to place description in the
context of general human abilities, relating it in particular to
perception: for it is through this connection that the ontological
force of description can be explained and evaluated. I shall then
show that mental language plays an entirely different role. This
role is not related in the same way to perception as description is,
but this does not depr5ve it of all power to represent reality. We
are not in this world only as perceivers.
To argue that mental language functions in a mode other than
objective description is fraught with difficulties, particularly if
the argument must not forfeit the language's claims to ontological
relevance. One troublesome difficulty, though not, I hope, a serious
one, is the strong attachment of the available vocabulary to the
objective. I have already mentioned the tendencjr for 'mind' to
gather objective connotations to itself; but there is a parallel
tendency with the expressions that we use to speak of mental events.
This difficulty may sometimes make my theory hard to formulate, but
I can take comfort from the thought that I am not likely to be led
astray by the superficial features of words since in many cases I
must work against them.
In order to show that mental language functions in a mode distinct
from that of objective language, I must first establish that objective
description does itself constitute a distinct mode of language. I
can best explain what I mean by 'description' by saying that description
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is what is understood to be carried out with a subject-predicate
sentence according to a conventional analysis of such sentences; that
is, with the subject term something is picked out and with the predicate
something is said about it.
It would generally be held that this procedure can range
indifferently over a wide variety of things, that the notions of
'picking out' and 'saying something about' are not tied to any part¬
icular subject-matter. For instance, we can seemingly pick out
numbers as well as material objects. This might lead to an objection
against the use of the word 'description' for, even if we can say
something about the numbers picked out just as we can say something
about material objects, it is not natural to say that we describe
numbers. It is my contention, however, that these notions of 'picking
out' and 'saying something about' belong essentially with material
objects. The use of subject-predicate sentences to talk about numbers,
or about any other sort of non-objective "thing", is derivative.
shall later have more to say about the way in which language
develops as an adjunct of objective perception. Here I want only to
insist that the language so developed, with its general syntactic
structure, is the core language that is adapted for all purposes. In
particular, the subject-predicate sentence form permits the positing
of artificial subjects, for instance propositions, and it contributes
to the construction of logical systems, such as that of number. In
either case the language form takes on a life of its own, and one day
might even say, to bring out the contrast, that these new subject matters
are of its own creation in comparison with the material situation it
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was itself created to cope with. In these extended uses, nothing
exists for the subject expression to pick out in the way that a
material object exists to be picked out: and, given this lack, nothing
can be said about anything in the way in which a predicate says
something about a material object, because there is nothing suitable
to have anything said about it.
This suggests that there must be various forms of truth. The
truth of an arithmetical equation such as '2 + 2 = 4' is of another
kind than the truth of a descriptive statement such as 'the flower
is red'; and that again is different from the representational truth
of a picture. I wish to contend that it is also different from
the truth of a mental report such as 'I am in pain'. Of course,
'true' is expressing the same sort of commendation in each case but
the differences are as important as the similarity.
IV
I am conscious that what I have said here runs contrary to a
strong trend in recent discussion. This trend supports the opinion
that the same forms of expression have the same existential force
whatever contexts they occur in. The most famous doctrine of this
sort is Quine's 'To be is to be the value of a (bound) variable'.^
1 'On What There Is', Landesman, p. 225.
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As Quine makes clear, such a formula is not intended to provide
a rule by which we can choose a language or decide what really exists.
It comes into operation only when the language has been choseno It
does then claim to tell us what ontological commitments we accept by
using certain expressions within that language.
A ruling such as Quine's can also forbid us to say certain things.
Thus Alonzo Church chided Ayer for inconsistency in asserting that,
while it makes sense to say that there is something that someone
believes, this does not imply that there exists something to be believed.
If this were merely a call for philosophical clarity, Ayer could res¬
pond by placing 'there is something that someone believes' in quotes
as an accepted expression in common language, to be kept at the door¬
step of his philosophy because ontologically misleading. The real
force of the doctrine, however, is that we should not be permitted to
say both that there are numbers, etc., and that they do not exist as
material objects do. And it is certainly not the intention of its
proponents to let us get away with the obvious move of refusing to
use such expressions as 'there is' anywhere but in the common material
object language; nor should we accept the inconvenience.
The full implications of this approach are probably most clearly
displayed in Carnap's article, 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'.
There the everyday language in which we talk about things is presented
2
as just one among many that we may choose to accept. Its one
1 'Ontological Commitment', p.1010.
2 Ibid., Landesman, pp. 229-31 <>
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distinction, according to Carnap, is that it is a language that
we have in fact accepted at a very early age. He realises that
this acceptance does not have an appearance of free choice, and he
tries to bring the language into line with others by suggesting that
we can at least freely reject it. Here, however, we realise that just as
its acceptance went with the acceptance of "the spatio-temporally
1
ordered system of observable things and events", so must its rejection
be more than a linguistic matter. We surely accept the system mainly
by behaving appropriately to our circumstances as defined by it.
Similarly a rejection of it will mainly be shown by a cessation of
such appropriate behaviour. It cannot be a matter, as Carnap imagines,
of merely turning to another language or falling silent. It is
doubtful whether a genuine rejection of the system could be carried
through; and if it could the experimenter would scarcely survive for
2
long.
This provides a somewhat pragmatic answer to Quine's claim that
"the distinction between there being one sense of 'there are' for concrete
objects and another for abstract ones, and there being just one sense
3
of 'there are' for both, makes no sense". Our ontological commitment
1 Op. cit., Landesman, p. 229o
2 The justice of this is apparent if we consider that a man's own
existence as an object is what primarily commits him to the
existence of objects.
3 'Word and Object', p. 242. Quine seems to have overreached him¬
self here by attempting too great subtlety; for what becomes of
his insistence that there is equal ontological commitment if a claim
that the meaning is the same makes no sense?
21
is lived, as well as displayed in the use of certain linguistic forms.
There seems sense enough in the suggestion that theso linguistic forms,
such as 'there is', gain their ontological reputation through their
use in the object language. That they are found useful in other
contexts need not mean that they carry the same ontological commitment
into those contexts.
V
Language begins, for each individual, as a part of his response
to the material environment. It plays a role, though a fairly late
one, in his objectification of the world, the creation of a coherent
and comprehensible system in which he (or his body) is distinguished
as one object among many. But language cannot, of course, be regarded
simply as something that the individual masters. It is a system of
communication, and teaching a child to speak plays an important part
in bringing him up as a member of society. But this social dimension
does not detach the origins of language from objects. Within the
general facilitation of social intercourse the naming of objects is
a dominant feature, for this lays the foundation for his sharing the
common understanding of reality through the social symbolic scheme.
And that, surely, must have been the sort of pay-off through which
the phylogenetic development of language prospered.
The question which we have to ask is 'whether the special
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connection between language and. material objects is merely contingent:
whether it merely so happens that language is first applied to material
objects, employing standard functions by means of which it is equally
applicable to many other types of referent? The alternative is that
the material object language, and to a certain extent all language,
gains its character from the material object context in which it was
formed. In the case of this latter alternative, what would be
carried over into other contexts would be the general practice of the
use of social signs together, probably, with some of the sign
structures developed in the original context. What would not be
assured would be that language would maintain its original functions.
New contexts and new uses would be expected to produce new functions,
even if these were carried out with the same tools as had been developed
to deal with the material situation.
In this case, which I think to be the more plausible, it could
well be that our basic intuitions of what language is and of how language
functions would be formed in relation to its use in the objective
context. Given such intuitions it would be easy to suppose that they
applied to language in a wide variety of its uses, because the
occurrence of the same linguistic forms would provide a reassuring
suggestion of uniformity. Thus the subject-predicate sentence is no
doubt quite as evident in talk of minds as it is in talk of bodies,
and this may encourage the supposition that the one case conforms to
the other. If, however, the basic intuitive analysis of the function
of a subject-predicate sentence is derived from the particular character
of its material object use, the same analysis may be inappropriate to
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this new context.
In recent philosophy, the suggestion that there is a special
tie between language and material objects naturally brings to mind
the work of Professor Strawson and, in particular, his book
'Individuals'. There he contended both that particulars were the
paradigm logical subjects and that material bodies (along with persons)
were the primary particulars.
Strawson's discussion tends to pitch its claims rather higher
than is necessary for my purpose, both in relation to the necessity
of something like material objects to experience and language and in
relation to necessary conditions for successful communication. I
should therefore regard much of what he says as compatible with what
I wish to put forward here; but I should not expect my ovm suggestions
to be refuted if his claims were shown to be too extreme. I am
concerned only with the language we have and the use we make of it,
and to a large extent I am concerned with paradigm cases of that use.
Thus we may manage to communicate about particular objects by using
the predicate, and not the particular-indicating subject expression,
1
to carry our common understanding; for example, the question 'Who
is coming?' may have for answer, 'James, whom you do not know, is
coming'. This, however, is a sophisticated complication that should
not undermine our intuition that it is the purpose of the subject
expression to direct the hearer's attention to what one is talking
about. This is indeed a trivial example of the sort of case that I
1 Strawson would seemingly have denied this at the time when he
wrote 'Individuals'- (see, for example, p. 181), though his article
'Identifying Reference and Truth Values' indicates that he would
now accept it.
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mentioned above, where a linguistic form can be used in a deviant
functional mannero Such deviations can only arise in an already
well established language that has been built up on the basis of
regular functions for specific forms.
VI
At this point I want to concentrate on one part of Strawson's
discussion in 1 Individuals': the part where he asks what conditions
"must be satisfied in order for it to be the case that an
identifying reference to a particular is made by a speaker and
correctly understood by a hearer".^ The first condition is that
there is just one particular to which the speaker refers. For this
purpose, Strawson says, "it is not enough that there should be at
2
least one particular which his description fits. There must be
at most one such particular which he has in mind. But he cannot,
for himself, distinguish the particular that he has in mind by the
fact that it is the one that he has in mind. So there must be some
description he could give, though it need not be the one that he
does give, which applies uniquely to the one he has in mind and does
1 Ibid., p. 181o
2 Strawson uses 'description' here to refer to phrases such as are
classified as definite and indefinite descriptions. In the
following pages I shall also use the word in this sense rather
than in the wider sense introduced aboveo
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not include the phrase, 'the one I have in mind'." The same
condition must be satisfied by the hearer so that he also has just
one particular in mind. This particular must be the same one as
the speaker has in mind, but the description by which the hearer can
specify it need not be the same one as that by which the speaker can.
My interest in this argument is not in whether it does in fact
express a necessary condition for referential identification. Ident¬
ifying reference is itself a paradigm case, not to be equated, as
2
Strawson equates it, with the introduction of particulars into pro¬
positions. Apart from the case already mentioned where the predicate
bears the common understanding, one could point to the use of indefinite
descriptions which do introduce particulars, but do not in general
achieve identifying reference; for example, 'A man came in' does
introduce a particular man who can henceforth be referred to as 'the
man who came in', but only rarely would produce the response 'Oh, I
know who you mean.' If identifying reference is a paradigm, there
can be no harm in treating it in paradigmatic fashion. It may be
that there are instances where speaker or hearer cannot provide a
suitable description but which would be established as instances by
3
our providing a description o None the less the standard case, which
1 Op. cit., p. 182.
2 Op. cito, p. 181.
3 We clearly have to, in any case, for those instances where the
speaker's and hearer's different descriptions have to be shown to
specify the same particular. Many counter-examples have been
presented by Keith Donellan in 'Proper Names and Identifying
Descriptions', though the force of many of these may have been
undermined by Steven Boer in 'Reference and Identifying Descriptions'.
/cont'd
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must cover very nearly every conceivable instance, even if a few
escape, does involve both speaker and hearer being able, in some not
too stringent sense, to provi.de descriptive specifications of the
particular.
We generally manage to communicate about particulars, then,
because particulars are represented in our minds by definite and
indefinite descriptions. It is, of course, the definite descriptions
that secure specific reference; but it may be somewhat misleading
to concentrate entirely on those. hot only will indefinite
descriptions serve as elements in complex definite descriptions as
need arises, but many an indefinite description will graduate as a
definite description as circumstances change, and not only because
it comes in time to specify a particular uniquely but because of its
sufficiency in a particular context. What concentrated attention
on a few definite descriptions was the desire to specify the necessary
conditions for satisfactory communication. With such a purpose
one turns to those cases where communication only just takes place,
where the connection with the particular is as tenuous as it can be.
But quite as interesting from a general point of view are those cases
where the particular concerned is very familiar to both speaker and
hearer. In such a case there may be a great wealth of descriptions
3 /cont'd
I think, however, that one of the examples, at least, survives as
an objection. This is the case of a child who, remembering
nothing else, says 'Tom is a nice man' after a night's sleep during
which he was woken to be introduced to someone named Tom. I am
at least unconvinced by Boer's objection (Op. cit., p. 215) that
the child fails to refer.
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contained in the understanding that both have of the particular
Even if the speaker refers to it by a proper name that is in itself
totally uninformative, he will yet raise in the hearer's mind many
true descriptions.) Such a particular is over-specified, and there
is no point in asking by which description it was singLed out.
Between this extreme and the other of just-successful reference
lie many degrees of understanding and familiarity which permit
communication about particulars. Subject terms have, as Strawson
suggests, a completeness in themselves. H owever bare themselves
of descriptive value, they can stand for a whole cluster of descriptions.
Before ever a predicate is attached to them, they can evoke a little
world of information. Strawson, who adopts the expression from Erege,
explains 'completeness', however, in terms of facts rather than of
descriptions. Although subject terms do not explicitly state facts,
he says, "they perform their role only because they present or
represent facts, only because they presuppose, or embody, or covertly
carry, propositions which they do not explicitly affirm".^ With
nearly all these expressions of the relation between subject expressions
and facts I can agree. I still think it worth while, however, to
suggest that their completeness is first a matter of descriptions
rather than one of facts; and I do still mean by 'descriptions' here,
definite or indefinite description phrases rather than whole descriptive
statements.
1 'Individuals', p. 187
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Let me explain by means of one of Strawson's examples® He
suggests that a group of speakers can only converse about Socrates
if there is just one person, Socrates, of whom a reasonable proportion
of the propositions they connect with the name are true®'' He
proposes to get at these propositions by the artificial procedure
of getting them to write down what they consider salient facts about
Socrates. In what sense, however, would these facts be present,
backing up people's meaning end understanding in a discussion about
Socrates? To speak or think of Socrates can be, for example, to
speak or think of the teacher of Plato. This can be spelled out as
a fact: 'Socrates was the teacher of Plato'; but surely it need
not be so spelled out. 'The teacher of Plato' can be substituted
for, or amalgamated with, 'Socrates', rather than being attached to
it by a verbal tie. When one does think a fact about Socrates, few
or many descriptions will crowd into the subject term. Thus 'Socrates
drank poison' might have the functional value of 'Socrates, an ancient
Greek philosopher, (and) the teacher of Plato, drank poison'. It
would be implausible to suggest that this was really to have several
propositions (three, or more?) in one's mind at the same time.
This discussion might here be illuminated by what Strawson calls
a pair of platitudes, his Principles of the Presumption of Ignorance
2
and of the Presumption of Knowledge. These express the necessary
conditions for the main type of useful communication: that the
1 Op. cit., p. 191.
2 'Identifying Reference and Truth Values', Strawson p. 76.
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audience should on the one hand be in need of information and yet on
the other understand enough to know what the speaker is referring to®
This understanding can be represented in a simplifying fashion as an
ability to replace, or rather supplement, the speaker's referential
subject term with synonyms or other expressions that denote the same
object® The ignorance of the audience demands, however, that further
information should be added to the conglomerate of their interpretations
of the speaker's subject term. It is here that the predicate comes
into its own in spelling out a fact, something that is not known to
them. The completeness of the subject expression is in contrast a
matter of the non-propositional aggregation of descriptions.
In a sense, this is not a criticism of Strawson; for it is true
that subject terms do, indirectly, contain facts. The descriptions
I have been talking about clearly are assimilated facts. What needs
to be told to us today is known by us tomorrow, amalgamated in our
understanding of the particular, and just as descriptions are condensed
factual propositions, so they can be reconstituted as propositions,
particularly for the purpose of passing on the information to others.
I think, however, that my insistence on descriptions, rather than
factual propositions, as what the completeness of subject expressions
directly comprehends, is most important to the understanding of the
basic type of subject-predicate statement, of description in the wider
sense, to which I now revert.
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VII
The discussion of subject expressions in the last Section has
proceeded without overt mention of material objects as what they
primarily indicate, but not without an informal assumption that the
account had to fit our talk about material objects before it fitted
anything else. The time has now come to justify the claim that
description, the conventional use of subject-predicate statements,
is indeed fundamentally associated with material objects. I
suggested above that this would be an affinity derived from the
origin of language. We have therefore to consider the natural
setting in which this language functions. The link between language
and material object is of course perception; it is only through
perceiving objects that we can describe them.^ We should therefore
ask whether subject-predicate statements show, in their essentials,
any signs of an origin in association with perception. In
particular I shall be interested in whether the subject expression's
double relation with descriptive phrases, functional incorporation
and attachment by a verbal tie, can be paralleled in perception.
It used to be thought that perception was achieved through a
1 I do not mean by this, as one sense of 'description' would suggest,
that we can only thus give an account of their appearances, but
that it is only thus that we can talk about them at all.. It
is true that we can, as sophisticated language users, describe
objects that we have never perceived, but that does depend on
the perception of those objects, or at least of some objects, by
others. The paradigm case of material object perception, without
which all other -would be impossible, rests on our own
perceptions.
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process of inference from the basic information provided, by our
senses. We were supposed, by studying colour patches, to infer
that there was, for example, a bus before us. This view of per¬
ception is now in full retreat both in philosophy and in psychology.
It is recognized that what emerges into consciousness is highly
conceptualized. The simple information of colour distribution,
as on a plane projection, is not readily available, as amateur
artists are only too well aware. The sense of sight does not
function like a camera nor the sense of hearing like a tape-recorder.
One is functionally aware not of sensations or phenomenological
objects but of material objects; and this, in essentials, is a mode
of awareness that dates approximately from the time when one could
begin learning to speak.
In perceiving material objects one generally recognizes them
immediately, though in many cases only under a vague general desc¬
ription: as a flower, for instance. This limited recognition once
achieved, one can go on to attend to specific features of the object:
'It has long stamens' or 'Its petals are lemon yellow in colour'.
The interesting feature that I want to stress here is that these
developments on the original recognition of a flower may either add to
the information explicitly or implicitly contained in the immediate
perception, or unpack the information that was only implicit. In
order to express the character of the immediate perception, we might
say perhaps that it was of a flower as something attached to a plant,
of distinctive colour from the leaves, and of an acceptably flower¬
like shape; but we would say this not to specify the actual concepts
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involved but to express its minimal character. Both the stamens
and the specific colour were not mentioned, but there is a difference
between these two caseso The stamens were probably not perceived
at all; they may have been out of sight. Therefore the information
that they were long would be obtained entirely by further perceptual
probing. The colour of the petals, however, is quite another matter.
There was probably no need for any further inspection; we could have
shut our eyes immediately and still have said 'lemon yellow'. This
is not to say though that the colour was, after all, explicit in the
original perception. Vie did not take notice of the colour; so,
having shut our eyes, we should have thought for the first time what
the colour was.
We did not perceive this flower as a flower through noticing
the stamens or the specific colotir. This was seemingly a case of a
type of flower that was comparatively unfamiliar to us; but suppose
it was a type with which we were very familiar and of which we knew
the name. Then it would seem necessary, for us to be able to give
it its name, that we should notice the colour and shape that
distinguish it from flowers with other names. But, apparently, this
is not so; we should have perceived it directly, under its name, as
a recognitional unity. Shutting our eyes we would no doubt be able
to say what colour it was, though we might find ourselves drawing on
our knowledge of that type of flower aswell as on the immediately
preceding perception; but it is doubtful whether we would give a
satisfactory account of its shape. Again we have a possible
distinction between what was implicit in the perception and what was
not present in it at all.
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The features that are implicitly contained by a perception will
include not only features that would seem immediately apparent to
the senses but also features that are already understood to belong to
the object, or type of object, recognized. That is, the functional
value of the perception will not be drawn entirely from the immediate
sensory information; it will also be drawn from the store of
information connected with the verbal expression for what is perceived.
The features, on the other hand, that will be added through further
perceptual attention will typically include special features of this
specimen or attributes of a familiar object special to the occasion,
features that are not included in our understanding of the particular
or of the type of object. Suppose, for instance, that we see a man
whom we know. We do not notice then or later the features of Ms
face, though it is, in a sense, by those that we recognize him, and
we do not notice that he is old, or that he is intelligent, a bachelor,
or our creditor, though all are implicitly comprehended in our per¬
ception; but we may notice, separately from our perception of who is
there, what clothes he is wearing and what he is doing, if this inform¬
ation is particular to the occasion and not contained in the recognitional
schema.
VIII
I hope that a clear parallel is now emerging between the subject-
predicate statement as I analysed it and the perceptual setting in which
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I suggested it had its original and determining role® The immediate
perception is explicitly simple like the subject expression; but it
incorporates, again like the subject expression, a functional complexity®
As the subject expression can contain many descriptions, so the
perception can contain many implicit cognitions, derived both from
the senses and from the understanding® On the other hand, we can
notice further aspects of the object that is perceived, just as we
can attach a predicate to the subject expression that adds to someone's
understanding of what is referred to. This completes the analogy,
so that the movement of attention from the comprehended object to the
specific quality or detail corresponds to the movement in the proposition
from subject to predicate® Undoubtedly, however, the really striking
similarity is that between the subject expression and the immediate
perceptual recognition of an object. The value of our perceptions
lies in the wealth of information that they embodv, available but not
often fully activated. Similarly the value of the subject expression
rests on the descriptions it contains, for though we rarely make them
all explicit, it is upon them that the appropriateness and meaningfulness
of the expression depends® Further, the meaning of our perceptions
does of course depend on constant up-dating by attention to fresh
information, and the completeness of the subject expression would be
barren without its capacity to condense fresh factual propositions
and expand into others at need.
It might be objected to this analogy between description and
perception that I am merely comparing one thing with its reflection®
This objection might take two forms. In the first it would suggest
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that perception has the character that it does, in adult human beings,
only because it is thoroughly dependent on languageo In the other it
would suggest that perception only appears to have this character:
we can only think abou.t perception in terms of its linguistic results,
our- descriptions of what we perceive, and therefore the real nature
of perception, whatever that may be, is hidden from us under the
linguistic structure.
With the first form of this objection I can sympathize, for I
readily accept what I take to be its main premise: that adult human
perception is thoroughly permeated with language, functioning for it
and through it in a seemingly perfect symbiosis. Whereas, though,
the objection would present this as evidence that language provides
the essential structure for such perception, I see it as revealing
language as a natural growth out of perception, as an offspring that
carries the system that begets it to a far higher level of achievement
but only by developing in sympathy with it in the same fundamental
structure. To decide between these two interpretations seems a
developmental question; but it would be too facile to say that
language must develop out of perception because awareness precedes
talking. I have to face the argument that while perception may in
some form or other be prior to language, it is only in conjunction
with language, and perhaps derivatively from language, that it gains
the structure that supports its resemblance to description, the
resemblance on which I have laid such weight. Evidence is needed
that perception has the required structure independently of language;
and such evidence will of course also dispose of the second form of
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the objection with which I am much less in sympathy, denying as it
does the common ground I see between myself and the objection in its
first form.
It might be suggested that perception, before it is conjoined
with language, can only be a matter of constant reactions to repeated
patterns of stimuli, and that it must therefore be an awareness of
universals rather than of particulars: but this would be to
underestimate the abilities that a child possesses before he learns
any words, and indeed the abilities of animals that never learn any
words. A child will at first put words to his own purposes, using
•mama' for instance to indicate that he wants something, no matter
from whomo In this deviant use the word clearly replaces a demanding
cry; but conventional uses of words may also build on the child's
capacities rather than depend on the development of entirely new
abilities. The space through which a baby crawls will at first have
been structured for him entirely by his immediate interests; but, by
the time that he learns to speak, some objects, notably people, will
be understood to be independent particulars with a continuous
existence from one perception of them to another. For instance, a
child will clearly recognize his mother, behaving differently towards
her than to any other object and showing particular signs of expectation
of her reappearance. His idea of his mother is of just the sort to
support the use of a name such as would potentially serve as the
subject of a sentence; but it is not surprising that this idea takes
some time to become attached to a noise. So little is this early
development of understanding dependent on language, indeed, that by
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that time the child's interest may have passed on to other tasks.
The word 'mama' may thus seem a convenient tool for noting similarities
and get applied to any woman whatsoever. This is not because the
child cannot distinguish his mother, or even other individual women,
hut because he has his own use for a word: a use which happens to
be closer to that for 'woman' than to that for the word which people
have tried to teach him.
In the case of animals, what will come to mind is not their
ability to distinguish particulars over an extended length of time -
one might surmise that if animals talked they would speak only in the
present tense -, but their very much more developed ability to deal
■with three-dimensional objects in continuous circumstances. Their
capacity to deal with other animals, for instance, as they move
through space, shows up clearly as an ability to recognize particulars
of various types and to notice present features of those particulars,
notably what they are doing. There is no plausibility in the
suggestion that this recognition might be only of universals for it
is not altogether dependent on perceptual continuity, even if one
does not claim for them long-term reidentification. To suggest that
a cat, for instance, shows no belief in the continued existence of
the mouse that it is chasing, when the mouse runs under something that
hides it from view, is surely absurd. The cat's senses supply it
with integrated information that represents a mouse which is to be
held in attention while it is apparent and, if it disappears, to be
searched for and to be expected to reappear. The cat has no more
need than we do to spend its time extrapolating from more basic
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information in order to track the mouse as a continuous existent.
I have written the last two paragraphs with one eye to Strawson's
contention that, in the last analysis, all particulars rest on, or
1
unfold into, facts. The type of facts that Strawson has in mind
are such that their statement involves the demonstrative placing of
■universal features. He suggests, for instance, that thoughts of
cats are based on facts about cat-features. Cat-features are
remarkably like cats, for the concept of a cat-feature involves "the
idea of a characteristic shape, of a characteristic pattern for the
2
occupation of space". What does distinguish this concept from the
concept of a cat is that it provides no distinction, among cases of
'more cat', between cases of 'same cat again' and 'anothercat'.
As I have pointed out, however, this condition takes us back beneath
the surface of pre-linguistic capacities. We do not have to proceed
to thoughts of cats by way of thoughts of cat-features because our
senses already provide us with recognition of the 'same', and of the
'similar though distinct'.
Strawson would protest that he was not concerned with charting
any actual development but with giving a coherent and intelligible
3
explanation of our conceptual schemeo Our conceptual scheme is not,
though, a dead thing to be provided with foundations, but a living
1 'Individuals', p. 211.
2 Op. cit., p. 207.
5 Op. cit., p. 209<
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thing with its own roots. It is no doubt tempting to put forward
some class of statements as conceptually more basic, on the grounds
that they make more limited claims; but the likely result is
distortion of the actual structure of experience and language.
The sense datum theory is the exemplar of this type of limited
claim theory that provides a quite unnecessary and misleading
conceptual foundation for our everyday statements. It is to
be feared that this part of Strawson's theory approaches this model.
I do not doubt that in giving an account of our perception of
objects, and hence in giving a full account of our ability to refer
to objects, universals will have an important role: but these
universale will be patterns of sensory stimulation and such-like:
not basic constituents of our conceptual scheme. To transfer
them from scientific explanation to conceptual analysis can only
distort the relation of language to reality.
IX
The purpose of my excursion into genetic psychology was to
dispose of the suggestion that the completeness of the subject
expression was achieved by unification of linguistic facts rather
than through its being the direct successor of the unity of sensory
recognition. What this mo-vedefends is the more important
contention that the typical use of the subject expression in a
description not only corresponds to perceptual recognition but is
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the result of the core transformation in a social formalization of
perception. The perceptions of those who speak a language are
facilitated and enriched by the common understanding; hut this can
only he through the natural structural affinity of language to
perception. Conversely language has objective meaning, not
through a mere association with our experiences, but through its
intrinsic relation with them. Telling other people facts about
objects is a development of our ability to concentrate on specific
aspects of perceived objects; but the multiplicity of predicates
not only makes for variety in communication but enables a much
greater complexity of information to be coalesced in perceptual
recognition.
An implication of this view is that the roles of subject
expressions and of predicates aie essentially contrasted. There
need be. no controversy over the subject expression's role to pick
out some item; but it has often been suggested that predicates
too perform a similar role. If they do not have a function exactly
similar to the subject expression's indication"', it is yet thought
that they perform a function that can be subsumed with indication
2
under some name of wider scope such as ' the introduction of terms'.
1 The word that might be expected to occur at this point is 'reference',
but I prefer to reserve that word for what people do - which should
be distinguished from what the words they use do.
2 E.g., Strawson, op. cit., p. 146. This is not the place to offer
a full criticism of the term theory of propositions. Its dev-
f~\ "] q y>rn y~i 4^ /■> rp. yi P (J 4- Vn v*q. . "D ^ yvi r-t r- -ry t /\q^ -f\ 1 rir.4 f f TTv-i 4 a 1 T* '
Landesman, pp. 85-6) by some thoroughly confusing remarks by
Russell ('On the Relations of Universals and Particulars', e.g.,
Landesman, p. 25). The confusion is basically an uncertainty
whether propositions are objective or conceptual and is marked
by a careless disregard for the use of inverted commas.
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This train of thought is on the one hand, a remarkable example
of the tendency already mentioned, to assimilate all uses of
language to description; on the other it is a response to the
transformability of predicates into subject expressions. If
'Socrates is wise' can be rewritten as 'Wisdom is a characteristic
of Socrates', why should we not allow that 'is wise' introduces
some item as 'wisdom', as a subject expression, may be presumed
to do? 'Wisdom', however, is surely derivative from 'wise', and
it is therefore more plausible to argue in the opposite direction
that'wisdom' does not introduce any item since 'is wise' does not.
Some small indication that this is so is given by consideration
of the converse of 'wisdom'. As Peter Geach has stressed^, a
distinctive feature of predicates is that they carry the negation
of a proposition. The negation of a standard subject expression,
if this is conceivable at all, is presumably an expression that
stands for the whole of existence bar the object denoted by the
original subject expression; 'Not this cat' must stand, if for
anything, for everything in the universe apart from this cat. But
a subject expression such as'wisdom' does have a natural negation,
vis. 'unwisdom'. We might say therefore that wisdom does not
exist in any universe from which it can be picked out or introduced
as an item; it forms, with its negation, a closed "world"' of its
own.
This link with negation elucidates the use of predicates
1 'Assertion', p. 461.
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a3 a reaction to, or treatment of, the items picked out hy subject
expressions, rather than as an introduction of a further range of
items. The reaction or treatment may be given as appropriate, or
explicitly withhold as inappropriate, to the identified object.
But in denying that predicates introduce a further range of non-
linguistic items, it would be a mistake to go to the other extreme
of claiming that universals are entirely linguistic. There is some
1
truth in this old doctrine, however. As John Searle says, "Universals
are not entities in the world, but in our mode of representing the
world; they are, therefore, identified not by appealing to facts,
but in the utterance of expressions having the relevant meanings"
In other words, what universal we are dealing with is determined by
what predicate we are using, and more precisely by the exact shade
of meaning of that predicate, which is entirely determined by the
quirks of language use and not by set divisions in reality.
That universals are identified by reference to language does
not imply a thorough-going nominalism. It does not force us to
think that what red objects, for example, have in common must be
only that they are all called 'red'. It is well worth asserting
2the platitude that what red things have in common is that they are red.
1 'Speech Acts', p. 116.
2 Op. cit., p. 116.
Renford Bambrough has introduced this type of platitude as a
summary expression of what he takes to be Wittgenstein's complete
solution of the rreblem nf universal s ("'Universal s and Pamilv
Resemblance', Pitcher, p. 185»)« Bambrough is too optimistic,
for an explanation needs to be given of the natural features
that he takes for granted, the prelinguistic similarities and
differences on which the linguistic classification is based.
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This does not deny that the class of red things consists of just
those that are, or could he, properly called 'red'. But it does
insist that the grounds for the proriety of this naming lie in
reality; that there are common natures in objects, or many
continuums of similarity between them, which support our classif¬
ication. Our language draws the boundaries, but the ground on
which they are drawn is provided by reality.
We can recognize this in the way that language-linked
universals are grouped together in our understanding. We may
recognize that there are several based in one unspecified feature
of an object. For example, 'X has a temperature of 10°Col
introduces a different universal than does 'X has a temperature
of 283°A.', though it has been shown that these values are equiv¬
alent. Similarly, 'X is brittle' introduces a different universal
than does 'X has its molecules bonded in such and such a way', even
though it is just the molecules being bonded in that way that makes
X brittle.^ In each case, therefore, we may be inclined to say
that there is just one real property of the object involved in both
universals. This, however, would be to fall into the error of
supposing that predicates introduce countable entities. It is
true that we can recognize a certain priority among universals.
Thus the Absolute scale may be regarded as more basic than the
Centigrade scale, and the molecules being bonded in a certain way
may seem more basic than the dispositional brittleness. It would
1 Both examples are due to Max Deutscher, 'Mental and Physical
Properties' , pp. 74-5<>
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be a mistake, though," to suppose that corresponding to. these
universals are what must be distinguished a3 the veritable properties
of the objects* These more basic universals are still relative to
language and perception, and not different in kind from the more
superficialo It does not really make sense, therefore, to try to
count properties* We can speak of a property corresponding to
every universal, or we can restrict them to universals that we
consider to be particularly basic, or we can think of properties
as underlying all universals however basic. Whatever we do, it
will clearly be a convention and not an objective enumeration*
Even if properties are not countable, there is in objects
a genuine basis for perceptual reactions and through them for
linguistic classifications. Linguistic universals, the proper
repetition ox a word in different circumstances, therefore correspond
to objective universals, such aspects of the property continuum as
underlie the universals of perceptual reaction, the recurrent
summation of sensory information, now organised according to the
linguistic scheme. This triple generalization can be seen most
clearly in a simple case such as that of 'red'. Objects differ
in a way which is understood to place them in a continuum, of which
one dimension runs from red to violet. Our experience of colour
is also naturally organized in a continuum, rather different from
the former in that the dimension mentioned becomes circular with
violet leading into red again* Since this structure of experience
has a functional value in itself, it may provide an effective way
of discriminating objects before colour words are learned or
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colours discriminated in consciousness; but the functional
organization that we know comes with the learning of colour wordso
The word 'red' delimits a certain range of the experiential continuum
and through it of the objective continuum# The experiential range
thereafter takes on a common functional value, all experiences
within the range having a joint interpretation. Similarly the
objects, the relevant properties of which fall within the range,
are grouped together, by perception as well as by linguistic
description, as so relevantly similar as to be of one classo
The predicates that we use do not always, of course, have so
direct a connection with experiential simplicities. Even while
we speak in commonplace terms of the most familiar material objects,
the greater number of predicates could not be supposed to reflect
a natural classification of experience. On the contrary, it is
evident that they presuppose a prior perceptual recognition and
understanding of objects. They are, in Kiss Anscombe's terms,
•substance-involving' or 'substantial'."' Far from offering
themselves as original constituents for the notion of an object,
they function only as elaborations upon that notion. Thus, a
term like 'malleable' makes no pretence to be a straight
categorization of experience after the fashion of 'red', but is
1 G.E.K. Anscombe, 'Substance', p. 75. Miss Anscombe introduced
these terms in the course of arguing that particulars necessarily
retain certain properties while they remain those particulars.
As used here, however, they are not intended to carry an
implication of essentialism. An object may come to be, or
cease to be, malleable, while remaining the same object. Miss
Anscombe's argument can indeed be seen as enlarging the distinction
between substance-involving and substantial predicates, as arguing
a great difference between predicates such as 'malleable' and
'a horse', both of which are equally apposite to my present
purposeo
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obviously dependent for its sense on some basic notion of an
object, a potential subject of malleabilityo
It is important to realise this common feature of so many
predicates in order to come to a proper understanding of the
ontological force of descriptive language. I have already spoken
of the way in which a subject term is able to pick out an object
by means of powers of characterization that might more properly be
understood to belong to predicates. These powers it borrows from
predicates with which it is understood to be connected, and linguistic
indication is therefore far from analogous to a simple pointing.
Similarly, we can now recognize that the characterization of
objects through predicates is far from being a straight-forward
attachment of quite distinct elements to the core denotation.
Predicates, in general, build up the concept of what is indicated
as an object; but the later, more sophisticated ones presuppose
the object as represented by their predecessors. This progress
parallels the development of more sophisticated constants of
interaction between the person and reality. Y/e advance from sensory
constants such as 'red1 to more complex perceptual constants such
as 'malleable1. Such a constant depends on the prior recognition
of objects that can be picked out as of different characters. In
this case an object is noted as one that will respond in certain
ways to being pulled and prodded. The ability to use the word
•malleable' arises as a joint product of perceptual and pulling-




The fact of this interaction between subject and predicate
should warn us against supposing that subject and predicate provide
us with a clean model of the ontological structure of the things
that we perceive. Such a model has often been accepted, but things
are not really constructed out of distinct entities: indicated
objects on the one hand and qualities on the other. The supposition
that they are appeared in full force in the Aristotelian 'substance
and accident'; but in English philosophy it is most familiar in
John Locke's less than enthusiastic account.
Lock felt that 'substance' was a shadowy notion, but he was
driven to accept it by his doubt that the genuinely experienced
qualities could have the power to exist on their own account. To
give the qualities some existential prop, substance had to be
accepted even though nothing could be known of it since it was out
of the reach of experience. The steps leading to this surrender
were clearly outlined by Locke himself. "All the ideas of all the
sensible qualities of a cherry come into the mind by sensation. . .
The ideas of these qualities are perceived by the mind to be by
themselves inconsistent with existence, i.e., that th^ycannot
exist or subsist by themselves. . . Hence the mind perceives the
necessary connexion with inherence or being supported, which being
a relative idea superadded to the red colour in a cherry . . the
1
mind frames the correlative idea of a support." The conclusion
1 'A Letter to the Right Rev. Edward Ld. Bishop of Worcester . .',
1697, quoted Pringle-Pattison, pp. xxiv-v.
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seems inevitable enough, but hidden in the first sentence is the
crucial assumption that need not have been made: the assumption that
qualities are distinctly perceived, independent of any awareness of
an object.
I have already mentioned the decline of that view of perception
which built it upon awareness of qualities. Join this with the
recognition that the very conception of most qualities involves
the notion of an object, and it should be clear that we no longer
need suppose with Locke that qualities are free objects in need of
external support. Yet there are still those who take qualities
to be separately given and who also, therefore, accept the need for
some equivalently separate type of entity to sustain them.
These separate entities have generally been referred to in
recent discussions as "bare particulars". Their advocates, such
as Eergmann and Allaire, have not been so pessimistic as Locke about
the possibility of making their acquaintance. Allaire, for instance,
argues that a bare particular is presented in our awareness of one
object as numerically different from another.^ But while he
presents this idea in an attempt to show that there is phenomen-
ological as well as dialectical evidence for bare particulars, his
critics are to some extent justified in finding it altogether
2
dialectical. They overstate their case, however, as when Hochberg
says "To be acquainted with an object is not to be acquainted with
1 'Bare Particulars', pp. 6-7.
2 V.C. Chappell, 'Particulars Re-Clothed'; H. Hochberg, 'Ontology
and Acquaintance' .
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it as a particular ontological analysis holds or reveals it to be";
for perception can be reformed by the understanding. The main
obstacle to being acquainted with some thing as some theory holds
it to be is the thing's not fitting the theoryo Thus there seems
no reason why Allaire should not come to be aware of bare
particulars through convincing himself of their existence - provided
there are such things. On the other hand, he cannot claim the
experience so gained, which may be delusory, as convincing evidence
2
of their existence.
Few of those who make the visual experiment, however, are
likely to agree that they have caught a glimpse of a bare particular.
The main support for the existence of such entities must be
dialectical; and the most promising argument suggests that they
are required to individuate objects. Consider two objects with
all their non-relational qualities in common. These, so the
argument runs, would not be distinct objects if they were only
complexes of qualities. Their individuality is ensured only by
their having bare particulers as constituents. What, though, of
their relational qualities; could not spatial relations, for
instance, individuate them? The answer given is that relations
only hold between objects that are already distinct. In Allaire's
words, "The fact that spatial relations imply diversity does not
1 Op. cit., p. 50.
2 Hochberg does also make the point (Op. cit., p. 51) that someone
who claims acquaintance with a bare particular on the basis of
acquaintance with an object is claiming acquaintance not just
with that object under another description but with a constituent
of that object. But, given the unclarified sense of 'constituent',
it is not clear whether this is a more serious objection.
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ground, the difference between two things but, at most, our knowledge
that there is a difference to be grounded."^
The idea seems to be that space would of itself be incapable
of holding mere complexes of qualities aparto Objects, on this
view, can only be kept distinct by being pinned out in space by bare
particulars. But such is the obscurity of the notion of ontological
priority that it is by no means clear why this view should be
preferred. If qualities can be treated so distinctly, why should
they be regarded as forming a dependent category? Could not
complexes of qualities supply their own ontological identity as
bare particulars are supposed to do for themselves? As Hochberg
2
has pointed out , we need not accept the principle that only simple
particulars can be simply different. The rules of the game are not
so clear that we need feel prevented from saying that two complexes
are just different. Then it could be argued, alternatively, that
complexes are distinguished ontologicaliy by containing different
combinations of qualities. It is true that one would have to
recognize the possibility of two complexes with all their non-relational
qualities in common; but this difficulty could probably be circum¬
vented by including relational qualities among those making up each
3
complexo
If only one is prepared to accept the treatment of qualities
1 'Relations and the Problem of Individuation', p. 63°
2 'Universale, Particulars and Predication', pp. 89-95*
3 See, for example, Hochberg, 'Things and Descriptions', p. 43*
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as isolatable realities, quite a plausible case can be made out for
the contention that objects are complexes of qualities, as is shown
best, perhaps, by Hochberg in his 'Things and Descriptions'o He
is persuasive in dismissing the bare particular as "a hypostatization
of (the indicating) function of a sign'O The apparent strength
of his account does derive, though, more from the weakness of its
antagonist than from virtues of its own. The bare particular
account can be made to seem ontologically fanciful and the force
of its objections to the quality-complex theory can be overcome.
One is left, however, with the suspicion that the notion of a
complex is none the less almost as fanciful*. The familiarity of
qualities is an advantage; but is there any sense in speaking of
them as if they could be taken, linked together and organized into
objects?
It is interesting to note how the word 'complex' provides a
vehicle for the ontologically essential indicating function. The
bare particular theory did treat that function as altogether self-
sufficient, thus depriving the indicated object of all character.
Here, however, the indicating function is surely not taken seriously
enough. What we have is a dummy object conjured into existence
by the use of a convenient noun. Much capital is thus made of our
natural tendency to credit any noun with picking out some element
of reality; but, at the same time, this pointing is deprived of its
ontological priority. The individuated particular, the complex,
1 Ibid., p. 41
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is subsidiary to its characterizing elements, the qualities.
It is significant, no doubt, that Hochberg displays indifference
whether phenomenal or physical objects are to be discussed and that
1
he does, in fact, choose the phenomenal. It is at least
questionable whether there are any such objects; and, even if we
allow that there are, they lack the independent 'out there'
character of physical objects. There will always be a suspicion
that to talk of phenomenal objects is only to recast our talk of
sensuous qualities in the form, without the substance, of the
language of genuine external perception An account such as
Hochberg's could therefore prove to be well suited to phenomenal
objects; but it would be quite mistaken to think of it as extensible
into a general ontologyo
If we direct our attention to objects in physical space,
the notion that they are somehow compounded of qualities becomes
quite unconvincing. Even if we allow that the commohplace notions
2
of attaching, mixing or grouping would have to be transcended , it
still seems naive to suppose that any such operation could be carried
out on objective qualities. When an object changes, we may perhaps
say that it gains or loses certain qualities; but this should not be
taken as a serious representation of the change. A count of the
differing qualities would be not so much a measure of change as a
measure of our capacity for description relative to the changing object.
1 'Universals, Particulars and Predication', p<> 87o
2 So far transcended that, as Long points out ('Particulars and
their Qualities', p. 199), the ontological tie between the
qualities (and that name restates the problem rather than solves
it) cannot be compresence in space-time or any other predicative
relation.
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The object-dependence of qualities may perhaps be brought out
most convincingly with respect to location. Our first thought may
be that the placing of qualities is a simple matter on the lines of
'green here and red over there'; but, as Douglas Long has stressed,"'
more attentive consideration of particular examples soon undermines
this first confidence. Some of the most obviously troublesome
cases are those of shape. Think, for instance, of the roundness
of a ball. Where is this located? One can say where the round
surface of the ball is located; but is that where the roundness
is located on its own account? Could it be said to be spread out
in space where the surface is, and would it, therefore, be regarded
as round in itself?
These problems are not restricted to qualities of shape.
Colours are seemingly as easily placed as any, but are revealed on
little further consideration as also lacking location in themselves.
A pigmented surface can be located, but the colour itself is neither
that surface nor another thing in exactly the same location. Long
therefore reaches the conclusion that we cannot understand the
location of qualities independently of the location of things having those
qualities. "To say, for example, that redness is at can only
make sense if we understand it to mean that something red occupies
st."2
1 1
In the same article, Long goes on to present what might be
regarded as a common-sense theory of 'clothed particulars'. In
1 'Particulars and their Qualities', p. 198.
2 Op. cit., pp. 198-99.
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denying both bare particulars and bare qualities - the latter 'bare'
in the way that cupboards rather than bodies may be he accepts
the natural ontology at its face value. Objects are, as we have
always thought, things such as their qualities make them. There
are particular's to be recognized and located; and these are not
complexes of qualities. On the other hand, the suggestion that
these particulars "are both intrinsically without qualities and
yet somehow characterized by them is not intelligible". Therefore,
"In the sense that the concept of a qualified particular is not
analysable in these terms" (of bare qualities and bare particulars),
"that concept must be regarded as being basic to the metaphysical
framework in terms of which we speak of particulars and their
qualities".^
This is surely entirely right; not least because it does not
make any claim for the ultimate validity of the metaphysical
framework. The qualified particular is clearly not of a character
to satisfy those who are looking for a final ontological simplicity.
It has to be accepted as an element in a perceptual ontology, one
that has a conceptual complexity corresponding to the perceptual
process; but while we speak of particulars and their qualities,
these are inseparable. There is no future for attempts to re¬
construct our natural ontology by giving independent priority either
to particulars or to qualities. This is not to deny absolutely the
possibility of any more fundamental ontology. Given, however, the
close connection between language and perception and between the
1 Op. cit., p. 205.
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structure of our language and the object/quality distinction, the
formulation of any such ontology would be fraught with difficulty®
That need not prevent us, however, from recognizing that the
perceptual ontology does have limitations®
XI
My final aim in the last section was to argue that the
particular/qualities structure is a product of our perceptual relation
with the world rather than an authentic uninterpreted structure of
that world as it really is® Some doubt would follow from this
whether the objects that we pick out have any genuine status as
entities; whether they may not be appearances, in a Kantian sense,
mediating between us and whatever really is.
This is a question that I wish to pursue; but, if I may wish
to diminish the significance of material objects, I should perhaps
explain first how I could associate myself, in section v, with
Strawson's theory of the primacy of material bodies as particulars
in our conceptual scheme. Strawson can be taken to advocate the
ontological priority of material bodies, and the position that I
wish to take may seem to deny this; but, before deciding whether
there is an incompatibility, one must make quite clear the relevant
senses of 'ontological priority'.
The needed clarification may be obtained, indirectly, through
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consideration of a writer who is reluctant to make the necessary-
distinctions. In criticizing Strawson, J.M.E. Moravscik offered
what he took to be a general definition of ontological priority.
"To say that x is ontologically prior to y means that the
existence of x is a necessary condition of the existence of y, but
the existence of y is not a necessary condition of the existence
of x".1
Now, this definition is clearly appropriate to an ontology
in which we attempt to state the structure of existence as, to
the best of our understanding, we consider it to be. There is,
however, quite another way in which ontological priority can be
thought of. In the place of priority according to the judgment
of the completed ontology, we may intend priority within the
development of the ontologv. It may be, perhaps, only by
supposing the existence of one type of entitv that we can discover
the existence of another type® Then, in the internal evidential
structure of our ontology, the first type would be prior to the
second; and this priority, too, may with good sense be referred
to as an ontological priority® It might be called priority in
the order of understanding or enistemological priority, to
distinguish it from the priority defined by Moravscik, which in
its turn might be called priority in the order of being or
existential priority.
Strawson's theory awards priority to material bodies with
1 'Strawson and Ontological Priority', p. 107-
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1
respect to identification. This is clearly a case of priority
in the order of understanding; and, unless one adopts an idealist
position which views objects as dependent on mind for their existence,
it would provide no evidence of priority in the order of being.
While material bodies would, on this theory, be prior to any other
particulars in the evidential structure of our ontology, they might
yet be existentially subsidiary in the final judgement of that
ontology. It is even possible that they would be relegated to the
marginal status, doubtfully real or unreal, which goes with the name
'appearance1.
Such a priority is clearly incompatible with the definition
given by Mcravscik; and yet he does attempt to force it into this
pattern, treating dependence with respect to identification as just
one among many different possible dependencies corresponding to
2
different conditions of existence. He therefore argues, for
instance, that a full concept of an animal commits us to the existence
3
of events such as eating. Of course, we do generally understand
that animals cannot exist without some such events; but that follows
our recognition of events. This does not prove that the identification
of events is not, as Strawson would have it, dependent on the
1 'Individuals', pp. 38-59.
2 At one point Moravscik does recognize that Strawson's priority
should be regarded as one of 'ontological commitment1 (Op. cit.,
p. 112); but he is prompted to this by a doubt whether ident¬
ification can be a sufficient condition of existence, not by
its not being a necessary condition.
3 Op. cit., p. 118.
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identification of some material bodies. Still less does it prove
that the way we talk and think about events is not, as I would have
it, dependent on the way we talk and think about material objects,
which itself develops from the structure of our perception of those
objects.
This confusion about the different senses of ontological
priority is apparent also v:hen Strawson's view is criticized on
the ground that the stuff of which objects are made must be
ontologically prior to them. This objection has been presented at
length by Henry Laycock in his 'Some Questions of Ontology'. lie
starts from the very reasonable assertion that before there can be
a sphere of bronze or a pool of water, there must first be bronze
1
or water. From this there naturally follows the contention that
material objects are not ontologically more fundamental than stuff
2
or matter, a contention that, in the sense of existential priority,
can be allowed. As with events, however, the existential priority
of stuff would have no necessary bearing on the priority of material
objects with respect to identification. It is remarkable that
Laycock does not recognize this, for he does distinguish epistemolo-
gical priority in much the same sense, so that one kind of entity
may be epistemologically more basic than another without being
3
existentially more basic. He only introduces this type of priority,





Op. cit., p. 9.
Op. cit., p. 40.
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which stuff is composed: what science tells us are atoms and
molecules. Stuff is clearly more "basic epistemologically than
its elements, which are only discovered after protracted investigation
into the nature of stuffs. On the other hand, the elements would
seem to be, if anything, existentially prior to the stuff.
While Laycock recognizes epistemological priority between
stuff and its elements, the same pattern could be found where he
does not think to find it, between, for instance, pools or drops
and water. As we speak of these, there is, no doubt, a conceptual
dependency of the pools and drops on the water, informally recognizing
its existential priority. There is, in Layccck? s words, " a
particularization over stuff".^ That does not mean, however, that
man did not have to recognize particulars such as pools and drops
before he could develop the notion of water, that the epistemological
development was not a "generalization over particulars".
Names for different stuffs are intermediate in character
beiween words that stand for objects and words that characterize
them. It is not surprising, therefore, that someone should hold,
as Quine does, that mass terms are a survival from a stage in
conceptual development before the dichotomy between singular and
2
general terms was established. But this is surely to mistake the
structural compromise for the inchoate. As a linguistic phenomenon,
the use of names of stuffs seems a more complex development,
designed to cope with aspects of reality that the perception and
description of qualified particulars could not cover. Its
1 Op. cito, p. 33.
2 'Word and Object', p. 95
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intermediate character would then be due, not to its representing
a common origin, but to its borrowing from the available elements
in the language of perceptual objects.
The natural bias of language towards material objects comes
out very clearly in the difficulties that writers display in dealing
with notions of stuff. There may be much that is problematical
about objects, but to find the problems one must break through
the mask of a language that comprehends them all too well. With
stuffs, on the other hand, problems are already apparent in the
language. Firstly, the word for a stuff has a generality which
links it with words for qualities, a characteristic that is naturally
most obvious when such a word appears as a predicate. Thus,
•This is water' seems to have much in common with 'This is green'.
It is this aspect that Strawson emphasizes in his account of these
words."' This means, in the context of his theory of term
introduction which offers the alternatives of introducing objects
or introducing concepts, that they must be taken to introduce
concepts. But this is a totally implausible suggestion in relation
to the same words' occurrences as genuine underived subject terms in
such phrases as 'Snow is falling'; hence haycock's jibe that, on
Strawson's interpretation taken literally, this would mean that "the
p
universal itself was falling (out of the Platonic heaven, presumably)"."
It will not do, on the other hand, to place all the weight
1 'Individuals', pp. 202-203*
2 Op. cit., p. 15.
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on the resemblance to singular subject expressions. Though Quine
is right, in contrast to StrawBon, in recognizing that a stuff such
as water is as real or concrete as any particular object, he is
mistaken in thinking that it must therefore be such an object<J
Objects are typically perceptible wholes, which water is not.
Perhaps water's being so scattered through the universe as it is
does not altogether rule out its being regarded as a single object;
but the fact remains that, scattered as it is, it has never been
so regarded. Supposing that all water was gathered together into
a single comprehensible body, we could give that body a name as a
single object; but 'water' is not already a potential name for
that body.
Trying to steer a course that will avoid the misleading
emphases of Strawson and Quine, Laycock notes that mass terms, such
as 'water', function in very much the same way as plural sortal
2
terms such as 'apples'. With such terms there might be a hint
how the indicating and characterizing functions could be joined,
there being many objects to be both indicated and characterized as
of the same kind: but Laycock*s attempt to develop this line soon
runs into fantasy. He proposes that there is a sort of atomism
presupposed in our common speech of stuffs, so that to speak of
3
water is to speak of water elements. This is a more bizarre
interpretation of common understanding that Quine's single object.
1 'Word and Object', p. 98.
2 Op. cit., pp. 35-38.
3 Op. cit., pp. 38-40.
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Helen Cartwright is surely correct when she stresses the point that
mass nouns provide not an arithmetic as sortal nouns do but a
1
measure. When a stuff is spoken of, it is an occasion for asking
'How much?' rather than 'How many?'. This simple recognition will
not solve all problems about stuffs; but their connection with the
more sophisticated question 'How much?' does suggest again the
comparative complexity of the notion of stuff in relation to the
main drift of our conceptual scheme.
This complexity stems from the difficulty of accommodating
a response to many particulars (e.g., pools and drops) that does
not differentiate them but that does indicate rather than
characterize. We might well regret, given the existential and
explanatory relations of stuff to objects, that this is so. We
might have a more God-like view of the universe if stuffs were the
general currency of our understanding. The fact remains that we
do have difficulty in comprehending a general target for indication,
because our perceptual predilections are for indicating objects
that we can really see or grasp and for characterizing these on
the basis of generalized interactions with reality. It is this
objective perception that our language develops out of and is
designed to serve. No wonder then that there is evidence of strain
when we have to deal with stuff that scatters and recombines, but
is always the same and not thereby destroyed or reconstructed.
1 'Quantities', p. 27.
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XII
One area in which limitations of the perceptual ontology
can be sought is that of the durational identity of its objects.,
These objects are said to come into existence, to last for some
period of time and to then go out of existence. Are there any
good grounds, though, for supposing that the beginning and the
end of these objects constitutes a genuine origin or cessation
in reaLity? It might be that the occasions noted as their
beginnings and endings do involve comparatively large changes in a
basic process, but that these changes are only distinguishable in
degree (and that not infallibly) and not in kind from those
occurring during the period of their existence.,
One way of expressing this doubt is by asking whether it
is possible to determine objectively whether an object picked out
at one time is or is not the same object as one picked out at
another time. It would naturally be assumed that identity could
be so established, providing certain conditions were satisfied.
These conditions might be that an object had been traced in a
continuous path through space and time and that its cliaracter had
not changed too much in the interim. Is it certain, however, that
any conditions such as these could be sufficient to establish a
real identity, rather than a conventional one imposed by our
interests?
In recent times Peter Geach has strongly upheld the view
that identity is always relative to some classification; so that
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"it makes no sense to judge whether x and y are 'the same' or
whether x remains 'the same', unless we add or understand some
general term - "the same F"".^ So expressed, this view relates
not only to identity over time but also to present identity; but
here I want to concentrate on the former application. In this
application it suggests firstly that any decision about the identity
through time of an entity must be restricted to that entity under
a certain characterization; and secondly that the decision might
vary as we discussed the entity under different general terms.
A suitable example would be bronze that is successively formed
into two statues. While it would be the identical piece of bronze
2
over the whole period, it would not be the identical statue.
Strangely, this view has been considered to be a form of
3
essentialism, as if the object's being relative to a general term
meant that there was an object that necessarily possessed the
qualities prescribed by the general term. But this is obviously
4
a case of modality de dicto rather than of modality de_ re. All
the necessity derives from the fact that the object, while it is
counted the same object, must retain suitable characteristics.
Its being counted the same object shows only that there is a
continuous point of application for the same general term. This
1 'Reference and Generality', p. 39*
2 The example is John Perry's ('The same F', p. 198) with Sydney
Shoemaker's practical substitution of bronze for clay ('Wiggins
on Identity', p. 530.)
3 E.g., by Loux, 'Recent Work in Ontology', p. 134.
4 Plantinga, 'De Re et de Dicto'.
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can have no implication for what is picked out, since the same
element of reality, x, may be indicated by different general terms,
F, G, etc. It is clear, therefore, that a general term does not
determine the nature of an element of reality to which it is applicable.
The boundaries that we have are limits of application and not
essential limits in reality.
This view is also regarded, not least by Geach himself,^as
leading to an assault on (the so-called) Leibniz' Law: 'For any
entity, x, and any entity, y, x is identical with y if and only if
for any property, F, x is characterized by F if and only if y is
2
characterized by F'. My concern, however, is only with that
part of Geach's view that relates to identity over time. Whether
that part is incompatible with Leibniz' Law depends on whether the
Law itself is reckoned to cover identity over time. Its great
plausibility rests on its interpretation in terms of contemporaneous
identity and of present-defined properties. To extend it to cover
identity over time requires the dating of properties or of their
possession. It may be thought that little can be achieved by
this, however, since the Law will still fail to express the real
requirements of identity over time, such as a continuous path
through space and time. It is true that the Lav/ should not in any
case be regarded as a recipe for establishing identity; but it does
express a necessary as v/ell as a sufficient condition for identity,
and this is obviously quite vacuous when one has to study, as one
1 'Identity', pp0 5-5.
2 Feldman, 'Leibniz and "Leibniz' Law"', p. 511•
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clearly must, a object to discover the properties of a t^ object
at t,. In other words, one must assume identity over time before
operating the Law.
Leibniz' Law might still be permitted the role of expressing
implications of identity over time, if this did not have any harmful
results. Unfortunately, however, to allow it this role is to
destroy its main function of formulating contemporaneous identity.
The examples that can be adduced in support of Geach's view show
either that identity is a non-transitive relation - which is not to
be allowed - or that Leibniz' Law formulates either contemporaneous
identity or identity over time but not both. Let us say, for
example, that this bronze, x, at time t is identical with that
bronze, X, at time T, for at time t bronze X has all the properties
of x and vice versa. On the other hand, this statue, y, at time t
is not identical with statue Y, or bronze X, at time T because
statue y does not exist and has no properties at all at time T.
This means that statue y cannot be identical with bronze x, due to
the transitivity of the identity relation, x's identity with X and
y's non-identity with X.
Given the choice between Leibniz' Law as a formulation of
contemporaneous identity and as a formulation of identity over time,
the former would seem obviously preferable. Remarkably, however,
the latter has been chosen by the main opposition to Geach. David
1 2
Wiggins and, later but more clearly, John Perry have insisted
1 'Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity'
2 ' The Same F' o
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that particulars cannot be the sane P but not the same Go They
prefer to see two particulars, the statue and the piece of bronze,
in the one thing, rather than admit that identity over time is
not formulated by Leibniz* Law.
Wiggins and Perry do recognize a form of identity or sameness
which is not relative to general terms - or, at least, not to any
but an altogether basic one such as * thing*. Wiggins, thinking
of the relation between components or fragments and whole, speaks
of the constitutive •is*®'' Shoemaker points out that this needs
to be supplemented by a symmetrical relation; and, following Perry,
he suggests that the relation 'being composed of the same matter'
2
can in many cases be expressed by 'is one and the same thing as'.
This notion, which is that expressed by Leibniz' Law restricted to
purely contemporaneous properties, seems a much more desirable
property than the unrestricted identity over time. Both Wiggins
and Perry, however, prefer to reserve the term 'identical' for the
3
latter.
Wiggins employs a symbolism that endorses Geach's connection
4
of the general term with the identity relation* but Perry brings
out better the structure of this alternative view by allowing
identity to be a single relation and allocating specificity to
the names; so that x is the same P as y because x is by definition
1 Op. cit., pp. 10-13.
2 'Wiggins on Identity', p. 531.
3 Wiggins, Op. cito, p. 13; Perry, Op. cito, p. 199«
4 Op. cit., p. 2.
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1
an F, y is by definition an F, and x is the same as y» This
account of identity, unlike Geach's, is thus genuinely essentialist,
for it makes an object fully dependent on the way in which it is
picked outo Thus Wiggins savs, "how we do our singling out
determines both what we single out, and (which is the same thing)
the principle of individuation of what we single out, and (again
the same thing) the conditions of the existence of what we have
2
singled out." Now, the apparent implication of this is that the
necessity in the object is one and the same as the necessity in
the categorization; there has been an amalgamation of modality
de re and modality _de dicto because objects are thought- or concept-
dependent .
Wiggins does not recognize this, however, for he says that
the existence of what we have singled out "is independent of our
thought . . ., even if our individuation of it (obviously) cannot
be". "It was there before we picked it out", he continues, "but
2
to pick it out you have to pick ijfc outo" This is rather like
saying that the round area of flat paper, that we have just drawn
a line around, was there before we set pencil to paper, existing in
its own right as an essentially flat round area; and not only
this, but further that, whenever the paper is bent, this part¬
icular is destroyed along with an infinite number of other flat-
shape particulars. Such a multiplication of entities is not to
1 Op. cit., p. 185«
2 Op. cit., p. 42.
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be permitted., even on the smaller scale envisaged by Wiggins and
Perry®
Before considering how this population increase is to be
avoided, let us introduce a further possible conception of identity®
This is the fourth and last combination of views on the necessary
relativity of identity to general terms and on the possibility of
one object's being the same F but not the same G. Geach
approved of both, Perry of neither, Wiggins of the first but not
the second; the remaining combination is the one, therefore,
that favours the second but not the first. Just such a view has
been advanced by Douglas Odegard, who characterizes it as Lcckean®
He points out that it is quite possible to combine two notions of
identity; a general unrestricted sense can exist alongside one
tied to specific general terms."' While, therefore, in the first
sense it can be stated outright that one object is identical with
another, in the second sense it can be said that they are the
same P but not the same G.
Odegard, whose interest is in identity through time, arranges
this seemingly paradoxical combination by awarding unrestricted
identity to any objects that are the same P for any general term
2 3' F' • I doubt whether this arrangement can prove satisfactory,
1 'Identity through Time', pp® 29-31*
2 Op. cit., p. 31.
3 My view will appear at variance with Odegard's as I develop it
here. More specifically, I doubt whether a general notion of
identity over time can be valid to cover both material continuity
and continuity as a perceptual object regardless of material
continuity. Further, given the wide variety of general terms
and the heavy dependence of some of these on specific interests
of ours, I doubt whether a general notion of identity to cover all
perceptual objects, distinguished under any general term, could be
of value.
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but want instead to achieve the same combination by contrasting
contemporaneous identity with identity over time. Contemporaneous
identity is absolute identity, identity over time is relative to
general terms.
Let us return to Wiggins and Perry and their threatened
multiplication of entities. Wiggins' idea was that an entity
exists as it is singled out and therefore necessarily possesses
the properties understood in the term that singles it out. What
was apparently one thing could then be singled out as many different
entities as different terms were applied to it. Wow, it is my
contention that some part of reality^ can indeed be singled out in
different terms; and those different terms represent different
perceptual interpretations of that reality. Where I diverge from
Wiggins is in my ontological estimate of the perceptual 'objects'
that may thus seem to accumulate. I have already proposed in
the previous two sections that perceptual objects would lack status
in a serious ontology, and I now wish to give greater substance to
this suggestion.
What is picked out in perception or in immediate reference
is some genuine reality, more fundamental than the perceptual
object it is interpreted as. The notion of contemporaneous
identity is then the idea of one reality being picked out by two
different names. Thus, 'this piece of bronze' and 'this statue'
may at one time indicate the same reality. They can be said to
1 When I speak of 'parts' of reality, and later of 'realities',
these expressions are not really satisfactory. They must not
be thought of as count nouns.
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do so because they can be shown not to do anything more. If the
conditions of contemporaneous identity, as specified by Leibniz'
Lav.1, are satisfied, piece of bronze and statue have exactly the
same properties. At the one time, that is, their names offer
exactly the same specification of reality. They are, therefore,
ihcapable of indicating different realities.
Contemporaneous identity is, then, a matter of two names
indicating the same underlying reality. What that reality is
we perhaps do not know. Whatever it is, it lies beyond the range
of perceptual characterization. It is consequently independent
of the general terms under 'which perceptual objects are classified,
and the identity it mediates is therefore quite independent of
any of those terms. In contemporaneous identity, as I have
already said, we have absolute identity.''
Identity over time, however, presents us with an entirely
different picture. The reality that is picked out at one instant
does not have a defined past or future as an object. Origin,
continuity and end belong to the object in its perceptual
characterization. Thus 'this statue' will function, over some
1 This is clearly a straight contradiction of that part of Geach's
account that refers to contemporaneous identity. The sort of
example, however, that can be brought forward in support of
Geach on this point, rests on concepts such as 'official'.
The same man can be different officials according to the roles
he is playing. Such a concept, though, is so obviously
conventional and non-objective in its application that it makes
no pretence of providing an inventory of reality. We can
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official, and x is the same as y, but x is not the same official
as y'• The real question is whether 'x.is the same as y' has
to be understood as 'x is the same man as y'; and the answer
to that question is surely negative, since 'x is the same man as
y' will not provide a repetition of the difficulty found with
'official'.
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period, as a continuous indicator of some reality. But there
is no guarantee that the parts of reality that it picks out later
will constitute a future which is in some way naturally proper to
the part of reality that it originally picked out.
That a perceptual object's history is independent of the
reality it represents at one time has a corollary. If the
continuation depends on the classification and is not defined by
the reality originally picked out, different names, that at one
time indicate the same reality, may specify different pasts and
futures. Identity over time is, therefore, not absolute but
relative to general terms. Though the piece of bronze and the
statue are at one time the same reality, this does not mean that
they may not diverge at other times. At some other time they
may indicate different realities, at yet another one may indicate
some reality and the other may indicate nothing.
The low ontological status of these durational conceptually-
defined objects is confirmed if one considers how, even in
perceptual terms, they lack clear plurality. Wiggins would have
us make sharp distinctions between these "entities", but when we
perceive an object or refer to it we are under no obligation to
be precise as to its classification. As Tobias Chapman says,
"more than one general concept can play a part in the reference of
a term even though the concepts involved provide different criteria
of identity for the entity that is named".^ Even the perceptual
1 'Identity and Reference', p. 548.
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object, therefore, only gains a more precisely defined history
as it is more precisely defined itself. In so far as it remains
undefined, the one object may contain many futures, may be the same
P as a future object but not the same G.
To say, as I have above, that perceptual objects are
interpretations of reality and that their histories do not
necessarily correspond with a consequential development in reality,
does not mean that we cannot regard some classifications as giving
a more stable representation of reality than others. This is well
shown by the classical example of the ship that is rebuilt plank
by planko The end product is indeed the same ship, but that
only provides a particularly clear example of the later phase of
an object not representing the future of the reality represented
by the object in its original phase. The collection of planks
that is taken from the ship, on the other hand, even the ash, etc.,
if the planks are burnt, forms a much more plausible approximation
to a representation of the future being of whatever was picked out
by the original f ship'.
The principle by which we prefer the collection of planks
to the rebuilt ship as a representation of a real continuity is
clearly a general preference for the preservation of matter. This
principle conforms to our scientific understanding of what is to
count as the same existence, the basic reality against which we
chart the changing constitution of perceptual objects. Is this
however, the only standard by which we can judge of real rather
than apparent continuity? The question arises from the case of
living things® These certainly do not achieve a real identity
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over time through their preserving the same matter; indeed, among
perceptual objects they are notable for their failure to do this.
Yet we are strongly inclined to say that there must be an identity
here stronger than that of any lifeless assemblage of material.
Probably, it is living things that provide much of the
motivation for the essentialist approach. It should be clear,
however, that this type of account cannot supply a principle of
real unity. Leibniz' Law can only confirm our prejudices in
favour of the identity; and, so far as those prejudices are
expressed in terms of properties possessed at different times,
examples such as caterpillars and butterflies or leptocephali
and conger eels^ show them to be thoroughly ill-grounded. There
are, however, good reasons for counting caterpillar and butterfly
as the same thing, reasons that will become apparent in a
scientific account of how one develops into the other. It is
the preservation and self-development of organization that living
things have to offer as the grounds for granting them more than
perceptual continuity. Whether that is evidence of a more genuine
unity over time depends on whether organization can be regarded
as an alternative to matter as a basic mode of continuous existence.
Among living things, the example of most interest to us is,
of course, man. In our own case we may suspect that there is an
entirely different principle of identity, one that might or might
not apply to other types of creature. This is the unity of
1 Wiggins tells us (Op. cit., p. 59) that leptocephali are
young conger eels, which were long thought to be a distinct
form of creature.
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consciousness, mediated by memory and the continuity of ideas and
intentions. In my full account of mind, I hope to give a persuasive
account of what we have to say in terms of this other form of
continuity, which may justify our supposing that it represents a
genuine unity. If accepted, this would give persons an identity-
over time on grounds quite different from, and superior to, those
provided by perceptual reidentification.
The introduction of other criteria of identity need not lead
to conflict. The weakness of the perceptual descriptive scheme
as a survey of real entities does not rule out the possibility
that a genuine unity coincides with a perceptual identity. I
have not said that a perceptual object necessarily does not represent
a genuine continuity in reality, only that it does not establish it.
There may be, too, a justifiable hope of a more positive relation
between the subjective account of mind and a more serious external
ontology. Here we must bear in mind the suggestion that the
scientific recognition of organization may be as relevant to real
continuity as that of constancy of matter. Since the individuation
of minds coincides with the individuation of organized living things,
this may offer a way of holding together the subjective and objective
findings as recognizable accounts of the one reality. In
descriptive perceptual terms there may be some artificiality in
making an essential break between living body and corpse; but




A natural ontology that may seem to give a closer approximation
than the object ontology to an underlying reality is an ontology
of events. We have a natural capacity to react to happenings
about us, as, for example, to a loud noise. This ability becomes
subordinate, however, to the rich growth of our main perceptual
system in terms of objects; events do not become a basic
furniture of our world in the way that objects do. The mature
recognition of events is in general not nearly so automatic or
conceptually explicit as is the recognition of objects. Events
)
are rather vague at the edges, both in respect of duration and in
respect of what is to be included in them at any one time. Here,
therefore, we might be thought to have a rather more open relation
with reality, which is not so strictly conceptualized as in the
immediate transformation of object perception. In an eventful
context we might give ourselves a running commentary covering the
interesting aspects of what was happening, but this would not be a
catalogue of clearly individuated events.
None the less, the way we speak of events does tend to be
modelled on the way we speak of objects. As Donald Davidson says,
our language seems to supply here all the machinery of reference:
•not only appropriate singular terms, but the full apparatus of
definite and indefinite articles, sortal predicates, counting,
quantification and identity statements'. We seem therefore to
1 'Events as Particulars', p. 25.
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l)e committed to events as things; and this commitment I should
analyse on the same lines as our commitment to objects. I should
therefore say that an event, as it is characterized, is an
appearance, an interpretation of reality. Two event descriptions
can, however, interpret the same stretch of reality because they
fail to pick out different stretches. These are then different
descriptions of the one event. Thus Brutus' stabbing of Caesar
is the same event as Brutus' killing of Caesar (under a suitable
interpretation of 'killing*) because these phrases fail to pick
out different stretches of reality.
In the case of objects, this character of appearance and
interpretation is generally hidden from us by the ease and
conviction of our perception of them. In the case of events,
however, the comparative awkwardness of the perception allows us
to recognize more easily the dependence of these supposed entities
on our characterization of them. It is not surprising, therefore,
that there should be considerable opposition to the treatment
of events as things. The counter-proposals range over various
degrees of language dependence, but it is the more moderate, I
feel, that are the most interesting. I am not so concerned,
therefore, with the views of Roderick Chisholm, Davidson's main
sparring-partner, which provide the current advocacy of extreme
language dependence. Events are sometimes identified with facts,
a view most commonly associated with Austin. This generally
1 See Davidson, 'The Individuation of Events', pp. 229-30.
2 In 'Events and Propositions' and 'States of Affairs again'.
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constitutes an objectivisation of facts; but Chisholm, bringing
facts back into the linguistic fold, brings events along with them.
He identifies facts with true propositions and makes propositions,
facts and events all species of states of affairs.'
Chisholm's view might be thought to provide a corresponding
theory for events to a nominalist view of qualities. More
moderate views of language dependence suggest that events are
indeed not like things but like qualities under a more reasonable
interpretation. Just as which quality is picked out may bo thought
of as dependent on the word used, so, on this type of view, which
event is picked out is dependent on which words are used. There
is no identification across non-equivalent descriptions, but the
distinctions are none the less drawn on a real basis.
One who might seem to be a proponent of such a view, but who
probably is not, is R«M. Martin. He certainly thinks that events
which Davidson would treat as identical, such as Brutus' stabbing
2
and killing of Caesar, are only simultaneous. This difference of
opinion seems to be based, however, only on the belief that the
names of events are so specific that they do in fact single out
different stretches of reality. If this is so, Martin is essentially
in agreement with Davidson on the objective character of events.
1 'Events and Propositions', pp. 20-21. This unholy alliance is
seemingly achieved by the use of symbols and the disuse of
inverted commas ('p is true' and ' p occurs', but contrast
' the man is drunk is true' and 'the man is drunk occurs') through
the mediation of the indirect quotation form ('that the man is
drunk is true' and 'that the man is drunk occurs', the first of
which is of course all right, and the second of which may be
odd enough to slip past the native language speaker's
instinctive censorship).
2 'On Events and Event-Descriptions: Reply', pp. 100-101.
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There is no suggestion that the name can define a particular reality
as one event rather than another.
Such a suggestion can be found in the work of Jaegwon Kim.
Like Martin, Kim things that Brutus' stabbing of Caesar is
distinct from Brutus' killing of Caesar; but his reason is not
that they do in fact pick out different contemporaneous realities.
Instead he concentrates on the causal explanation of each, pointing
out that an explanation of why Brutus stabbed Caesar may be quite
1
different from an explanation of why Brutus killed Caesar. His
suggestion is that events are primarily identified as "objects of
explanation and relata of causal relation"; and, therefore, that
we can justifiably regard the stabbing and the killing as different
events.^
Before criticizing it, I want to bring out what I think is
interesting in this suggestion. In picking out events we do
often take a very selective attitude to a stretch of reality. To
speak of stabbing rather than of killing is more specific, but
even here we abstract from the whole occurrence, many details of
which seem irrelevant. This selectivity is even more apparent
with respect to the causal setting of an event, for that provides a
far larger universe of aspects to be neglected. It is this causal
setting, too, in its wider sense that would seem to offer a
comprehensive definition of what really occurs. Our selectivity
1 E.g., 'He had a knife handy' v. 'He thought all dictators shoxild
be killed'.
2 'Events and Descriptions: some considerations', p. 215*
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in relation to the causes of an occurrence therefore brings out
particularly clearly the degree to which our perceptions of events
involve abstraction from reality.
What is wrong with Kim's suggestion is that the causal account
understood in the name of an event does not fully determine the
individuation of the event, which is after all the occurence and
not is causes. We can distinguish between the explanation of why
Brutus stabbed Caesar and a causal explanation of the stabbing-event.
The latter explanation is far more independent of the particular
term used to specify the event and can include any factors that
we can draw from the total causal setting. We therefore recognize
the event as reidentifiable under different names and different
causal explanations. Once again, as with objects, our supposed
entity may be only an appearance; but some event names may still
pick out an identical reality since the appearances are not
relevantly distinct.
The case of events thus illuminates the general perceptual-
descriptive system, through the particularly evident disparity
between the interpreted event and the underlying reality. It is
also, however, of considerable interest in itself, not least in
relation to the study of mind where, with the exception perhaps
of the self, we may seem, even at first sight, to have to do with
events rather than with objects.
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XIV
In this chapter I have been working towards two goals. The
first is to establish a close link between the descriptive mode of
language and perception, and the second is to show the limitations
of that mode as a representation of reality; thus opening the
way to the acceptance of the language of mind as a distinct mode
and to the sympathetic assessment of it as a representation of
realityo
To express the limitations of perception and its associated
descriptive language, I have suggested that perceptual objects
should be allotted the status of appearances in the context of a
serious ontology. Such a claim is always, of course, to be
connected with Kant. When Kant spoke of empirical objects as
appearances, he did, however, regard them as appearances of
transcendental objects'', of things-in-them selves, whereas I have
suggested that the underlying reality is non-objective. It is true
that the Kantian thing-in-itself has little objective character -
our idea of it is an " indeterminate concept of an intelligible
2
entity, namely of a something in general outside our sensibility"
but Kant1s attachment to the category 'thing' is still evident.
What perhaps I need to stress here, therefore, is that use of the
word 'appearance' does not demand the existence of an object as its
complement. If the appearances are objects as we ordinarily
1 'Critique of Pure Reason', pp. 84-5.
2 Op. cit., p. 268.
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understand them, then there is no reason why the reality that they
are appearances of must itself consist of objects. In its use here,
the word 'appearance' has clearly been detached from its usual
relation to objects in the analysis of perception, and it retains
only its function of granting a reduced ontological status to an
epistemological intermediary.
The prejudice in favour of objects, if I may call it that,
is even more apparent in the work of a recent refurbisher of the
Kantian doctrine. Wilfred Sellars writes, 'a consistent scientific
realist must hold that the world of everyday experience is a
phenomenal world in the Kantian sense, existing only as the contents
of actual and obtainable conceptual representings, the obtainability
of which is explained not, as for Kant, by things in themselves
known only to God, but by scientific objects'."' By 'scientific
objects' Sellars means to refer to sub-atomic particles. We might,
therefore, as I shall remark presently, take the use of 'object'
as not altogether literal. It is clear from other passages, however,
that Sellars intends no such caution. The most striking of these
occurs as the final gesture in his attempt to fit sensory experiences
into his scientific realism. In general he suggests that experiences
are to be specified through adverbial modifications of the verb
'to sense'. He now writes, however, speaking of an experience of
a red rectangle, "at the end of the road somehow the phrase 'a red
rectangle' will lose its adverbial status and, by a final trans-
2
position, will become once again a common noun for particulars" -
1
2
'Science and Metaphysics', p. 173°
Op. cit., p. 172.
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meaning by 'particulars" those same scientific objects® Such a
far-fetched hypothesis reveals great faith in the particularity of
the underlying scientific reality; but the discoveries of modern
science surely show that a micro-physical account of reality cannot
be expressed in terms of objects. They lend support, rather, to
my contention that the objective language is intimately connected
with perception."'
The particles of modern physics bear no resemblance to
Democritean atoms. Those, as was only natural, were minimal objects
modelled on those that we are familiar with in perception; but
reality is not so obliging. Our perceptual powers have been
considerably extended through the use of microscopes so that we
have been able to see, or see pictures of, smaller and smaller
objects. As the Uncertainty Principle shows, however, there is
a necessary limit to that extension: one which, none the less,
falls short of the micro-limit to reality, if there is any such
thing. There are other ways, however, of finding out about micro-
physical reality than looking at it; and it is conceivable that
these might have enabled us to go on thinking about reality beyond
the limits of perception in the same familiar objective terms.
With the discovery of wave-particle duality, however, the old ways
of thought would no longer serve. Heisenberg linked this specifically
with a break-down in visualization when he wrote "It is very difficult
to modify our language so that it will be able to describe these
1 This apparent dismissal of Sellars does not reveal how much
the later parts of my account of mind gain, in constructive
disagreement, from his strenuously thoughtful work.
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atomic processes, for words can only describe things of wjiich we can
1
form mental pictures. It is important, however, to realise that
the difficulty is of a quite different order than that which might
attend the attempt to visualize Democritean atoms. If we think of
a wave as a probability distribution for the location of a particle,
it might be supposed that reality consisted of an object - the
particular - in a somewhat uncertain location. Even if this object
were bare of familiar properties, the object language would not then
completely fail us. The double-slit experiment, however, showed
that the probability distribution of photons of light depended
on the interaction of the chance of going through one slit with the
chance of going through the other, photon by photon. Thus reality
cannot be just a particle that passes through one slit or another;
it must be both the particle or energy field and the probability
distribution for the location of its centre. In other words, the
particle is only an aspect of something to which we can only give
mathematical expression; though, appropriately, it is the guise
under which the reality is most often apparent to us object-perceivers.
The break-down of perception seems to bring with it, therefore,
the nemesis of the object language. We can talk of particles, but
this gives only an illusion that the language has successfully
crossed the barrier. The scientific search for basic reality
appears, therefore, to bear out my contention that descriptive
language is essentially tied to perception and that it cannot be
regarded as the prime model for all linguistic representation of
reality.
1 'The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory', quoted by
Hanson, 'Patterns of Discovery', p. 219«
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XV
The general evaluation of objective description does not place
so low an ontological value on this form of language as I have been
suggesting is its due. On the contrary, the logical form of
objective description is often taken as the very standard of onto¬
logical force in language. When it comes, therefore, to thinking
about mind, the natural tendency has been to treat it in these terms;
to ask whether mind oT mental events can be established as descriptive
objects and, if so, what kinds of objects, and bearing what sorts of
relation to the human body and to events in the human brain.
There are several ways in which it may be tempting to assimilate
mental language to objective description. These are conveniently
ordered by two main distinctions, one covering the scope of the
intended object and the other the point of view from which it is
approached. On one side of the first distinction we have treatment
of the mind, or of the conscious self, as a single object which may
be descriptively characterized by mental predicates, while on the
other we have treatment of conditions of mind as distinct objects,
or at least as states or events conceived of as objective particulars.
The second distinction divides an external approach to mind or mental
events, which treats them like other objects as open to third-
person perceptual investigation, from an internal approach by which
each person's raind is known primarily through his own privileged
inspection.
Remembering David Hume's failure to discover his own self by
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introspection , we may reckon that treating the whole mental self as
an object consorts most comfortably with the external approacho
Since it is the human body that confronts the external observer1s.
eye, this will generally, though not necessarily, have the corollary,
that the mental self is regarded as identical with the corporeal
self. This account can take two forms. The most frugal theory
will assert that the self is indeed identical with the material body
as it is accounted for in the language of physical science, that no
other properties than the material are required to substantiate a
being with any of the states or abilities generally connected with
the mental. The other theory, however, will regard a person as a
more complex being, uniting in a single object both material
properties and properties that are of an entirely different kind,
correctly distinguished as belonging to a separate category - the
mental.
I shall have much more to say of these theories, and particularly
of the first, in my next chapter. There are alternative accounts
of the mental self that make it a quite separate entity from the
human body. These naturally depend far more on the internal approach,
though this may supply encouragement rather than good evidence.
Conscious experience makes great demands of its devotees but, as
Hume's comment admits, does not afford them a glimpse of an objective
self. If it is imperceptible, I would argue that the notion of an
object should be dropped; but there has, of course, been a tendency
to think of the self as a particular to be characterized by mental
1 "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other. . . I never can
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can
observe anything but the perception". ('A Treatise of Human
Nature', p. 252.)
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predicates as the body is by material ones. One is then, however,
faced with the considerable problem of how the one descriptive object,
the self or mind, is to be related to the other, the body. Different
answers to this question have on the whole determined the different
varieties of this sort of theory.
One way in which the self has been conceptually distinguished
from material objects has been by calling it a 'subject'. It has
been recognized that the perceiver, the originator of actions, stands
in a position quite different from that of the object that is per¬
ceived or acted upon. Not enough attention, though, has been paid
to the effect that this different position has upon language. I
would argue that the use of language is relative to these two
positions, and that its logical structure is highly sensitive to
the difference. As it is, however, the subject is often treated
as a descriptive entity and thus, in effect, as an object.
We may take Kant as an eminent example of one who has differ¬
entiated between subject ana object but failed to carry the
distinction through. For Kant there are two conceptions of the
self: an empirical self and a transcendental self.'' These parallel
the contrast in the outer world between objects in space and time
and the things-in-themselves of which they are appearances. To
match the outer sense which presents these appearances to us, Kant
introduces an inner sense which presents the empirical self to us
as the appearance of the unknowable transcendental self, which is
again a thing-in-itselfThus the self is objective in two senses,
1 'Critique of Pure Reason' , p. 28.
2 Op. cit., pp. 87-88.
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whether on the level of material things or on that of the underlying
reality® No doubt, Kant was right to feel that there was a problem
about the unity of the self that could not be solved, as Strawson
1
would have him solve it, by relying on the commonplace external
criteria of identity for a man. With his belief in things-in-
themselves as the underlying external reality, it was natural,
however, that he could not break away from the idea that this unity
must involve a similar objective identity.
The many ways in which the objectification of the self can
be carried out may be matched by the many ways in which particular
mental happenings can be treated in an objective fashion. The
exterior approach produces various accounts corresponding roughly
to the different treatments of the self. If the self is regarded
as altogether identical with the material body, then particular
mental happenings also will be considered identical with mere
physical happenings. If the identity of the self allows, however,
a mental aspect, the mental happenings could either themselves
share in the dual nature "'of the self or be quite non-physical,
related to the self by some of its specifically non-material
predicates.
Particular mental happenings are, however, very much the
natural field of the internal approach. The self may fail to make
an appearance to the most introspect!vely inclined, but there is
no difficulty in supposing that one is aware of one's experiences
1 'The Bounds of Sense1, pp. 162-169»
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as objects of an inner attention. I must argue, however, that this
is only to delude oneself with a misconceptiono In my general
account of mind as non-descriptive I cannot allow such a thing as
an inner sense. Of course I am aware of a cut in my finger or of
the position of my foot; but the senses by which I am aware of
these things are, in these terms, as external as sight and hearing.
By an inner sense is meant one which sets a perceptual distance
between myself and my own experiences.
The claim that there is no such inner sense is inextricably
bound up with the claim that the language of mind is not descriptive»
It is by showing that the language of mind conforms to a different
model that I can hope to show that we need make no claim to
perceive events of the mind; while arguments against an inner
sense support; the denial that the language of mind is descriptive,
for, as this chapter has been intended to show, description is tied
to perception. I have also argued that description is not so
ontologically valuable as to be indispensable. My long-term aim,
therefore, is to show that what goes on in the mind can be
represented in language without there having been an intervening
perception to turn existence into descriptive information.
CHAPTER 2
Recent Descriptive Theories of Mind.
I
In my over-all strategy, I hope to discredit the descriptive
interpretation of the language of mind mainly through the presentation
of a convincing alternativeo If that alternative can be made
sufficiently attractive, if it can be shown to solve long-standing
problems, then this end will be achieved; for acceptance goes to
that theory that provides the most comprehensive and coherent picture,
the one that leaves the fewest unsolved problems, leaving the other
to wither away. It is not fruitful to exercise old complaints,
or even new ones, against old theories, for what can take their
place requires a complete reccnceptualization of the situation. In
philosophy, as in science, theories cannot be built out of the
destruction of their predecessors. None the less, it is necessary
to indicate the sort of difficulties that the old approach ran into,
in order to show by contrast the value of a new theory that avoids
those difficulties. This, then, is one good, though limited, reason
for giving space to an account of the rival vdew. Fortunately,
however, the theories with which it is most appropriate to illustrate
the descriptive approach are such as to make their discussion
profitable in other directions.
The focal point for discussions of mind has, in the recent
past, been provided by the Identity Theory of mind which was
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introduced about fifteen years ago. In the period since its
introduction this theory has broadened and changed to become what is
2
known as Central State Materialism. It has also received much
criticism, both from traditional mentalist points of view and from
3
a newer position known as Functionalism. The Identity Theory
itself can be taken to be, in one if not in all ways, a paradigm
example of descriptive accounts of mind; and, consequently, it
serves very well to illustrate the limitations of such accounts.
After isolating what I take to be its crucial weakness, I shall,
therefore, introduce one aspect of my theory by contrast with it.
At the other extreme, Functionalism can be seen as leading into
the sort of account that I wish to give, even though it does not
itself contain a sufficient reappraisal of the distinctive role of
the language of mind and therefore remains tied to a materialist
ontology.
It is Central State Materialism, however, that provides the
most interesting positive reason for the discussion of these theories.
As early as the very first section of this thesis, I suggested one
particular reason why it should now be easier to accept a non-
1 This dates its effective introduction from J.J.C. Smart's
'Sensations and Brain Processes', though this followed in the
steps of U.T. Place's 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?' and
was preceded by the publication of Herbert Feigl's rather
different theory in the original form of 'The "Mental" and the
"Fnysical"'.
2 This theory s o.sso***-3 3.1/Bcl of D©M« A27ms"fcz*on£C<*
It is succinctly presented in David Lewis' 'An Argument for the
Identity Theory' and at much greater length in Armstrong's 'A
Materialist Theory of the Mind'.
3 The functionalist criticism first appeared in Hilary Putnam's
'Minds and Machines', and he and Jerry Fodor are regarded as
the theory's main protagonists.
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descriptive theory of mind. With the advance of neuro-physiology,
the body can be seen as competent to act as the objective initiator
of all the multifarious activities of man. To remove mind out of
the realm of what can be described is to leave a space that needs
to be filled by new descriptionso The value of Central State
Materialism is that it does broach the problem of providing a
descriptive account of the objective origins of human behaviour.
As a theory of mind it is, I contend, false; but it may provide
the needed descriptive counter-part to the non-descriptive account
of mindo
II
The Identity Theory of Kind proposes that mental occurrences
are contingently identifiable with certain physical processes in the
brain. Its name is, to some extent, a misnomer, for, in all its
original manifestations, it j;as intended as a theory of limited
scope that did not purport to cover the whole of the mental. Whether
the favoured term was 'consciousness' (Place), 'sensations' (Smart)
or 'raw feels' (Feigl), what was to enter the identity from the
mental side was limited to the lived-through-experience aspect of
mind. As presented by Place and Smart, the theory was intended as
a contribution to a general materialist ontology and formed an
attack on what was regarded as the most recalcitrant feature of the
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mental, leaving other aspects to be dealt with by methods that had
1
already been adumbrated. Feigl, on the other hand, was not biased
towards materialism and placed quite as much weight on his raw feels
as on the neural events with which they were supposed to be
identifiedo He, too, however, agreed in splitting off these
experiences from other aspects of the mental that he grouped
together as intentional and therefore as "logical" rather than as
2
objective or "psychological".
The proposal, then, that the progenitors of the Identity
Theory advanced was, in Smartds formulation, "the thesis that sens-
3ations are brain processes". To clarify this contention, they
disassociated it from a thesis that might possibly have been confused
with it. The factual identity of sensation and brain process
would not imply that the name of the sensation meant the same as
the name of the brain process. 'After-image' or 'ache' would not
3
mean the same as 'brain process of sort X'. The discovery of any
one of these identities was claimed to be an empirical one. Before
the discovery, therefore, the names could not be understood to have
the same reference; and, even after the discovery, the names could
continue to have different senses so that what was said in statements
expressed in terms of the sensation would still be different from
4
what was said in statements expressed in terms of the brain process.
1 Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', Borst ppc 42-43.
2 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"', pp. 78-79.
3 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 95.
4 Op. cit., Borst pp. 55-56; but see 'The Identity Theory of Kind:
Comments on the Papers', p. 87.
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The Identity Theory has built into its foundations, therefore,
grounds for the rejection of one traditional objection to materialist
theories of roindo It had been argued that we could not possibly
be speaking of a material process when we spoke of an experience
in our customary manner; for we could not mean a material process
when we had no intention of speaking of one and, moreover, had no
idea of what any such process might be. The confusion in this
argument, as Smart pointed out,"' is between meaning as sense and
meaning as reference. Identity of reference does not demand identity
of sense and when empirically established cannot have been preceded
by it.
In all its forms, therefore, the Identity Theory seeks to
establish an empirical bridge between two conceptual systems, the
mental and the neuro-physiological. It strives to meet in quasi-
scientific terms the challenge to the concept of mind posed by
our greatly increased knowledge of the brain and our recognition
of what it may be shown to be capable of. The originators of the
theory - or the theories - differed greatly, however, in the degree
to which they wished to bring the mental under the sway of science.
While allowing science full scope, Feigl still set the mental and
the physical in equal balance. Place and Smart, on the other hand,
were motivated by the desire to submit everything to the rule of
science, and they therefore weighted the identity in favour of the
physical.
1 0po cit., Borst pp. 57-58.
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Of these two attitudes, it is Feigl's that I am more in accord
with. At first sight, too, its equal balance would seem to carry
an advantage as a fair reflection of an impartiality in the identity
itself. To express an identity it is necessary to yoke together
two characterisations of the one object. The impression then given
is that each characterization must be of equal weight because each
is of equal importance to the expression of the identity. This
presumption may be partly based, however, on the irrational feeling
that, in any identity, two objects are found to be one* In so far
as the two sides of a true identity are distinct, they are, of course,
only characterizations. Competence to pick out the object is what
is required of them in playing their role in the identity, and it
is not clear that this ensures them a place in the final account;
for stricter standards may be exercised once the identity has been
established. One characterization may then be subordinated to the
other as being less informative, or even as being misleading, about
the nature of the object. Despite my sympathy for Feigl's attitude,
therefore, I do not think that his balance between the mental and
the physical gains immediate support from the apparent equality of
the identity relation!
1 Whether the mental can in fact be thus subordinated to the
physical is quite another question that I shall discuss later.
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III
The sheer weight of discussion has made the Place/Smart line
the standard version of the Identity Theory. In this form, as I
have said, the theory makes a determined effort to reduce the
mental to the physical. The language of science is preferred
to the language of mind on the grounds that it will afford a fuller
explanation and more accurate prediction of 'mental' states, and
that it brings these states together with all the other states of
the universe under one explanatory umbrella. The theory thus
sets out to rectify what is taken to be a long-standing neglect of
Occam's razor"': the principle that entities should not be multiplied
without good reason. Where two entities, mental and physical, had
been envisaged, there was to be only one; but Feigl's version would
have achieved as mucho The materialist version does not stay at
entities, therefore, but insists that any properties of sensations,
mentioned in mental language, can be further elucidated in the
language of science. The take-over is therefore comprehensive.
No part of mental language, subject term or predicate, is to be
left with a distinct ontological role.
Seen from the point of view of scientific inquiry, the theory
therefore appears as an attempt to provide a justified authorization
of a comprehensive account of human nature. The scientist is to be
licensed to say that his account is a full and complete one that
1 Smart, Op. cit., Borst pp. 53-54-
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leaves nothing out. lie is to be allowed to treat a relation,
that might otherwise appear to be nothing more than a correlation,
as an identity. In discovering, for example, a brain condition
that concurs in a law-like way with the experience of pain, he
can claim to have discovered the real identity of the pain experience,
and not merely a physical occurrence that always accompanies that
experience.
As the theory warrants contingent identifications of mental
states with physical states, there-has been some temptation to
regard the theory itself as being empirically establishable. Place,
in particular, argued that the theory could not be established by
conceptual arguments alone. Once the conceptual ground had been
cleared, there would still remain the job of establishing that there
were suitable physical processes to satisfy criteria of identity
with each mental process.'' In this he differed from Smart, who was
inclined to stress that, however many satisfactory correlations were
obtained between physical and mental processes, these could not be
empirically established as identities. On Smart's view, therefore,
the theory made a claim that could not be substantiated by any
2
amount of scientific evidence.
This disagreement clearly arises from a difference over what
is to count as establishing a theory. Place is thinking in terms
of a scientific theory which, while it certainly has to attract by
its conceptual coherence and simplicity, can only be established
by being checked against old and new observations. Smart, on the
1 'Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis', Borst, p. 85*
2 Op. cit., Borst pp. 65-66.
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other hand, sees it as a philosophical theory which more or less
takes for granted the success of science if it were once given its
head; and a philosophical theory is finally supported by such
conceptual arguments as philosophers find persuasive. That there
is something odd about Place's view is apparent in the title of his
article: 'Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis'. To adopt a
materialist view towards anything is surely to regard it as
appropriate subject matter for science. One can then develop
suitable scientific theories to explicate it, but materialism does
not need to, and indeed cannot, appear as one of the hypotheses
to be established by scientific methods. It is not materialism,
therefore, that could be established by the observations that Place
calls for, but a particular theory about the nature - assumed to be
material - of what we now call 'sensations'.
This is an important point, for scientific theories, unlike
philosophical theories, can be developed on credit. By describing
the evidence in their own terms, scientific theories are permitted
to count their chickens before they are hatched. If, then, the
Identity Theory were a scientific theory, it would require only the
successful completion of Place's series of observations to establish
it; for its interpretation of those observations would already
have prejudged the issue. The identity theory, however, is external
to science. In intention, it is a permit allowing the writ of
science to run in further areas, and as such it would not mesh
into the net of scientific explanation. Once accepted, it would be
eliminable; for it would never appear in a final scientific account.
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If there was but one set of entities with only scientifically
explicable properties, these would properly be spoken of in physical
terras alone.
Another way ofmaking this point is to observe that the
scientific account of man under the standard Identity Theory would
be exactly the same as the scientific account of man under the
doctrine of Parallelism: the theory that to every mental event
there is a physical correlate. Both these theories demand a
perfect correlation between the mental and the physical and differ
only in their account of this conjunction. There is no experimental
evidence that can discriminate between them; and, therefore, neither
can appear as a justified part of the scientific account.
If the Identity Theory was taken to be a scientific theory,
there can be little doubt that only time and scientific investigation
would be needed before its acceptance. This has been shown best,
perhaps, in a joint article by Richard Routley and Valerie Macrae."'
They argue painstakingly for the identity of sensations and physical
2
occurrences on an analogy with lightning and an electrical discharge.
They show that identity has many advantages over theories that either
propose a looser relationship or the complete extinction of the one
3
in the other. They therefore conclude that the identity should be
1 'On the Identity of Sensations ana Fnysiological Occurrences'.
2 Op. cit., p. 104«
3 The case for correlation, as against identity, has DG6ii 5.1 gucdj
notably by Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim. Reference to such
physical laws as the Eoyle-Charles Law (Kim, 'On the Psycho¬
physical Identity Theory', O'Connor p. 199) which relates
temperature to mean kinetic energy without identifying the two
/cont'd
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accepted, once there is a satisfactory scientific account of the
physiological occurrences that explains their causal dependence on
and responsibility for the circumstances normally connected with the
1
sensations. They do not, however, settle the question whether it
is possible to regard sensations as analogous to lightning and
therefore as amenable to scientific treatment..
It is the non-scientific nature of the Identity Theory that
justifies the great weight that Smart places on Occam's razor in
his defence of the theory. If mind is to be handed over to science,
it will be of our own accord rather than at the dictates of science.
Occam's razor is a plea that a philosopher can recognize even if it
scarcely amounts to an argument. A theory such as parallelism is
embarrassing in its proliferation of entities if - but it is an
important 'if' - no positive justification can be found for its
duplication of occurrences. The official Identity Theory, on the
other hand, is parsimonious and has no ontological excrescences to
explain. We should also admit that we cannot be unmoved by the
offer of science to provide a better explanation and prediction of
'mental' events than we can now provide in mental terms. It may
not matter, therefore, if no better conceptual reasons can, be found
for the acceptance of the Identity Theory; and Smart, for one, has
3 /cont'd
does, however, reveal our attitude to properties rather than to
the events with which we are concerned in the case of mind.
Brandt and Kim do argue that events are property-like ('The
Logic of the Identity Theory', O'Connor pp. 214-215); but I
have already contested Kim's views on this subject in my first
chapter.
1 Op. cit., p. 109o
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admitted that he neither has a conclusive reason nor expects to
find one. The onus still seems to be on the opponent of the
Identity Theory to show why it should not be accepted.
IV
According to the Identity Theory, particular conscious
experiences are empirically identifiable with particular brain
processes. What is it that takes place in any such cross-identification,
and what are its necessary antecedents? In the identification, a
thing known under one name is recognized as the same as a thing known
under another name. It is clear, therefore, that, before the
cross-identification can take place, the thing must have been separately
identified under two different names. In the case of the Identity
Theory, this must mean, firstly, that something must already have been
identified as a brain process and, secondly and more interestingly,
that something - supposedly the same thing - must already have been
identified as an experience. With the Place/-Smart version of the
theory, there is an additional requirement that there should be no
specifically mental properties to remain as an obstinate mental rump
when the one entity has been successfully identified. Thus the manner
in which sensations are individuated in mental language must be
1 'The Identity Theory of Mind: Comments on the Papers', pp. 84-£5»
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directly transposable into the ascription of properties to physical
processes.
It was for these reasons that I earlier spoke of the Identity
Theory as a paradigm example of a descriptive theory of mindo In
a very important way it is, of course, very far from typical of
theories of mind, for it seeks to abolish mind as an independent
entity. On the other hand one will scarcely find another theory
with so clear a commitment to the claim that the language of mind
functions in just the same manner as objective language. With a
dualist theory, there might always be a slight doubt whether the
use of descriptive linguistic forms did not have a rather different
function in the separate context of mind. In the Identity Theory,
however, there is no separate context. The need to establish a
connection both in subject terms and in predicates between the
mental and the physical languages demands that they should have
strictly parallel forms and functions.
While therefore the Identity Theory does discriminate against
mental language, it yet allows it a proper descriptive role. Unlike
some coarser version of materialism, it does not deny that talk
about mental events is well-founded. Mental states are perfectly
good states - physical ones, in fact -, and mental terms do pick
out genuine entities by means of genuine, though unperspicuous,
characterizations. Having a sharp pain or having a green after¬
image, for example, are both well identified conditions, and only
await further identification as physical conditions. For the
purposes of that identification, there must be some translation into
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physical terms not only of 'pain' and 'after-image' but also of
'sharp' and 'green'; though, as Smart was concerned to point out,
there may have to be some juggling with what is to count as a subject
term, and a corresponding revision of predicates, if the identification
is to be at all plausible.
The proposed translation out of the mental language into
the physical was almost certain to run into greater obstacles with
respect to predicates than with respect to subject terms. In the
descriptive scheme it is the predicates that are the principle
receptacle of sense. The subject terms' indicating role is carried
out through the assimilation of predicates, but abstracted from those
predicates it would entirely fail to specify the nature of the
reality indicated. If, then, one makes a sharp distinction
between subject terms and predicates, or between particulars and
their properties, the particular will lack defined character. In
the present context, therefore, a descriptive analysis of mental
language will, by distinguishing between subject terms and predicates,
leave mental particulars without character: most importantly,
without specifically mental character. Prom this point it is clear
that the identification of the mental particular with a physical
entity must pass off with few objections; for - to put it bluntly -
no-one can have much of an idea of what is supposed to be happening.
On the other hand, the mental predicates, as the bearers of whatever
character may be specifically mental, will not submit so easily to
translation but will insist on an independent role. The result of
the descriptive analysis of mental language, therefore, is to produce
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unequal resistance to the translation that the Identity Theory
demands. If this pattern of resistance holds, the picture that
then emerges is one in which there may very well be only one entity,
but that entity must have not only physical properties but mental
properties as well.
It was natural, therefore, that Smart should have recognized
an objection based on mental properties as providing the strongest
challenge that his version of the Identity Theory had to face.
This objection he credited to Max Black. It claimed that "there
must be some properties which are logically distinct from those in
the physical story", if the entity is to have been picked out in
the first place in the mental story.'' The objection thus fastens
on what had appeared a strength in the theory, the ability of its
contingent identity to cross the gap between two languages that
wrere not on speaking terms. It allows the connection but, noting
that the link is independent of the meaningful expressions that it
hitches together, insists that these must retain independent roles
in relation to the unified object. The next move is to objectify
the senses of these independent expressions into properties. \'!e
then have the same picture as I mentioned above, of one entity with
both physical and mental properties. The mental would thus live
on as a range of properties and as a half-share of the nature of
the basic entities which would not be specifically physical or mental.
1 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 59«
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This objection is clearly not directed at the Identity Theory
as such, but only at the Place/Smart version. It strikes in
particular at the support that their version gains from Occam's
razor; for, if mental properties have to be included in the final
account, the identification of a single entity will have achieved
little simplification. A single system of explanation will
still be out of sight when the mental, in the form of properties
as in the form of particulars, falls outside the scientific
account.
Does the objection, though, establish its point? It is an
attempt to make something of the apparent balance of the identity
relation, by suggesting that an expression's competence to pick
out an object does ensure its presence in the final account of
that object. This claim would seem to gain support from the formal
explication in Leibniz' Law of what is meant by the identity of
the object. As J.T. Stevenson was the first to point out in this
context, Leibniz' Lav/ appears to draw all characterizations, from
either side of the identity, into the final account of the
■]
identified entity. Unfortunately though, Leibniz' Lav/, as I
presented it in section xii of my first chapter, is crucially
ambiguous in this context. It may mean that x is identical v/ith
y if and only if every property of x is a property of y and
2
conversely, which is the form in v/hich Stevenson quotes it ; but
1 "Sensations and Brain Processes"; A Reply to J.J.C. Smart'.
2 Op. cit., Borst p. 68.
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it can alternatively be taken to mean that x is identical with y
if and only if every term correctly predicated of x may be correctly
predicated of y and conversely.,
It is possible to imagine a situation in which this ambiguity
did not matter. In Leibniz' own vision of the world, for instance,
language and reality were perfectly attuned. Reality was mapped
out in subject and predicate, substances and their properties
were displayed in logical order in the perfect language. With
such a conception, it clearly would not matter whether one spoke
in terms of properties or of predicates. Each set maps into the
other, and the Law will clearly indicate the same identities in
either case. The position is quite different, however, when
we are concerned with two ranges of predicates that are unconnected
with each other, and when the question at issue is whether they
each correspond to a different set of properties or both to the
same set. Then the predicate form of the Law will deny the identity
if any predicates cannot be transferred from one side of it to the
other; but the property form will confirm the identity if those
particular predicates do not correspond to distinct properties.
The evidence that Stevenson can produce, in support of his
claim that the identified entity must have specifically mental
properties, consists of those mental predicates, whatever they may
be, thak, according to Smart's premise, prevent identity of sense
1
between physical and mental descriptions. The version of Leibniz'
1 Op. cit., Borst p. 90*
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Lav; that he is entitled to use, therefore, is the predicate form.
He cannot justifiably employ the property form of the Law without
the added assumption that every predicate corresponds to a distinct
property; and that is the one form of the Law that would provide
him with his conclusion. The predicate form of the Law would, on
the same premises, deny the identity altogether rather than allow
it with the proviso of separate mental properties.
The predicate form of Leibniz* Law seems of doubtful validity
when it is allowed to range over a sufficiently wide range of
predicates. The property formulation, on the other hand, seems
entirely valid, but is at the same time of doubtful application
A single entity, referred to in both physical and mental language,
would indeed have all the properties that it did have, whichever
language these were specified in; but we cannot be certain that
the twin lists of physical and mental predicates provide a single,
consistent and non-repetitive catalogue of its properties. As I
suggested in section ix of chapter 1, properties are not countable.
In particular, there are no natural demarcations placing them in a
one-to-one relation with predicates; therefore, predicates do
not isolate properties that cannot be approached in any other way.
Their very specificity prevents them from monopolizing any area of
the property continuum. If, therefore, some predicates are not
naturally attachable to some subject term, that subject term may
yet indicate an object with a suitable property basis for those
predicates. There may, indeed, be predicates that are naturally
attachable to the subject term which reflect the same property basis.
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Anyone arguing on behalf of distinct mental properties on
lines similar to Stevenson's seems, therefore, to be faced with a
dilemma. They may, on the one hand, decide to accept the inter¬
dependence of properties, the subordination of one predicate to
another, and the possibility of a movement towards the basic
property continuum that supports all these universals. In this
case, the existence of a separate range of predicates, currently
unconnected in meaning with any material predicates, cannot show
that they do not share the same property basis with certain material
predicates to which they might perhaps be subordinated. They may,
on the other hand - and this is the more likely prefer to stick
to the line that every predicate introduces a different property
and that no subordination or progress towards a basic continuum
is possible. In this case, the existence of a distinct range of
predicates and their corresponding properties could have little
bearing on the nature of the objects to which they were related.
Properties would then be so language-dependent that they would be
conceptual rather than objective. The impossibility of establishing
any interrelationship between properties would not therefore
demonstrate a difference in nature. It would show instead the
impossibility of demonstrating by difference of properties that
there was any such real difference. On this picture, mental language
might be discarded, in response to other demands such as that of
ontologlcal simplicity, as merely another way of talking about the
same, comparatively simple, particulars. If the possibility of
the subordination of predicates is not recognized, they lose their
role as ontological determinants.
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These criticisms apply, however, only to attempts to
establish the actuality and distinct character of mental properties
through the application of Leibniz' Law. They leave open the
possibility of establishing the same conclusion by different
methodso Provided an account of properties similar to my own is
accepted, it is possible to argue for the indispensability of
mental predicates on two levels. Firstly, there is the quite
comprehensible claim that mental predicates correspond to an
entirely different property basis from those which support physical
predicates. Secondly, an interesting case could still be made
out for the mental as an independent aspect of reality, even if
it were allowed that the ultimate property basis was the same as
for physical predicates. This case would have to rest on the
correspondence of mental predicates to a sufficiently distinct
and important set of higher-level properties.
To say of the first suggestion that it is comprehensible
is not to say that it is easy to find arguments in support of it.
The assumption of an identity of particulars suggests success in
the scientific programme; but that would depend on the discovery
of some sort of law-like association between mental and physical
properties. It would not then be plausible to suggest that saying
'everything mental is physical' was comparable to saying 'everything
coloured is extended'. Green does not pair exclusively with triangles
or red with circles, but the same freedom of distribution relative
to each, other could not be the lot of mental and physical
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properties. This would strongly suggest, therefore, that the
two types of properties were not independent of each other. Of
three possibilities, two would be plausible: that mental universals
were founded in physical universals, or that both shared a common
property basis.
The second suggestion is probably the more hopeful, therefore,
if one wishes to establish a distinct class of descriptive properties
as mentalo An illustration of what is intended may be provided
by the example of brlttleness, already touched on in chapter 1»
That dispositional universal is related to a more basic universal
defined in terms of molecular bonding; but 'brittle' possesses,
none the less, a distinct role in our conception of reality, along
with other dispositional terms. In a similar way, mental terms
could have a distinct well-founded role despite the subsidiary
2
status of their corresponding universals.
This view of mental properties as subordinate, but as
sufficiently differentiated to retain the mental as a distinct
preserve, might well find expression in a double aspect theory:
that is, one that treats the mental and the physical as reality
identified through different modes of inspection. Within such a
theory, mental language becomes our means of expressing our
1 The conceptual feasibility of a theory that did place mental and
physical properties in such free relationship is discussed by
Jaegwon Kim, who introduces, the colour/shape example ('Psycho¬
physical Laws and Theories of Kind', pp. 204-206).
2 It could be argued that a dispositional term such as 'brittle',
despite its subordination to here-and-now structure terms, does
introduce a completely different primitive property basis
related to potentiality for change. A similar power might be
credited to mental terms, and their subordination might thus be
regarded as only partial.
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acquaintance with reality through internal self-awareness. Mental
predicates would have, therefore, a distinctive enough role. Even
if the universals to which they corresponded were subsidiary to
certain physical universals - as brittleness to molecular bonding -,
the mental would be preserved as an important aspect of reality.
It is true that this double aspect theory would form another version
of the Identity Theory, and, as I have presented it, a materialist
version. It would, however, allow much more independence to the
mental than Smart's version does,- and retain at least something
of what mentalists hold dear.
V
All such speculation would be unnecessary, however, if a
more direct way could be found of relating mental and physical
predicates. Smart originally believed that he had such a way:
the proposal that all characterizations of sensations were essentially
1 topic-neutral'.^ He introduced this counter to the separate-
mental-properties objection with the following suggestion: "When
a person says 'I see a yellowish-orange after-image', he is saying
something like this: 'The re is something going on which is like
what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an
1 . The same proposal had already been made unobtrusively by Place,
'Is Consciousness a Brain Frocess?', Borst p. 50.
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orange illuminated in good light in front of me, that is, when I
1
really see an orange'The words underlined here are those said
to be topic-neutral. What is going on is not specified, and is
therefore, in Smart's view, free to be identified as a physical
occurrence in the brain.
The contextual placement of what is going on, that Smart
has provided here, is clearly intended to cope with the yellowish-
orange aspect of the experience. Further similes would be
required to cover its distinctive after-image character. One
can imagine something on the lines of 'like what is going on after
I have stared fixedly at a bright light', given Smart's intention
that the likeness mentioned should not exclude something being like
2
itselfo Can the formula that Smart provides be thought adequate,
though, to cover even the yellowish-orange aspect of the experience?
One feature of the formula which was commented on by critics
was the particularity of the orange as a reference point. It was
pointed out, for instance, that oranges do not only have a typical
colour; they also have a typical shape. Therefore the formula
does not distinguish what goes on when I am visually confronted
with a yellowish-orange object from what goes on when I am similarly
confronted with a roughly spherical object."' For reasons to be
mentioned later, Smart might run into difficulties if he tried to
avoid this problem by speaking directly of 'yellowish-orange
objects'; but he could introduce a list of objects of that colour
1 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. GO.
2 Op. cit., Borst p. 60.
3 J.W. Cornnan, 'The Identity of Kind and Body', Borst p. 126.
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that were sufficiently varied in shape'and in every other range
of properties to single out yellowish-orange as their common
factor® He might then have seemed to have achieved the required
specifity; but, envisaging this move, Ccrnman objected that 'what
is going on' is still insufficiently precise because there is more
than one thing that typically occurs when I am confronted with a
yellowish-orange object; there are, for example, events in the
retina.^
This objection makes an assumption about what is asserted
in the original sensation statement. 'There is something going
on . . .' will be an unsatisfactory translation for the reason given
only if the original statement specified one rather than another of
the typical occurrences. It is true that a slight emendation of
Smart's formula is required, but that is only the substitution of
'something' for 'what is', to remove the suggestion that through
'what is going on' we are referring to all that typically occurs.
Given that emendation, however, the question is whether 'experience'
or 'sensation' are any more specific than the inserted 'something'®
To sustain the objection against the topic-neutral translation,
it would be necessary to show that 'experience' or 'sensation'
are used with such a sense as enables them to indicate a part¬
icular occurrence. If, however, their sense is exhausted by their
attached predicates, ' of yellowish-orange' for example, the
1 I think this is Cornman's objection. He has published the
argument three times (Op. cit. , 'Metaphysics, Reference, and
Language', p. 43, 'Materialism and Sensations', p. 44)', but
since he has not made any significant alteration in the wording,
it has not become any clearer.
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objection would fail. Further specification of the occurrence
could then depend on neurological study of what happened if and
only if an experience was reported.
The significance of this way of discounting the imprecision
of the topic-neutral formula can be expanded by showing how it
also counters an objection developed by M»C. Bradley against the
formula. Bradley argued that, in the over-all pattern of Smart's
strategy, his topic-neutral formula had to be offered as a strict
1
analysis of the sensation statemento Nov;, I agree that it had in
the circumstances to be offered as a translation (even if an
incomplete one) and as expressing just what the sensation statement
meanso Thus Smart was wrong to suggest that it was offered only
as giving "in an informal way what a sensation report purports
2
to be about" or as vaguely "showing what sorts of things sensation
3
reports are". This need for equivalence of meaning does not
demand, however, that there must be mutual implication between the
topic-neutral formula and the original sensation statement as
4
Bradley suggests. If the sensation statement is in itself
sufficiently vague, a true translation of it will not imply ito
'I am having a sensation of yellowish-orange' would be vague in the
required manner, if we could only find out which of various types
of occurrence it referred to by noting when it was spoken rather
than by understanding its meaning. 'A sensation of yellowish-
1 'Sensations, Brain-Processes, and Colours', pp. 366-91
2 'Philosophy and Scientific Realism', p. 96.
3 'The Identity Theory of Mind: Comments on the Papers', pp. 90-91.
4 Op. cit., p. 390.
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orange' could then be taken to mean 'something . • <>', even
though there were more somethings so specified than were
identifiable as such experiences.
It would then be true that 'a sensation of yellowish-orange'
would have failed to specify an occurrence; but it would have
characterized one sufficiently to allow the identification as a
physical occurrence still to go through. The correlational
scientific methods do not, after all, require that the occurrence
should be uniquely determined by the original description. What
they do require is that a particular type of occurrence should be
found on every occasion when that description is applicable, but
never when it is not. The type of occurrence must be fully
compatible with the description, but it does not have to be picked
out by it. Other happenings which could be identical with what
it indicates, given the latitude of the description, can be excluded
by non-occurrence when needed or occurrence when not. The identity
of mental and physical occurrences could still be established,
therefore, even though our mental language lacks means of specifying
the event which is intended out of all those occurring in, for
example, a perceptual situation.
I consider, therefore, that Smart was mistaken in his
inclination to abandon the topic-neutral formula on account of this
criticism by Bradley."' His retreat was reinforced by his failure to
take to heart some earlier strictures by Jerome Shaffer on his
1 'The Identity Theory of Mind: Comments on the papers', p. 91*
116
confusing the meanings of terms with the ways in which those
1
meanings are learnt. He still speaks, therefore, of a child's
learning 'yellow' without having first learnt 'lemon' as providing
evidence against a topic-neutral formula expressed in terms of a
lemon (replacing an orange in the original formulation), a
criticism that could be extended to all items on one's own list
of yellow objects. Ask the child what he means by 'an experience
of yellow', however, and he may say that it is the sort of experience
he has when he sees nomels, etc., etc., naming further unknown
objects. At this point, if the topic-neutral formula is accepted,
'an experience of yellow' has a different sense for the child from
the one it has for oneself. We may suppose, however, that
confirmation that it refers to the same sort of occurrence in each
case may be obtained through the mutual introduction of objects
unknown to the other. If all these objects are agreed to be
yellow, not only will the reference of the expression be identical
but its sense will be so henceforth," since the classes of reference
objects will have expanded into equivalence. At any point in the
story, however, the identification of 'an experience of yellow'
with a brain process could be made by any scientist who understood
what objects were being referred to; for the occurrence could be
picked out just as well in relation to nomels, etc., as to lemons,
etc. The topic-neutral formula still seems, therefore, to provide
1 'Mental Events and the Brain', Borst p. 136.
2 Op. cit., p. 91o
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a coherent comprehensible account, even if one may have some doubts
about the child's meaning something different by 'an experience
of yellow'.
VI
Bradley later brought a further criticism to bear against
Smart's topic-neutral translation of sensation statements®^ This
attack concentrated entirely on experiences of colour, setting
the topic-neutral account against Smart's avowed theory of colour
in objects. What Bradley argued was that, considered together,
the two accounts of colour experiences and of coloured objects
formed a closed circle in which no starting point could be found
2
as a basis for the introduction of colours® Just as sensation
statements gained their meaning by reference to objects of part¬
icular colours, so apparently did objective colour statements gain
their meaning by reference to sensations of particular colours.
Is summarized by Bradley, the theory of colours that Smart
held at this time proposed that the colour of an object was "the
power of the object to produce colour discriminations in normal
3
percipients". A red object was thus conceived to be an object
1 'Critical Notice: 'Philosophy and Scientific Realism'', pp. 262-7«
2 Op. cit®, p. 267.
3 Op® cit®, p. 263.
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that a normal percipient could, given suitable lighting, dis¬
criminate easily from green, blue or yellow objects, but less
1
easily from other red objects.
Against this theory, CoB. Martin advanced an objection based
on the conceptual experiment of imagining that everything changed
2
colour systematically. It was to be supposed, for example, that
all red things became green, all blue things yellow, and so on
with all colours changing into their complementaries. After
this change, which seems impossible only from a practical point
of view, it would be the same things which would be hard to
discriminate from each other and easy from all others. On Smart's
theory, therefore, there 'would be no good reason for saying that
they had changed colour. We are agreed, however, that this
change that passes unnoticed on Smart's account was a change in
colour; so the objection naturally concludes that Smart has
failed to explain the meaning of colour.
Smart produced two replies to this objection. He first
suggested that it could be discovered scientifically that the
surfaces of the objects had changed so that they now reflected
3
light of different wave-lengths. Bradley rightly protested,
however, that such a discovery was not recognized as relevant in
4Smart's explanation of what colour meant. Smart's second reply
1 J.J.C. Smart, 'Philosophy and Scientific Realism', pp. 76-81.
2 Quoted by Smart, op. cit., p. 81.
3 Smart, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
4 Bradley, op. cit., p. 264*
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then, was that experiences of colour when the perceiver was
1
faced with the same objects would be different after the change.
This is a reply that Bradley would be happy to accept, but again
he doubts that Smart has any right to it. Indeed his objection to
the first reply would again be relevant; but he suggests instead
that it is Smart's topic-neutral account of sensation statements
2
that debars him from using it.
According to the topic-neutral account, a sensation of red
is one that is typically caused by red objects. Smart is now
telling us, however, that a red object is one that produces
certain behaviour and also experiences of red. This has every
appearance of circularity. In Bradley's words, we are first "to
eliminate the mention of colour experiences in favour of ascriptions
of colours to stimulus objects. Given the analysis of 'colour',
we are then to eliminate the colour expressions in favour of the
terms of the analysis ('behaviour' and 'colour experienced). But
then 'colour experiences' is what was at the outset to be eliminated
as repugnant; so we must again eliminate it, in favour of
3
ascriptions of colours to stimulus objects . . . And so forth."
What will happen, though, if we try to break out of this
circle by listing red objects? 'An experience of red' will then
mean 'something that typically occurs in the presence of raw meat,
etc., etc.,'. At first sight this might seem to place us in even
1 Smart, op. cit., pp. 82-83»
2 Bradley, op. cit., pp. 264-267*
3 Op. cit., p. 267.
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greater difficulty; for we might suppose that we would he compelled
to call objects such as raw meat 'red' even after they had turned
green in the general change. This would not be the case, howeverf
The result of the colouristic cataclysm would rather be that we
were forced to change what we meant by 'an experience of red'. We
would come to learn that this now meant 'something that typically
occurs in the presence of grass, etc., etc.'. Correspondingly,
it would be grass and other previously green objects that we would
now call 'red', as the imagined change demands we should.
This account of the change may well seem implausible. Eradley
could be expected to argue that words do not change their meaning
in this way. In particular he might suggest that the changed
application of the word 'red', must surely be due to our having
kept its meaning constant. This, however, we would have done.
A red object would still be understood to be one that gave us
experiences of red. It is only the meaning of 'an experience of
red' that would have changed; and that we can ascribe, on Smart's
behalf, to the short-comings of mental language. According to
his identity theory, we are able to recognize likenesses between
occurrences that we call sensations and which are in fact brain
1
processes. In so far as the grounds for these likenesses are
reflected in mental language, however, they are referred to the
objects in the presence of which they typically occuro There is
no reason why we should not continue to recognize likenesses between
the brain processes across the time of the colour change; but the
1 'Materialism', Borst pp. 162-164°
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language in which we spoke of those processes would be thrown into
disarra3r. Processes recognized as like would be linked with
previously untypical objects, and therefore a change would be
forced on a language that lacked sufficient comprehension of the
1
realities with which it attempted to cope.
VII
Given my acceptance of a listing of objects in the mental
specification of an experience, I cannot uphold Bradley's objection
on the grounds of circularity. None the less, I think that Smart
was probably right to move, under its influence, towards an
objectivist theory of colours. To suggest that a colour is a
power is less than plausible. When we say, for example, that
an object is red, we are surely, in intention, ascribing some
property to it. Since any power of an object is based on some
property, or group of properties, there would have to be some
property or properties supporting the colour if it were a power.
It therefore seems very odd that the property or properties should
go unmentioned, even though we imagined we were speaking about a
property. All that we may know about a colour as a property may
1 It goes without saying that over the period of the colour change
the attempt to establish an identity between mind and matter would
be thrown into abeyance; but it could begin again as soon as
the mental concepts had adjusted to the new scene.
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be that objects possessing it have the power to produce
experiences of red in us; but this does not make it any less a
property rather than a power.
Smart now believes that "colours are properties of the
surfaces of objects which explain the colour-discriminating
behaviour of normal human percipients".^ He considers that these
properties can be scientifically identified with certain physical
properties. Due to the complexity of the perceptual process,
2
however, these properties are "highly disjunctive and idiosyncratic".
They are not such as a scientist would ever identify, except under
the peculiar demand of explaining human behaviour.
As we have noted, however, talking of the identity of
properties,raises problems. To say that one property is identical
with another, on grounds other than the meaning-equivalence of
their names, can be understood only as a loose abbreviation. On
my interpretation, it can only mean that both properties correspond
to the same fundamental property basis. At the same time, however,
one universal can be subordinated to another as approximating, the
one less and the other more closely, to the same basis. In this
case, then, one may suppose that the universal of redness, for
example, can be regarded as subordinate to some complex physical
universal which approximates more closely to the property basis to
which both properties correspond.
1 'Critical notice: 'Content and Consciousness'', p. 623° We
might add that this explanation must be filled out by reference
to certain experiences or brain processes.
2 Op. cit., p. 623.
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The property of redness cannot, therefore, be said in any
strict sense to be identical with some complex physical propertyo
In consequence there is comparatively little difference between
Smart's account and that of Dennett, which he criticizes for its
failure to permit this same identity. Dennett thinks quite
correctly that colours are functional properties and that they are
therefore not to be identified with non-functional physical
2
properties. Like Smart, however, he misses the relevance of
the general point about the identification of properties. He
therefore offers some quite mistaken particular reasons for the
non-identity of colours and physical properties. It is not the
messiness of the required physical property that, as Dennett thinks,
3
prevents the identification. However tidy or scientifically
interesting it was, it could not be identical with the functional
colour. Nor is Dennett correct in thinking that the colour,
because functional, must be 'unreal'.^ It is no more made unreal,
by its dependence on perceivers than brittleness is made unreal
by its dependence on the causes of breakages.
Colours provide, of course, the ideal illustration for a view
of objects, such as I have proposed, that regards them as Kantian
appearances of reality. As objects are presented to us in natural
perception, they are coloured; but they are thus classified in
a way which is not fully borne out by any other description of them..
1 Op. cit., p. 623.
2 'Content and Consciousness', p. 146.
3 Op. cit., pp. 143-146.
4 Op. cito, p. 144.
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No appearances are without foundation in reality, but colours
are particularly idiosyncratic in terms of that reality as it is
conceived in more serious ontologies. If they can only be
subordinated to a long disjunctive list of properties in the
language of physical science, it becomes cuite exceptionally
evident that the specific character of these properties is a
product of an interaction between the perceiver and perceived
realityo It would be a mistake, however, to single out colours
as essentially different from other properties of objects because
of their apparential character. One might say that objects can
be coloured only because they too are appearances with all their
properties, however they are conceived. Colours are, therefore,
only the most obvious exemplars of properties as pertaining to
appearances, differing from other properties in degree rather than
in kindo
VIII
I have given Smart and his identity theory a good run. Indeed,
I have tried to show one part of his theory, the topic-neutral
translation, to be good for a longer distance than Smart himself
thought it to be. The time has now come, however, to question
the whole endeavour.
What I shall aim to achieve is very close to the intended
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purpose of the argument by Bradley that 1 discussed in section vi.
In trying to show that Smart's accounts of sensation statements
and of colours bit each others' tails in a fruitless circle, he
was suggesting that our experiences of colour must be accepted as
data in any discussion of colour; that they cannot be conjured
out of behaviour, brain processes and the physical properties of
object surfaces. It is my intention, also, to argue that
experiences must be accepted as existing outside the range of these
materials or of anything that can be constructed from them. In
doing so, I can take a lesson from the failure, as I suppose, of
Bradley's approach. He attempted to fault the system on its own
terms; but it may well be generally unprofitable to try to pin
down an error in the materialist programme by showing that jt is
inconsistent or incomplete in itself. One can, after all, imagine
a machine that could produce appropriately distinct responses to all
colours. Within that machine there would be states mediating
between input and output. Someone might choose to call those
states, or a selection of them, 'sensations'. If, then, the
process can be materialized in this fashion, it seems unprofitable
to argue that a materialist account of the process is incomprehensible.
What can be denied, however, is that the 'sensations' located in
the machine belong to the sane category of being as sensations
as we know them in human life. That denial needs support, not
from a critique of materialism, but from a presentation of the
positive claims that can be made for experiences.
This is a brave assertion; for, as every philosopher knows,
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sensations may well seem to 'speak* loudly for themselves, but to
put their case into words is the hardest of taskso As Deutscher
says, "The feeling is that we know without any sort of argument or
inference that physicalism is false» For one thing we know this
by our immediate acquaintance with the richness of our sensory
experience. However, when I try to catch this feeling by the
throat and make it speak, all I get are bad arguments."^ Philosophers
dislike bad arguments, so it is not surprising that they may sometimes
be driven apparently into an apparently reckless attitude of dismissal
2
towards the natural evidences. It is such an attitude that gains
expression in Smart's defiant remark: "Raw feels, in my view, are
3
colourless for the very same reason that something is colourless".
When Smart uses the word 'colourless' here, I am not sure
whether he is making the point that sensations are not coloured,
not red, yellow or blue that is, or the rather different point that
sensations are not "colourful" in the sense of being vivid and
interesting. Probably he does mean the former; but, within his
argument as a whole, that can feature only as an exemplar of the
more general point. It is the latter that he requires to sustain
his thesis that, while sensations - as brain processes - do have
properties, all those properties are no more mentioned in speaking
of sensations than the properties of an object are in speaking of
1 'Mental and Physical Properties', p. 79*
2 They really do deserve more sympathy than was shown by William
Kneale's kindly eschewing psycho-analytic explanations of why an
intelligent man should philosophize in this fashion. ('Critical
Notice: 'A Materialist Theory of Mind1', p. 299«)
3 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 61.
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'something'• Pains as well as experiences of colour must lack
specifically mental properties, and. experiences of colour must
lack all such properties, not just colours. One might, too, let
the restricted point pass; sensations cannot be red in the same
sense as that in which raw meat is red. It is the general denial
of "colourfulness" that seems to deny our fond presuppositions.
It is "colourfulness", then, that we wish to accommodate:
that is, whatever it is that might make us feel sorry for a
colour-blind person quite apart from his comparative inefficiency
in discriminating between objects, or that might make us envious
of those people who feel no pain despite their liability to
injuries. Can the difficulty of putting this "colourfulness" into
words be overcome; and might it be possible at the same time to
explain just why it is so difficult to express?
Pet us return to the earliest exposition of the Identity
Theory.^ In the course of his article, Place suggested that a
major stumbling block to the identification of sensations with
brain processes had been what he called 'the Phenomenological
Fallacy'. That fallacy consisted in supposing that "when the
subject describes his experience, . . . he is describing the literal
properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal
2
cinema or television screen." It leads, Place suggests, to the
supposition that when a subject reports a green after-image there
1 U.T. Place, 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?'.
2 Op. cit., Borst p. 49. That this was a fallacy was not an
original point; but Place sets it in the same context as I
have been using.
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is an object that is literally green. It is based, however, on
the assumption that "because we recognize things in our environment
by their look, sound, smell, taste, and feel, we begin by describing
their phenomenal properties, i.e. the properties of the looks,
sounds, smells, tastes, arid feels which they produce in us, and
2
infer their real properties from their phenomenal properties."
On the contrary, Place claims, "we describe our conscious experience
not in terms of the mythological 'phenomenal properties' . . .,
but by reference to the actual physical properties of the concrete
physical objects, events, and processes which normally . . . give
rise to the sort of conscious experience which we are trying to
2
describe."
We are here on the verge of the topic-neutral account of
sensation statements. What has led us to this point is a rejection
of the perceptual approach to sensations: the notion that I am
aware of my experiences as internal objects. A colour experience
is not something that I am aware of as being coloured. This last
statement can, however, express two points, between which Place's
presentation is in fact equivocal. He cannot decide whether the
fallacy is supposed to say that sensations are literally green,
like grass, or that they are phenomenologically green. He should
perhaps have said that there were two fallacies. The first is
fairly obviously nonsensical, but the second is a more interesting
1 Op. cit., Borst pp. 49-50.
2 Op. cit., Borst p. 50.
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mistake. It is this fallacy that is rejected by pointing to
the way in which we learn to speak of our experiences. It is
countered by the claim that, while experiences are not objectively
coloured, the colour words which are used in connection with them
do retain their commonplace objective meanings. They cannot,
therefore, refer to an entirely different range of properties.
We say, therefore, not that we have a green experience but
that we have an experience of green. To make the intention of
that expression quite clear, we.might imagine it expanded into
'an experience of green grass'. This is not, perhaps, an altogether
natural expression, but it has a clear purpose and does not offend
our linguistic susceptibilities. It does, however, raise problems
with experiences such as those of after-images. We can, it is
true, say that we have an experience of a green after-image; but
we are agreed that, in this case unlike that of grass, there is
nothing that is objectively green. How then can it be an experience
of green, if 'green' is meant objectively? Do we have an illusion
of green?
This problem has been touched on by Don Locke, who regards it
as the one impediment to materialism.'' He considers the after-image
situation and the similar one where a neurologist causes an
experience of red by direct stimulation of the brain. In both
cases he feels that he must insist that he is seeing something red,
2
"even though there is no red object to be seen". This position,
1 'Must a Materialist Pretend He's Anaesthetized?1, pp. 229-231.
2 Op. cit., p. 231.
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as it stands, is clearly incoherent; hut he rejects the way out
which would be provided by sayins "it is as if I were seeing it,
1
but I am not seeing it". Hone the less, this was pounced upon
by Antony Flew, who pointed out that we can deal with cases where
we think we see an object but do not, by saying that we "see"
the object. Why should we not, therefore, say that we "see"
2
something red in the cases discussed by Locke? In reply, Locke
plunged into worse confusion by suggesting that '"seeing"', introduced
as it is to cover cases where there is no object, must nevertheless
3stand for a process, like seeing, which has its own object.
The way to avoid such muddles is to remove from the account
of such experiences all suggestions of perception. An experience
of having an after-image, when we have an experience of green but
are not aware of any green object, is not an occasion for speaking
of "seeing", unless the experience has deluded us into thinking
that we are aware of a green object. In that case to say that we
"see" only refers to the delusion; it does not give the experience
a perceptual object.
To understand how the experience can be divorced from
perception while remaining an experience of green, let us remember
our natural confidence that experiences are "colourful". The
demand that all experiences of colour must involve the existence
of something coloured stemmed from an insistent belief that those
1 Op. cit., p. 231.
2 'Unanaesthetized Materialism', p. 54.
3 'Can a Materialist see What isn't There?', p. 55*
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of the experiences that occur without the perception of a
coloured object can be quite as "colourful" as those that occur
in the paradigm situations. We want to say, further, that the
"colourfulness" of a perceptual experience of a green object is
in some way similar to the "colourfulness" of a mere experience
of green, in the case of an after-image for example.
A solution to our problem may therefore open up before us
if we transfer our attention from colour to "colourfulness" in
the sense already explained. We can meet our natural demands,
while avoiding the mislocation of colours, by saying that what is
common to experiences of a specific colour is not the presence
of that colour but a common "colourfulness". What is vivid in
each experience, and what we really want to say is common between
two experiences, does really belong to the experience and is not
an objective property even when the experience is of an objective
property. This we express by speaking, for example, of an
experience of green rather than of a green experience. It is the
words 'of green' that convey the nature of the experience as it is
lived through as one of many of like value, whether of green grass
or of green after-images.
One thing that I must stress at this point is that
"colourfulness" has no special connection with colours. As I have
said, pains too can be highly "colourful" in this sense. I am
not, therefore, trying to smuggle colour into experiences of
colour under the disguise of "colourfulness". To say that an
experience is of green is not, in any sense, to say that it is
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coloured. Nor is it to say that there is something else in the
conceptual vicinity to provide a greenness that it cannot supply
itself "but that it none the less needs. Colours belong to
objects, but this is no loss to experiences; for their richness
is expressed in terms such as ' of green'0
IX
The recognition that I accord here to this "colourfulness",
which we are naturally so concerned to give proper allowance to in
any interpretation of experiences, should give my account a strong
advantage over the topic-neutral one. Recognition of this
"colourfulness" is precisely what Smart refused; and yet his system
can still be seen as self-contained and coherent. It has to be
faulted, therefore, for that original refusal and for its consequent
failure to represent experience as we know it. This criticism must
go forward despite the long-standing uncertainty of how the richness
of experience can possibly be explained in words. If one is going
to characterize experiences by ascribing properties to them, it
will not do to suggest that their character, as we are aware of it,
is so indistinct that all we can do is to note similarities and
dissimilarities between experiences, without any positive awareness
of the properties that justify these comparisons.
A convenient illustration of what is felt to be lacking can
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be taken from D.M. Armstrong, whose theory is open to the same
complaint. Armstrong has been criticized for having modelled his
whole account of perceptual discrimination on the case of the chicken-
sexer who manages to distinguish male and female chicks vrithout
1
having any idea how he does it. The criticism, as made, is not
altogether fair, for Armstrong does introduce the case as an example
2
of an atypical unconscious perception ; but it does express a
well-founded disquiet that the experiences that we know as so
vivid have been accorded only a "colourless" existence. One may
justifiably feel that there would be no real loss, on Armstrong's
account, if perceptions of red objects did pass unnoticed.
It should be clear that my account, apart from giving due
weight to "colourfulness", is intended to avoid both forms of the
fallacy that Place was concerned to expose. Firstly, it does not
suggest that there is a literally green object involved in the
experience of a green after-image. Secondly, it does not suggest
that 'green' is used in a special phenomenological sense when
speaking of experiences. It accepts that, when we say 'an exper¬
ience of green', we intend 'green' to have just the same meaning
as it has in 'green grass'. By stressing the use of the words
'of green', it allows 'green' to retain that commonplace meaning
without contaminating the experience. It might be thought, however,
that the account does not, by this move, really avoid the second
1 ¥. Kneale, 'Critical Notice: 'A Materialist Theory of the
Mind", p. 298.
2 'A Materialist Theory of the Kind', pp. 114-115.
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form of Place's fallacy* Phenomenological properties may not be
banished by preferring 'of green' to 'green'; for what is
"colourfulness" if it does not consist in phenomenological pro¬
perties? Far from ridding experiences of phenomenological
properties, have I not stressed their importance and made 'of
green' the name of one such property?
A further doubt might arise as to whether I have ever
banished the literally green object from the green after-image
situation* Although it might pass unquestioned that the experience
itself is not green, it might still be thought that there must be
some other green object in the vicinity; for how can the experience
truly be said to be 'of green', if there is not some genuine green
object to which it is related?
I do not intend to give full replies to these questions here;
for proper answers require a wider development of my argument than
I have provided so far. Some of the materials have, however,
already been assembled. I have, for instance, denied that
experiences are objects of any internal perception, though this is
a point that deserves further argument. If established, it would
link up with a point for which I have already argued at some length
in the first chapter: that description as a mode of language is
closely associated with perception. These two contentions would
together constitute an argument that experience can be disassociated
from description; and this would prepare the ground for a denial
that, in speaking of experiences, we are picking out any objects or
ascribing properties to any. This denial can only be given sub-
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stance, however, if a new positive account can be given of the way
that language is being used here. What is needed, therefore, is
the presentation of another mode of language as a convincing
alternative to description; and that I shall start upon only in
the next chapter.
This, then, is the ongoing argument in the context of which
I must for the moment just affirm the non-property nature of
"colourfulness" and the non-property-indicating function of
expressions such as 'of green'." If these claims can be taken
partly on trust, it should be clear how my account, while accepting
Place's demands, does not follow him in supposing that those
points, once accepted, lead straight into a topic-neutral treatment
of sensation statements. My account does agree that there are no
specifically mental properties; but that is as a corollary to
the general denial that experiences have any properties at all.
It disagrees, therefore, that experiences have properties, defined
in mental language by reference to typical causes, which are open
to identification with properties of brain processes.
I am not, therefore, merely making an appeal to our prejudices
in favour of our experiences. It will not do just to say, as
1
Kneale does, that Armstrong - or Smart - 'ignores sentience'.
That notion has to bo explained, and the greatest conviction of
its relevance will not serve, if sentience continues to be regarded
as an area in which descriptive particulars and properties can be
found. 'Of green', for example, can be of no use as the name of a
1 Op. cit., p. 299«
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property, for, given the commonplace meaning of 'green', this
could only be a relational property. It follows that its
valid application would be dependent on the context of the experience,
and it could not be truly applied to an experience if there was no
green for the experience to be of. We do, however, want to speak
of an experience of green in a case such as that of the green after¬
image. Therefore, the expression 'of green' is clearly intentional;
it points to a greenness beyond the experience and yet is applicable
to the experience whether that greenness is there or not. I have,
however, suggested that 'of green' is the linguistic expression
of the real nature of the experience. I must claim, therefore,
that the experience is what it is - that is, of green"' - even in the
absence of anything green.
What I am suggesting here is that experiences themselves are
2
generally intentional. It is not, then, just a manner of talking
about experiences that is to be spoken of as "intentional, but the
actual vivid occurrences that we live through. It will be recalled
that, when Feigl introduced his version of the Identity Theory, he
intended that, out of all mental phenomena, it should cope only
with raw feels. These, he believed, were descriptive entities;
1 The words 'of green' could with advantage appear in quotation
marks; but since the desirability of that would not be understood
at this point, I preferred to stress that the experience is not
just called 'of green'.
2 This is what Brentano, the introducer of 'intentionality' in its
modern use, would have advocated ('The distinction between
, , J "pi, nr1 r\l.-r . ,1 r; 4 \ c U.J.liCil vd± O-i.iOi. Aiy Oxvrfux u. 2 • y I / j CU. O 1UO 1UU1U 1 U
followers have linked intentionality more with developed
psychological attitudes (e.g., R«M. Chisholm, 'Perceiving',
p. 169) and have often spoken as if intentionality was a char¬
acteristic of mental language rather than of actual mental
occurrences (e.g., Chisholm, op. cit., pp. 170-171)•
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and, on that premise, I consider that he was right to try to find
identities for them in the objective scheme. All the other
subject matter of mental language Feigl considered to be intentional,
semantical and, hence, "logical" rather than psychological.^ He
declared that it would be "a category mistake of the most glaring
sort to attempt a neurophysiological identification of this aspect
1
of 'mind'." This I can gratefully accept; but, unlike Feigl, I
do not make the distinction which, singling out raw feels, placed
them alone in the field of description. Raw feels I believe to
be generally intentional and never descriptive. By the same
standards, therefore, it would be mistaken to attempt their
neurophysiological identification.
In the wider perspective of my whole account, it is the
non-descriptive character of mental language that I wish to stress,
rather than the intentionality of mental occurrences. That non-
descriptive character ties in more, perhaps, with what might be
called the basic intensionality of mental language: its insistence
on specific terms rather than the intersubstitutable terms that,
in the descriptive scheme, are permitted providing they refer to
the same object. For instance, if we have a colour-term for the
specific green of a green object, we can correctly redescribe the
object using that term; but there is a limit to the degree to which
we might recharacterize a person's experience of the object by
means of that colour-term, if he did not know the term himself.
Nevertheless, intensionality is, of course, associated with
1 'The "Mental" and the "Physical, p. 78.
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intentionality by more than the inconvenient similarity of their
nameso Substitutivity fails in the intentional context when there
is no object to determine whether two terras do have the same
reference. Arguing for the intentionality of experiences can,
therefore, play a contributory role in my general strategy, and
may provide, perhaps, a particularly perspicuous counter to identity
theories.
I am not here accepting Brentano's claim that intentionality
1
provides an exclusive and comprehensive criterion of the mental.
I do claim, however, that mental life, as it in fact originates
and develops in men, is overwhelmingly intentional. Our
experiences do, on the whole, have the function of informing us
about features of our own body and of features of the external
world. It is important to stress that this is not an altogether
passive process. If I am right in regarding objects as Kantian-
type appearances, both particulars and their properties are
interpretations of reality. What might, therefore, be regarded as
the creativity of experience, the objectivization of reality with
both its indicating and characterizing aspects, suggests an outward
gesture, a pointing to an other. This applies not only to the
perception of objects but also to the associated awareness of
objective properties. The natural form of a primitive experience,
such as one which we might later know as an experience of green,
is thus to point to a property of an external object. It is this
1 'The Distinction between Mental and Physical Pnenomena', p. 50.
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perceptual characterization of the perceptually indicated that
underlies the linguistic characterization of the linguistically
indicated.
It is in the context of the general intentional force of
experience that one can understand how our concept of colour comes
to place weight in what seems the wrong place relative to the
realities of colour discrimination., If my account of colour
experiences is correct, then the genuine "basis for the whole
structure lies in "colourfulness" rather than in colours; and
yet the varieties of "colourfulness", as we express them, are
clearly dependent conceptually on colours. That colours might be
truly subordinate was, however, foreshadowed in section vii, where
the views I expressed about colours did prepare the way for their
being assigned to a comparatively minor role.
When we say that an object is green, that remark cannot easily
be expanded. We may explain that when we see the object we have
experiences of green; and we may say that we mean that the object
reflects green light.^ As I have suggested, we therefore think of
greenness as a property of objects which is such that those objects
which have it produce experiences of green in us. Further
investigation of these objects may reveal that there is a range of
physical properties that in one or other case provide a more basic
interpretation of this feature that in natural perception we know
as greenness. Something that cannot fail to strike us, however, is
1 This is what someone is likely to mean, even if it is only
an approximation to the truth.
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that, while objects'are coloured, this seems quite adventitious to
their nature. The vivid difference that we find between a red
object and a yellow object is of no weight in a serious comparative
1
account of the objects; even less, perhaps, the still vivid
difference that we find between two objects of only slightly
different colour. There seem good grounds, therefore, for
thinking of the actual colours as supplying only the occasions
of the occurrences that provide an entirely different dimension
in which the exciting differences are displayed. Green, red
and yellow are thus only the comparatively unexciting causes of
experiences of green, of red and of yellow.
Given the intentionality of experience, however, it should
not be at all unexpected that our basic conception is of green,
red and yellow objects, even though this is a poorly founded
classification of objects. 'The genuine point of the distinction
does lie in the experiences, in the differences expressible by
'of green", 'of red' and 'of yellow'. These are differences,
however, in intentional force, and therefore find first expression
in classification of objects rather than in classification of
experiences; hence, the evident conceptual dependence that 'of
green' bears to 'green', even though it expresses the real grounds
for the distinction.
1 Think, for example, of comparing an object painted cadmium




There are vaxious ways of reacting to the double phenomenon
of intensionality and intentionality« One is to suppose, as
Feigl did, that it can be set aside from the real problem of the
relation between the mental and the physical, a view which was
neatly expressed when Smart wrote "let the world be as spooky as
you like and the problems of referential opacity are still there
to be solved, or perhaps somehow- by-passed".^ This assumes, in
accord with the Identity Theory, that, as it exists, the mental
must be describable even if non-physical. This would be the view,
too, of the theory that I sketched out in section iv, according to
which the mental consists of a separate range of properties. One
can, on the other hand, accept, as I have done, that mental
language is irretrievably intensional and committed to the intentional.
This alternative path splits, however, into two widely diverging
branches. One leads to the acceptance of the mental as a distinct
non-descriptive mode of being; and it is this one that I have
begun to advance along with the aid of the notion of "colourfulness".
The other shows so great a commitment to descriptive reality that,
embarrassed by intensionality and faced with the irreduceability
of the intentional to the describable, it turns right away from
the mental. What it arrives at is a version of the so-called
Disappearance Theory of mind.
It is, indeed, probably the best justified route to that theory
1 'Critical Notice: 'Content and Consciousness'', p. 620.
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which contends that the mental is merely the intended subject-
matter of a language which has in fact no bearing on what really
exists. Mental language is therefore regarded as, in some
sense, discardable, though upholders of the theory differ widely
1
on the possibility and desirability of that move. In its early
presentations, it was arrived at as an alternative to the Identity
Theory through rejection of the value of the attempt to carry over
mental identifications into the scientific scheme. Both Paul
Feyerabend and Richard Rorty regarded this attempt as a source of
conceptual confusion, Feyerabend because he believes that all new
theories should be given a clear run uncluttered by old concepts,
and both because they feared, in this particular case, philosophical
problems about the relation of mental and physical properties
2
such as were raised by Stevenson. Both were rejecting, therefore,
the retention of what they conceived to be the incompetently
described objects of mental language.
D.C. Dennett, on the other hand, does not regard mental
language as descriptive. Starting from the premise that it is
intentional, he can see no way of reducing it to an extensional
form. He finds greater success, however, in approaching the problem
from the other end. While mental language cannot be rendered
1 Feyerabend seems to favour it in the cause of enlightenment
('Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', Borst p. 156), Dennett
to deplore it in the cause of human society ('Content ana Con¬
sciousness', p. 190.). Rorty seems to think its practical
impossibility a permanent block to the enlightening acceptance
of the non-existence of the mental ('Kind-Body Identity, Privacy,
and Categories', Borst pp. 196—199-)-
2 Feyerabend, 'Comment: 'Mental Events and the Brain'', Borst
pp. 140—141; Rorty, op. cit., Borst pp. 188-191*
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descriptive, it seems as if some extensionally conceived objects
may be such that it is convenient, if not altogether perspicuous,
to speak of them .in an intentional language. Dennett devotes
some effort to showing how happenings in organisms can have
gained functional values through the evolutionary process, and
how this development can be continued for brain processes in the
life of the individual.^ Whether the'details of his account are
correct does not seem to matter so much as the general persuas¬
iveness of the case that the development of a complex, apparently
intentional system is possible by natural means from the basic
objective origins of life. Dennett believes that he is thus
enabled to ex;plain both the way in which mental language is at
present so successful and the way in which it is ultimately
2
discardable in our account of what really is. An intentional
language is well designed to express the way an event such as an
occurrence in the brain is appropriate to the life of a creature;
but how that event gained its function and how it now achieves
it can be accounted for descriptivelyo The final inventory
can therefore be purely extensional.
For whatever reason a disappearance theory is adopted, it
is obviously even more subject than the topic-neutral identity
theory to the criticism that it entirely ignores the "colourfulness"
of our experiences. Rorty may say that he suspects that topic-
3
neutral translations can never be shown to be adequate, but, in
1 'Content and Consciousness', pp. 47—71•
2 Op. cit., p. 89»
3 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories' , Borst pp.
190-191.
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this sense, no translation at all can scarcely be adequate
either. It should be clear, however, that apart from this very
important difference, my account has much in common with Dennett's
version of this theory.
Dennett views mental language, as I do, as a self-contained
system operating according to standards different from those of
the descriptive physical language; and he sees that this rules
out the existence of any entities that are descriptively identified
by it. At one point he puts the question whether "pain is some
thing (some thing) in addition to the physical operations of the
1
pain-network." My answer to this question, like his, is 'Not';
but, whereas for Dennett the non-existence of a thing marks the
end of the matter, for me it means only that reality is not being
treated descriptively when we speak of pain. If we can only get
away from the notion that description is the only genuine way in
which language can represent reality, admitting that pain is not
an object will not lead us to admit that pain, as such, does not
really exist. The sort of thing that I want to say is this:
pain is one form of what it is like to be this reality which, from
a perceptual point of view, is this human body. This other mode
of reality, that I here speak of as 'being' a particular reality,
is what gains non-descriptive representation in the language of
mind.
At this point I should recall the theory that I sketched
out in section iv, which suggested that the mental might be a
1 Cp. cit., p. 91»
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further range of prdperties of the one basic reality that also
possessed physical properties. I am, of course, rejecting that
theory now; for I believe no more that there are mental properties
than that there are mental objects. The theory does, however,
provide the sort of structure that I am considering now; for,
despite its being expressed in terms of properties, it does
formulate a double linguistic representation of the one reality®
To say that mental language represents reality in a different
way from physical language is not to say that it represents a
different reality, but rather the converse. One great advantage
that such an account has over a descriptive theory of mind is,
indeed, that it does not seem to posit a distinct range of entities.
It is not in competition with physical language to provide a
catalogue of entities or of properties. Physical language deals
with reality as it is revealed through perception, and it is from
that angle that reality appears as objects and their properties.
Mental language, on the other hand, deals with reality as it is
revealed through self-consciousness. From that angle reality
might be said to appear (though here the word 'appear' must be
rid of all its perceptual connotations) as experiences in their
varied "colourfulness". It is what it is like to be this reality,
as opposed to what that reality is like as perceived. I am
therefore speaking of one reality when I speak of myself in the
two languages, the mental and the physical, as I would have been
according to the theory in section iv. The theory which I am now
proposing differs from that previous one because the representation
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of reality in mental language is not based on some form of
internal perception and, therefore, is not descriptive and does
not introduce any further properties.
When we study a person objectively, what we might say about
him in mental language, for instance that he is in pain, is to
some degree irrelevant. Dennett says "when we abandon mental
process talk for physical process talk we cannot say that the
mental process analysis of pain is wrong, for our alternative
analysis cannot be an analysis of pain at all"."' I am not pro¬
posing that we should abandon mental language, but, if one does
turn away from it to a descriptive account, its representations
are placed at one remove. The same reality may found both a
person's pain and some objective condition of his body, but when
we speak of the objective condition we are taking a different
route to that reality from the one that the pain and the pain talk
are on. The two representations cannot collide, therefore. It
may be difficult, however, always to keep the two approaches apart
in one's mind. Dennett himself is inconsistent; thus, on the
same page from which I took the last quotation he asks the rhetorical
question, "Could any sense be made of the supposition that a
person might hit his thumb with a hammer and be suddenly and over¬
whelmingly compelled to drop the hammer, suck the thumb, dance about,
shriek, moan, cry, etc., and yet still not be experiencing pain?",
2
and expects the answer 'Nol'. If, however, we are looking at
1 Op. cit., p. 94*
2 Op. cit., pp. 94-95»
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this happening objectively, the idea of 'pain1 should not enter
our heads. It should, therefore, be quite possible at a higher
level to set the descriptive account against the avowal of pain,
and to recognize that the former is quite independent of the
1
latter because it carries no conceptual relation to it.
This is not to deny the valuable point that Dennett is
making here, that the descriptive account is, in theory, fully
capable of providing an account of all human behaviour. In my
own account this point follows from the independence from each
other of two approaches to reality. The presence of some feature
in the appearance that some reality presents to one approach
cannot introduce into the appearance that is presented to the
other approach anything that breaks the principles of that other
approach. In particular, the applicability of mental language
to a reality which has a perceptual appearance as a human body
cannot introduce any objective feature to that human body which
cannot be accounted for in physical language as much as any other
physical feature can.
I must reject, therefore, all the arguments that have been
put forward, by Horman Malcolm, for example, in an attempt to show
that our acceptance of mental language commits us to the view that
human behaviour is not physically determined. Malcolm has
1 This may well identify an inconsistency in Dennett's position,
for, if he did not answer 1Noi' to his own question, the
mental occurrence would seem to be independent of the physical
occurrence. He is arguing, therefore, both for the independence
of the languages and for the capacity of one of them, the
physical, to keep track of anything that the other speaks of.
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suggested, for instance, that, in a certain situation, it is
someone's intention to retrieve his hat that causes him to climb
a ladder. If this is so, Malcolm argues, his physical condition
cannot be sufficient to cause his climbing the ladder; for there
cannot be two sufficient causes, the intention and the physical
condition.^ There is a mistake, however, in the original
2
attribution of causal effectiveness to the intention as sucho
Malcolm's error there was to mix the two languages, mental and
physical. Climbing the ladder is clearly taken objectively and
it is as such that it can be causally explained. If, however,
one thinks of this behaviour as what the man did, one will not be
nearly so inclined to say that the intention caused the action.
One would rather say that his intention led him to do what he did.
The relation here is much more a conceptual one than a causal one.
It corresponds rather to the reasoning, 'I want to retriare my
hat; I can retrive my hat by climbing the ladder; I must climb
the ladder', than to any causal determination. In the same
spirit one might say that the intention informed his action, that
he climbed the ladder intending to retrie/e his hat. This
suggests, not that there was a persistent force pushing him further
and further up the ladder, but that climbing the ladder had a
certain meaning for him.
I am not suggesting here that no causal connection could be
1 'The Conceivabiiity of Mechanism', p. 52-53.
2 I can, therefore, ignore the ingenious arguments of Alvin
Goldman that it is quite possible for one event to have two
independently sufficient causes ('The Compatibility of
Mechanism and Purpose').
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found, between his having the intention and his climbing the
ladder. If one reflects that one must change from one language
to another in passing from intention to movement, it will be evident,
though, that the connection can only be indirect. Certainly,
however, we can take it that the reality which was represented
mentally by the intention was in its objective appearance a bodily
occurrence, probably a brain process, causally related to his
movement up the ladder. On the other hand, that movement would
involve the objective appearance of a reality that would be represented
mentally by a conscious awareness and intentional "control" of the
movemento While, therefore, the causal development belongs strictly
to the physical appearances, it is not unrelated to the mental
occurrences which are after all different appearances of some of
the same realities.
XI
I should, at this stage, indicate what relationship I take
my theory to bear to Central State Materialism. The Central State
theory, as Armstrong expresses it, is the theory that "the concept
of a mental state is primarily the concept of a state of the person
apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour", while some
mental states are secondarily "states of the person apt for being
brought about by a certain sort of stimulus".^ This theory is
1 'A Materialist Theory of the Mind1, p. 82.
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converted, into Central State Materialism by the added expectation
that these variously apt states of the person will be empirically
1
discovered to be in fact conditions of the central nervous system.
The general intention of Central State Materialism is similar
to that of the Place/Smart Identity Theory, though it differs from
that theory in bringing all mental phenomena, and not just
sensations, under the same formula. Further points of difference
are that the topic-neutral translations are expressed in terms of
causal relations rather than of merely concurrent occurrences, and
that the position of the external observer is firmly adopted in
contrast to the Identity Theory's genuine, though somewhat fragile,
respect for the first-person point of view. It is indeed derived
to a far greater extent from behaviourist psychology, though it
differs from that in positing an internal occurrence as the location
of the mental.
Against Central State Materialism I must add, to the reasons
I have for rejecting the Identity Theory, an objection to its
2
definition of mental concepts in terms of causes. As the other
main proponent of the theory, David Lewis, realises, mental
occurrences are not, as they are expressed in mental language,
suitable candidates for a causal relationship expressed in standard
terms. He says that Central State Materialism "inherits the
behaviourist discovery that the (ostensibly) causal connections
between an experience and its typical occasions and manifestations
1 Op. cit., p. 79°




somehow contain a component of analytic necessity". The way
that the theory proposes to cope with this analyticity is through
the words 'apt' and 'typical'; for, when these are inserted into
the causal statement, the apparently necessary connection, expressed
by the intended names of cause and effect, does not have to hold
on all occasions, and the contingency of the actual causal relation
is therefore preserved.
This way of expressing the relationship between certain
important internal occurrences and the behaviour they are related
to is indeed valuable; but it does not explicate our conventional
mental concepts. Experiences of green do typically occur in the
presence of green objects and experiences of pain in the presence
of damage to, or malfunction of, the body; but experiences of
green or pains are experiences that have the conceptual status of
indicators of green or of bodily harm, before ever they could be
considered to be caused by them. They are, that is, the experiences
that directly lead us to respond appropriately to their object,
to say 'green' or to rub the relevant limb, etc. The conceptual
tie between experience and typical circumstance is, therefore, the
intentional relation, by which the one points to or means the other.
This is the role that experiences have for each one of us, and
which we credit their having for others through our general sense
of human community. Experiences also lead to fairly predictable
behaviour; but, as I argued in the last section, the way that
1 '/in Argument for the Identity Theory', p. 21.
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mental occurrences lead on to actions, also, cannot be regarded
as a purely causal process. The personal action is derived from
the experience as a development in the understanding of the situation
rather than as a determined result.
To say that experiences are caused by certain objects or
certain stimuli is therefore to hazard an explanation of the
occurrence of experiences rather than to unpack the original meaning
of avowals of experience; and to say that experiences cause certain
behaviour is equally inventiveo I have argued that these are false
explanations because they try to apply to experiences a developed
form of the descriptive scheme which is totally foreign to them.
Of course, a causal explanation can take us a long way in either
case to establishing the connection, but it does not finally latch
on to the experience. That the causal account can take us so far
does, however, make the states posited by Central State Materialism
of considerable importance to my theory.
One position that I certainly wish to avoid is the suggestion
that mental events are a curious epiphenomenon, faint existences
on the fringes of reality. This is what Lewis, however, considers
to be the fate of all experiences conceived of as non-physical and
causally inefficacious. He writes: "It is true that such phenomena
cart never bo refuted by any amount of scientific theory and evidence.
The trouble with them is rather that they cannot be what we call
experiences. They can only be the non-physical epiphenomena or
correlates of physical states which are experiences. ° . Such things
may be - but they are of no consequence."^ Experiences, non-physical
1 Op. cit., p. 25«
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and causally inefficacious, are, however, of considerable
consequence to us who live through them. They are what we mean
by 'experiences', even if they are not what behavioural scientists
mean; for what we, in general, mean is shown by the logic of our
talk about experiences - not by whether we can be enticed into
agreeing that, of course, experiences are causally related to
stimuli and behaviour.
Our experiences are, too, of more genuine ontological
significance than a defence in terms of human interest would
suggest. I have argued that mental language represents one and
the same basic reality as is represented by physical language. If
either of these representations is more directly related to the
basic reality than the other, it must surely be the mental, for
that does not involve the distancing of reality as other, which
is natural to perception. We should not, therefore, be too
impressed by causal efficacy, for that is only how the same reality
is articulated in its objective appearance. The causal
ineffectiveness of experiences does not, therefore, render them
ontologically frivolous as Lewis suspects. They introduce the
same realities (more directly too, perhaps) as appear as his causally
efficacious entities.
Central State Materialism is not to be congratulated,
therefore, for specifying entities that provide the true identities
of mental occurrences; for that it does not achieve. The entities
that it introduces are of interest, however, for their strong claim
to be regarded as the objective appearances of the underlying
realities of mental life. This claim has two bases, empirical and
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conceptual. The empirical one is provided by the expected
temporal correlation between these observable conditions of the
central nervous system and avowed mental occurrences* The
plausibility and meaningfulness of this correlation are dependent,
however, on the conceptual basis by which the physical condition
is naturally tied to contexts of stimuli and behaviour which are
also suitable to the mental occurrence. This tie is a causal
one; but, since the relation is expressed through such words
as 'apt' and 'typical', the causal conditions need not always
be satisfied. The relation is thus flexible enough to permit
the condition to occur on some occasions without the defining
context. The physical condition is thus able, in its occurrences,
to mimic the intentionality of the mental, though it does not of
itself point to anything beyond it. From the descriptive point
of view, any one manifestation of the physical condition just occurs,
and occurs with just the context that it has in that manifestation.
Whether it is sometimes preceded by a certain stimulus or followed
by certain behaviour is not narked in the physical condition. These
are purely relational properties, in descriptive terms, which either
do or do not hold.
Y/hile the physical condition is thus indifferent to the
context in which it occurs, the same is not true of the mental
occurrence. If there was not the typical causal connection with
stimulus or behaviour, then the mental occurrence would not have the
meaning it has, it would not point to what it is understood to
point to. The mental occurrence is only able to develop meaning,
therefore, by means of that nature of its underlying reality that
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is reflected in objective causal relations within the physical
context of stimuli and behaviour. It does, however, retain that
meaning through repetitions of the reality, whatever causal context
it may have in its objective appearance.
XII
It may be asked how a particular physical condition can be
precisely identified as the objective appearance of the reality
that an experience is based upon. Temporal correlation with the
experience and causal relations with suitable stimuli and suitable
behaviour have already been mentioned. These, however, may well
provide only a rough indication of the area in which the appearance
might be located. An anterior limit could, one might think, be
established by direct stimulation of the brain to reproduce, at
different stages, the causal nexus between stimulus and behaviour."'
For the posterior limit one would have to look, presumably, to the
point of divergence for the causal production of different effects
related to the experience, such as bodily movement and the subject's
spoken report. Should we, however, ask for anything better than
this? The possibility of strict descriptive identification would
seem to depend on the existence of clear descriptive rules of
1 In intention, the latest stage to produce all the typical
effects, including a report of the experience, would define the
limit; but the difficulty here is to know 'whether one has
produced the reality itself or only its typical effects.
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discovery. The absence of such rules might be an embarrassment
to the Identity Theory, but must be expected on my theory, according
to which we are searching for a reality specified as underlying a
non-descriptive mental occurrence. It is sufficient, therefore,
to establish that some physical condition satisfies the comparatively
loose requirements of correlation and causal suitability. Whether
that particular condition, as it is descriptively specified,
represents the required reality is a further question which cannot
be answered.
Another problem facing us relates to the degree to which the
objective appearances of the realities, which in mental terms
have the same meaning in each ca.se, must be descriptively similar
to each other. This is a question of how far the common nature
of the realities underlying the mental occurrences must be
represented in their objective appearances. If one was thinking
in terms of properties, as in the theory of section iv, this would
be to ask whether the mental properties were independent of the
physical properties, as redness from roundness, etc. It might
be thought that the distinct nature of the mental approach, as I
conceive it, would permit even greater independence than can be
imagined in terms of properties. I feel, however, that the reverse
is true, for the mental approach cannot add further to the same
range - of properties, for instance - but must represent the reality
in its one nature that is also reflected in its objective appearance.
I am inclined to say, therefore, that there must be some descriptive
similarity, at least, among events correlated with a particular
type of experience.
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A sharp distinction should be drawn between this problem
and the question whether mental events are generally predictable
through a causal explanation of their objective correlates. One
who has run these two problems together is Donald Davidson. Arguing
for what he calls the "anomalism of the mental", the absence of
any laws by which types of mental event can be predicted or
explained,^ he locates the break-down of prediction and explanation
2
in the psychophysical relation. Nov;, I am quite ready to accept
that no psychophysical laws can be established, and I am generally
sympathetic with the type of reason that Davidson gives for this in
terms of the independence of the mental and physical languages.
This barrier applies, though, to particular mental events as well
as to general types, whereas Davidson wishes to say that particular
3
mental events are explicable. The point where this distinction
can really be drawn is in relation to the objective correlates of
the mental events. There is no reason to suppose that physical
events corresponding to a type of mental event do themselves form
a class which can be mentioned in any general causal law. Even
if, as we may suppose, they form a descriptively definable class,
they may occur in many combinations of circumstances. Each event
would then be causally determined and the occurrence of each could
be lawfully explained, but, as a class, they could not be subsumed
under one general explanation.
The general inexplicability of mental events by types can be
1 'Mental Events', p. 81.
2 Op. cit., pp. 88~89«
3 Op. cit., p. 100.
158
dealt with, therefore, outside the scope of the question of
similarity among the objective correlates for one type of mental
event. In relation to that question, the next requirement is to
distinguish the leveLof mental classification at which it is
reasonable to look for a corresponding physical similarity. The
independence of the mental from specifiable physical manifestations
is sometimes argued for on the basis of high-level examples such as
1
•thinking of Spain'. It must be admitted at once, however, that it
would be absurd to suppose that, on every occasion when anyone, or
even when a particular person, thought of Spain, this must be
represented physically by an occurrence of a single recognizable
kind. This sort of example is not relevant to our problem because
• thinliing of Spain' does not specify a single type of occurrence
even in mental terms. To think of Spain may be to have an image
of Barcelona, to have an image of Granada, or to think quite
abstractly about that country's weather or its Civil War. It
should be noted, therefore, in general terms, that the higher
classification of mental occurrences, that of their developed
meanings, does not correspond to a higher descriptive classification
of objective occurrences; at most, all physical correlates would
share a relational property corresponding to the shared implication
of all the mental occurrences. More specifically, there is no
reason why a thought of Spain (image of Barcelona) should be like
a thought of Spain (fact about weather) in either its lived-through
character or its physical correlate, except, in the first case,
1 Quoted from Putnam by Dennett ('Content and Consciousness',
po 17«)»
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through its understood implication of 'Spain' and, in the second
case, through its potential causal relation with the objective
correlate of that idea.
Our problem of descriptive similarity arises therefore at
the level of the basic "colour1 fulness" of experiences. An
appropriate example would be provided by experiences of a particular
shade of green. Could a particular person have such an experience
on two occasions without the objective correlate falling on both
occasions within the same descriptive class? I am inclined to
think that the need for a coherent notion of the reality underlying
both the mental and the physical demands the expectation - it
would be rash to put the point more strongly - that there would be
two similar physical occurrences.
I have spoken here in terms of a single person because there
do seem to be convincing reasons for supposing that experiences
could develop different meanings for different people even at this
most basic level. One familiar imagined case is that where the
visual system of an individual is so disorganised that the
occurrences in his brain caused by green light striking his retina
are just like those which occur in the brain of any normal perceiver
when his retina is struck by red light. If I am right in suggesting
that the basic "-co lourfulness" of experience must be related to
types of objective occurrence through their common ground, we
would seem to have evidence that this individual's experiences of
green must be for him as our experiences of red are for us. This
would not mean, however, that he did not really have an experience of
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green at all but an experience of red; for 'of green' does not
provide a descriptive characterization of the experience. His
experience would be one of green: that is, an experience of the
colour of green objects, of grass and of unripe apples, for
instance. The basic "colourfulness" of the experience would have
come to mean for him 'grass' and 'unripe apples' among other
things. Once informed of his curious visual organization, he
might say that his experience of green was like others' experience
of red; but that would not give it the meaning of an experience
of red. It would, instead, take on the rather complicated
character that he attributes to it. The experience can be both
'of green' and '"like" others' experiences of red', because its
character is given by the further meaning that is talcen on by its
basic "colourfulness" and not by some progressively corrected
description of it.
XIII
To turn from Central State Materialism to Punctionalism, as
I now wish to do, may seem to involve only a small change in directiono
A Central State theory, such as is summarized in the definition of
mental states that I quoted from Armstrong in section xi, comes
very close to proposing It hat mental language is concerned exclusively
with states in their functional character. The use of the word
'apt' indicates that the state is not conceived of as merely
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causing the behaviour, as it so happens, but as forming a natural
foundation for the behaviouro It is true that 'apt' does suggest
that the state is one which someone might put to the use of producing
the behaviour; but this is clearly a connotation that has to be
discounted.. Armstrong's definition does not, therefore, include
a positive recognition of the functional status that these states
have within the organism, through having evolved along with the
behaviour as enabling conditions for it. The definition would
only need to be filled out in this way, however, to take on the
character of a functionalist theory, even if it would not share
some important features of Punctionalism as it xra.s developed by
Putnam.
It might be thought that one difference between Central State
Materialism and Functionalism emerges through the functionalist
use of such examples as that of 'thinking of Spain' which I
mentioned in the last section. The intended point of such examples
is to show that types of mental event can be instantiated in
descriptively different physical states, and accordingly that the
type of mental event cannot be given any descriptive characterization.
This is not an argument against Central State Materialism as defined
by Armstrong, however, unless that were developed in such a way as
to insist on descriptive specifications of types of state apt for
the production of set types of behaviour. As it stands, the
theory sets no limits to the number of descriptively characterized
states that might be apt for the production of the same type of
behaviour. If behavioural function is what is common to all cases
of thinking of Spain, then Armstrong's definition could surely
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group them into the one class.
Unfortunately for this brand of Functionalism, however, there
seems to be scarcely any more reason to suppose that all cases of
thinking of Spain share the same function than to suppose that
they all share the same physical instantiation. Consider, for
example, thinking of Spain as a place to go to on holiday, and
remembering an incident that took place during that holiday. Both
/
would commonly be recognized as cases of thinking of Spain, but
they seem to lack any common function. It is true that the
production of the word 1 Spain' which is prominent in the first may
be somewhere in the offing in the second, but that does not seem
sufficient to give them the same function. It seems doubtful,
therefore, whether Functionalism, or Central State Materialism
in so far as it overlaps with it, can produce a classification of
states which corresponds to that of mental language
There is another aspect to Functionalism, however, than this
straightforward insistence on the functional role rather than the
descriptive character of states as what is spoken of in mental
language. Although it is not altogether explicit in most expositions
of Functionalism, an approach to the language of mind can be detected,
quite different from any that a functionalist theory on the level of
Central State Materialism would suggest. This approach is revealed
indirectly through the theory's frequent emphasis on the simulation
1 Armstrong is in a better position than Putnam to avoid this
criticism because 'apt' allows the production of the word. 'Spain'
to be a quite superficial, not to say merely potential, effect
of thinking of Spain, while Putnam may have to insist that it is
the state's essential function. Armstrong will, however,
merely fail to offend the mental language classification; no
more than Putnam will he have independently reproduced that
classification.
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of human mental processes in machines. The possibility of such
a simulation is a natural implication of the view that the same
function may be instantiated in many different physical forms.
Once, however, machine simulation is introduced, it soon becomes
apparent that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the
language in which the machine processes are interpreted as
comparable to human mental processes, and the language in which
the physical manifestation of those processes is descriptively
characterized. This difference can be seen more clearly than
in the case of mental language and the physical description of
brain processes, because the machine language has to be set up
from scratch and can therefore be seen for what it is.
Putnam introduced machine simulation with the proposal that
the mind could be regarded as analogous to a Turing machine, a
device which is in principle capable ;pf carrying out any operation
than can be performed by any sort of digital computer.'' Any
Turing machine can be described by a table of "instructions", in
which each "logical" state of the machine is defined, in relation
to any input, in terms of output, location of next input, and
successor state.^ This one "machine table" can fit many different
Turing machines, the one requirement being that their states should
conform to the pattern prescribed. The states expressed in the
machine table will then be the same logical states as in a similar
Turing machine, even though the physical states through which they
1 'Hinds and Machines', pp. 138-142.
2 Op. cit., pp. 140-141.
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1
are realised may differ widely.
This wide-spread applicability of a single machine table has
led to what I take to be an interesting misinterpretation of Putnam's
proposals. In his original paper, Putnam spoke of Turing machines
2
as actual physical devices which were described by machine tables.
At one point, however, he did say that "a given "Turing machine"
is an abstract machine which may be physically realized in an almost
3
infinite number of different ways". Ignoring the inverted commas
4
about the words 'Turing machine', William Lycan has jumped to the
conclusion that Putnam must have been advocating what he calls
"ATM (abstract Turing machine)-Punctionalism", the theory that a
person's mind is analogous to a universal corresponding abstractly
to a machine table. This theory naturally puzzles him; "On this
view", he writes, "a 'mental state' is not a state at all, but a
5
universal instantiated by states." He finds it a mystery,
therefore, how mental "states" could be found in people, and argues,
reasonably enough, that an abstract Turing machine could not change
from one state to another. Not surprisingly, he then turns grate¬







Op. cit., p. 147.
Op. cit., pp. 140, 141, 142, 144, 146, 150, 159*
Op. cit., p. 147.
It is true that Putnam did later drop the inverted commas in
speaking of a "physically realized Turing machine" (op. cit.,
a An a a n
* 1 "T I f • J ® J ©
'Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis', p. 54.
Op. cit., p. 55»
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of course, the theory that Putnam had actually put forward.
Lycan's longer-term purpose is to argue that logical states
of a physical Turing machine can, after all, be identified with
structural physical states of that machine, and hence that mental
states can, upon this analogy, be identified with structural states
of the brain. His reason, derived from his distinction between
ATM- and PTM-Functionalism, is that, when instantiated, a logical
state is no longer an abstract universal that can apply to many
different objects. It must then be, he thinks, the structural,
state that instantiates its universal form.''
From one point of view, this argument can be seen as raising
the old problem whether one property can be the same as another.
Once the notion that the so-called 'universal logical state'
actually is some sort of state is removed, the universal can be
seen as corresponding - after the usual manner of universals - to
a linguistic description. A column of "instructions" in a machine
table would then stand for a logical state of a physical Turing
machine in the same way as a description in technical language
stands for a structural state of the same machine. This would,
indeed, seen to be Putnam's own view, even if he puts the word
'describes' into italics when speaking of a machine table as
2
describing an actual Turing machine. The machine table can
therefore be seen as introducing a different range of properties
which, it would be reasonable to suggest, are not identical with
1 Op. cit., pp. 55-57.
2 Op. cit., p. 141 •
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any introduced by a description of the particular machine's
1
structural propertieso This rejoinder is at least strong enough
to show that Lycan has not established his case<> One may well
wonder, however, whether it is really on the right lines and
whether it makes as much as it should of the abstract/physical
distinction.
Why is it more plausible to think of an abstract Turing
machine than of an abstract turf-cutting machine? The notion of
the former does not seem to require an ascent into a Flatonic
heaven such as the notion of the latter seems inevitably to demando
We seem to be led to this distinction by the way in which 'turf-
cutting' simply describes an operation that might be performed by
a machine. The idea of an abstract turf-cutting machine would
therefore produce a universal out of purely objective particulars.
On the other hand, a machine table must be seen as interpreting
rather than describing an actual Turing machine. At first sight,
a list of states defined in terms of precedents and effects might
seem to be purely descriptive; but, if the analogy between minds
and Turing machines is to be at all plausible, this impression must
be removed. It was not for nothing, presumably, that Putnam spoke
2
of the "logical" states of Turing machines. He did not explain the
choice of this expression, but it does carry the clear suggestion
that the interrelations of these states are verbal rather than
causal.
1 'The Mental Life of Some Machines', 0'Connor p. 274»
2 'Kinds and Machines', p. 147»
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The attractiveness of the Turing-machine analogy is based in
large part on the facility with which it seems to model those
features of mental language that appear in utterances such as avowals
of pain. Putnam suggests the case of a logical state, A, the
definition of which includes the print-out of 'I am in state A'
1
among the output of the state. This print-out then follows as
a natural result, or even as a concluding part, of state A. It
follows from this that there is no need for the machine to
"determine" - by some internal recording device - that it is in
state A in order to produce the print-out. Putnam contrasts this
case with that of the structural state described by 'vacuum tube
2
312 has failed', where it is obvious that some recording device
is required to produce that print-outo It is then clear that the
logical-state print-out corresponds neatly to an avowal of pain
with its apparent immediacy and independence of recognitional error.
The structural description, on the other hand, corresponds to a
statement that there is, for example, a cut in one's finger. The
reports of damage to one's finger or of vacuum tube condition can
be at fault through perceptual or quasi-perceptual failure to
ascertain the truth. The avowal of pain or the print-out 'I am
in state A', on the other hand, can only go wrong through something
2
like a "verbal slip".
It is important to recognize, however, - not that Putnam
did - that this contrast, in its machine version, does not demand
that the machine should necessarily include a different sort of part
1 Op. cit., p. 144*
2 Op. cit., p. 148.
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in order to produce the true print-out 'vacuum tube 312 is in
descriptive state X'. The logical-state print-out could depend
on the physical presence of the same device. Indeed, it is
possible that the same print-out should be read alternatively as
•I am in logical state A' or as 'vacuum tube 312 is in descriptive
1
state X'. In the first case, however, it would be a logical
conclusion of state A, whereas in the second it would be quite
distinct from state X. In other words, the recording device
could form part of the physical instantiation of state A, and its
break-down would then constitute a verbal slip rather than a
perceptual failure. The difference, therefore, is not essentially
one of physical constitution, but consists in a difference in
i '
understanding of what is taking place; in particular, how a break-
do™ is interpreted depends on the over-all context provided by a
logical or structural account of the whole. It is an interesting
question whether this is a feature for which the analogy with mental
reports would hold.
The intimate connection between logical states and their
defined output may suggest that the relation between such output as
'I am in state A' and the state that it belongs to cannot be a
descriptive one; and, hence, that the relation between a machine
table - which can fill out the meaning of 'state A' - and its
corresponding Turing machines also cannot be a descriptive one. We
would therefore have to reject the proposal that machine tables
merely introduce a different range of descriptive properties from
1 Statements printed out by a Turing machine are single symbols
which have to be translated into English (Putnam, op. cit.,
note 10, p. 162.).
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any mentioned in a"structural account. Considerations of this
kind have led James Tomberlin to suggest that Putnam's theory
provides new grounds for arguing that we are not referring to
anything when we speak of mental states.'' This is in accord with
the view that I have been expressing in this chapter; and, on very
much the same lines, he goes on to say, "my utterance is not a
description". Unfortunately he interprets this as meaning "I say
nothing about myself, just because I am not saying anything".^ His
views clearly fall within the scope, therefore, of those theories
which suppose that without description one is left with mere
expression. I am in strong disagreement with him, therefore, on
account of my belief that mental utterances, while non-descriptive,
nevertheless do represent genuine modifications of the basic
"colourfulness" of experiences. I cannot accept his conclusion
that an utterance such as 'I am in pain* essentially "shows
something about my condition, and what it shows is that my "physically
2
realized" nature is in this or that structural state".
Tomberlin has been criticized by R.H. Kane on the grounds
that mental reports can be false to the facts, as when someone
3
says that he is in pain when he knows that he is not. According
to Kane, this shows that mental reports must have descriptive refer¬
ence. ^ Falsity can appear, however, in other contexts than that of
1 'About the Identity Theory', p. 298.
2 Op. cit., p. 298.
3 'Turing Machines and Mental Reports', pp. 347-348.
4 He therefore puts forward an account that forestalls Lycan's
in suggesting that instantiated logical states are identical
with structural states.
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linguistic description. The person is mimicking a genuine
pain avowal, but this does not mean that he must be making an
untrue descriptive statement. We would do well to think of a
case such as that of a bird pretending to have a broken wing.
That, no doubt, is not exactly like a false verbal avowal of
pain; but it does suggest one end of a continuum on which the
avowal of pain might be placed. At the other end would be a
genuinely descriptive untrue statement; but the pain avowal need
not tend altogether to that.
Why is it, though, that Putnam's theory cannot be accepted
as the descriptive one that he appears to think it to be? It
might be supposed that the machine table describes the input,
the output and the location of the next input; and these are the
only points at which a mode other than description might intrude,
for the last element of the definition is expressed in terms of
a further state and therefore in the terms established by the
first three. The crucial element here is output.'' It is true
that the output might be described, but then the analogy with
minds and mental language would be lost. The analogy is only
convincing because the output is understood to be, for example,
'I am in state A'. This is not the description of a symbol, but
a reading. If it were a description, it would fail completely
to refer back, or reflexively, to state A. As it is, the output,
as a defined element of the state, not only has meaning in itself
but contributes meaning to the state as a whole. When we say of
1 The describability of the other elements might also be
questioned in view of the variety of instantiations that one
Turing machine may have.
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the machine that it is in state A, we are not describing the machine,
therefore, but "understanding" it. Hence the attractiveness of
the analogy; for, when we say of someone that he is in pain, we
are understanding his condition, a condition he might make explicit
by saying 'I am in pain'. This condition is, of course, informed
with an awareness of bodily damage as its intentional sense, and
this is conveyed by the utterance that emerges from it. Similarly,
the machine state, as interpreted, does comprehend its functional
role, though only within the limited horizon of its immediate
context and immediate result. All this is true, however, only
of the state conceived of as something that may be understood rather
than as something that may be described. We are prepared to think
of an abstract Turing machine because, unlike a turf-cutting machine,
it resembles a book which we can read in whatever edition it is
instantiated.
XIV
Putnam himself did not suggest that minds were actually to
be regarded as Turing machines; therefore, criticisms intended to
1 Still less did he suggest that brains were Turing machines, as
Dreyfus' criticism - that the brain functions more like an
analogue computer - would require. ('Phenomenology and Mechanism',
pp. 90-92.). Putnam was trying to reproduce the sense of
mental language, not that of some ultimately satisfying
explanatory account of the human organism. This fact also
undermines William Kalke's criticism that, if one studied the
/cont'd
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show that mental states cannot in fact be logical states of
Turing machines are not altogether to the point. One interesting
criticism of this sort, however, suggested that mental states
might correspond more closely to the computational states of
such machines: that is, to the process by which they pass from
one logical state to another® ^ The partial validity of this
criticism can be seen from Putnam's own example of a machine
2
table® This table is intended to represent a machine that adds
unary numbers together. Adding is achieved by the machine passing
through a sequence of logical states, and the total is readable on
the machine's input/output tape when this has received the output
of all the states in the sequence® Adding seems, in itself, to
consist in the intervening sequence of processes which lead on
from one logical state to another, including the final state of
rest when the calculation has been completed® One might suggest
tentatively, however, that the computational states correspond
most closely to unconscious mental processes - in this case, what¬
ever carries us to the answer -, while the logical states correspond
1 /Cont'd
functional processes closely enough, these would be shown to be
dependent on structural variations in different instantiations,
even if there was surface uniformity; for mental language
does not itself probe deeply ('What is Wrong with Podor and
Putnam's Functionalism', pp. 91-92.).
1 This objection is similar to one introduced, with several
others of interest, by Block and Fodor in their article 'What
Psychological States Are Not' ; but they mean something rather
different by "computational state" (pp. 176-177.)®
2 'Minds and Machines', p® 141®
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roughly to the conscious states during the process - the inter¬
mediate stages which gain expression in what we say to ourselves
as we perform the calculation. The state of pain, also, i3
obviously more closely analogous to a logical state than to a
computational state0
In speaking of computational states in this way we are again
placing an interpretation on a machine table, but now on the whole
rather on a part which defines just a single machine state. This
placing of an interpretation needs to be stressed, for it may
indicate an important disanalogy between minds and any sort of
machine simulation of them. I am of course thinking of the common
objection that men mean what they say but machines do not mean
anything by their output; they only operate in ways that have
meaning in the minds of their makers or users. Is it possible
to elucidate this objection by attention to Putnam's argument?
Let us consider his example of a machine table. As I have
already mentioned, he stated that its purpose was to represent
a machine that would add unary numbers. He may, however, have
blundered on a gadget designed as an aid to factory farming, an
adjunct to a mechanized version of Armstrong's chicken-sexer.
Its input might be provided by a sensory mechanism developed, like
its human counterpart, by reinforcement, with '1' indicating a
female chick and '+' a male. What Putnam innocently supposed was
the cancelling of a plus sign would then be the extermination of
a male chick, and what he saw as the rearrangement of units might
be an adjustment of the cage to take account of the reduced
population.
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This fanciful adaptation is intended to show that the
meaning of the machine states is essentially a meaning that is
read into them. One rejoinder that Putnam might make would be
that the meaning is given by the context, whether by the factory
farm or by some context that he could provide to show that the
machine was adding numbers. With this emphasis on context,
however, the analogy would cease to capture our general notion of
experiences. Think of the advantage that accrued to Armstrong by
the use of a word such as 'apt'. Putnam, by contrast, would be
unable to give meaning to an event divorced from its usual context.
The machine might be tampered with, as the brain might be by a
neuro-physiologist, in such a way that its normal input was effectively
reproduced. Supposing that it had previously been used for both
purposes, would it then imagine that it was adding unary numbers or
that it was killing chicks?
Faced with this problem, Putnam would be likely to insist on
the introduction of a more sophisticated robot in which the roles
were better distinguished. This robot might provide reports of its
"experiences" so that its behaviour would seem fully equivalent to
that of a hallucinated human chicken-sexer. Does this change to
a more complicated machine really help, however? The objection
against crediting the simpler machine with consciousness was not
that it could not show what it was imagining, but that it seemed
inconceivable that it was imagining anything, even though something
was occurring which was the functional equivalent of objective
occasions for human imaginings. Should not Putnam's manoeuvre
be seen, therefore, as an attempt to hide the lack of consciousness
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in his machines by perfect mimicry of those who do possess it?
In line with his variously stated beliefs that crediting
1
consciousness is a matter for decision or for rational inference
2
from behaviour, Putnam would say that there was nothing to be
hidden as there is nothing to be revealed in humans. His view is
rather that machines only have to pass an examination in behaviour
to have as much right to be admitted to consciousness as any
human being. Podor, on the other hand, expressed doubt at the
end of his 'Psychological Explanation' whether the functional
account he had given of mind really got to the root of the matter,
and his words are very apposite here. "What one wants to know
is not whether some machine processes might be functional
equivalents of some organic psychological processes. Nor is it
whether it could ever be rational or linguistically correct to
say that a machine feels pain, or thinks, or has gotten confused,
or whatever. Rather it is whether, in very fact, the machine hurts,
3
or cogitates, or finds itself bewildered."
Podor confesses that this question, if it is left over "when
the linguistic proprieties have been attended to", is too hard
4
for him; understandably, because, on the one hand, it seems a
genuine question demanding a 'yes' or 'no' answer and, on the other,
what seems the only relevant evidence has been discounted. Putnam
1 'Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life?', O'Connor,
p. 262.
2 'Hie Mental Life of Some Machines', O'Connor p. 281.
3 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
4 Op. cit., p. 152.
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may well be right, then, in thinking that a decision is called for.
If the language of mind is non-descriptive, the principle of finding
descriptive evidence for a descriptive conclusion is not appropriate.
We are therefore faced with a choice, whether or not to admit these
machines to community with us; and this is a choice which we must
make on less than rational grounds. If, however, I am right in
claiming that mental language does have ontological force, it will
either be applicable or not applicable to the reality underlying
these descriptive entities. Putnam would be mistaken, therefore,
in suggesting that this decision ratifies itself, that there is no
ultimate sense in which it can be correct or incorrect.
XV
Though I believe that Fodor's difficult question must have
an answer with respect to any descriptive entity, I cannot provide
a method for determining it. I do hope, however, to provide a
wider context of understanding in which the impossibility of
reaching a firm conclusion will seem less mysterious. What
materials do we have that might contribute to that context? We
would do well to start with that aspect of mental language that
Putnam came close to capturing in the analogy of the machine print¬
out ' I: am in state A'. That did indeed seem to mirror the
immediacy of 'I am in pain', and it is of considerable interest for
what it has to tell us about the relation between language and the
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mentalo Putnam's success was hollow, however, for we remain
unconvinced that the relation between 'I am in state A' and state
A does anything but mimic the genuine emanation of 11 am in pain'
from a state of pain. What may be lacking here, in the first
place, is what I have called the "colourfulness" of experience.
'State A' seems to be no more than our name for the machine's
functional state, however often the machine may print it out on
appropriate occasions. 'Pain', on the other hand, is our own
word which becomes integrated with, and the natural expression
for, those of our experiences which provide us with one range of
"colourfulness".
The merely attributed character of particular states is
not the only reason, though, why 'I am in state A' may fail to
match ' I am in pain'. The particular mental event in its vivid
lived-through character is represented by 'in pain', but the word
'I' represents an equally distinctive aspect of the mental. We
can doubt not only whether there is any "colourfulness" in the
machine but also, following upon this, whether the machine is
present in such a way that it should be treated like a person. It
is, of course, present as a descriptive object that we may perceive;
but we are now concerned with its existence in such a mode as is
represented in mental language. Just as the "colourfulness" of
particular experiences does not consist in any descriptive
properties, so it can be argued that 'I' does not primarily indicate
a descriptive entity. The uses of 'I' which are to be counted as
genuine occur in the utterances of those beings whom we are
prepared to admit into community with us, through our choosing in
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their case a positive answer to Fodor's question (generalized to
cover other human beings as well as machines).
Why should Putnam's machine print out 'I am in state A'
rather than 'This machine is in state A'? Clearly it does provide
a closer analogy with the human utterance ' I am in pain', and that
was Putnam's purpose; but does not his programming the machine in
this way beg the question? The use of '1' strongly suggests that
the machine has a conscious mental life, but it scarcely seems
justified by the mere fact of the machine state called 'A' printing
out 'A'. It carries, too, the suggestion that the machine must
possess some form of unity by virtue of that mental life which
might be contrasted with its unity as a descriptive object. There
is perhaps just a suggestion of such a unity in the Turing machine.
The way in which each state, once an input is given, is understood
to refer forward to its successor state does offer some slight
analogy with the continuity of human thought, if not with memory.
Once again, however, the objection must be that this continuity
is to all appearances read into the machine rather than inherent
in it. The possibility that the logical states of some machines
could be so defined that they provided a fuller resemblance to
the human condition should not convince us, therefore, that these
machines would be genuine mental unities.
It does seem possible, then, to read into an artefact some
unity, probably artificial, on the lines of the mental unity of
a man. This can be achieved, however, only by verbalizing its
states so that these seem to represent some of their fellow states,
just as Putnam's state A might be interpreted as "saying"that
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state B is its successor. If, on the other hand, an object is
merely treated descriptively, it cannot be seen to possess any
such unity. To see this clearly we would do well to return to
the Identity Theory to consider its failure to come to terms
with the self.
I remarked earlier that Smart had to do some juggling with
mental language in order to reduce it to a manageable shape.
'My after-image is yellowy-orange' is a sentence, for instance,
that he would refuse to translate directly into the material
language. He would have to change it first into 'My experience
is of a yellowy-orange after-image', where 'a yellowy-orange after¬
image' can be taken to be fused into 'My experience' to form a
single referring expression."' This expression can then be
treated as a unit when translation is attempted. Smart did not
take the process of fusion beyond this stage, but its interest
in this context comes from its further extension by those who
have modified his theory.
The piecemeal conversion of sensations into brain states
may well seem of doubtful value on various grounds, including the
consequent fragmentation of mental life. It may be tempting,
therefore, to carry the process of fusion further. For this
purpose it must be applied to an avovral such as ' I am having an
experience of a yellowy-orange after-image'. The result is that
the whole sentence is fused in 'I' as the single referring
expression. The identity theorist will then contend that this
1 'Sensations and Brain Processes', Borst p. 61.
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entity, I, is to be*identified with my body. He will suppose
that evidence to this effect can be supplied by correlating the
mental modifications of I with alterations in my body. Thus
Thomas Nagel proposes the identification of "a person's having
(a) sensation with his body's being in a physical state or
1
undergoing a physical process".
Can the body provide a unity such as is suggested by 'I'?
The first point to note is the apparent conventionality of the
specification of the whole body in relation to particular
occurrences. Any supposed material identification for one mental
event will be located in some area of the body, which may be more
or less extended. Take, for instance, the sensation produced by
direct experimental interference with the brain. The objective
correlate of this experience would be fairly precisely located.
It is true that it would be an event in the body just as it
would be an event in the brain; but why should it be specified
in relation to the one rather than to the other? The best that
one might hope for, seemingly, would be that the body should be,
as it were, approximately the smallest container in which all the
relevant events take place; but this would clearly not be
sufficient to provide a necessary connection between the body
and each separate experience. The descriptive scheme is therefore
indifferent to whether we allocate every event to the whole body
1 'Physicalism', Borst p. 216. Dennett puts forward a similar
view ('Content and Consciousness', pp. 16-19) in the context
of a disappearance theory of mind. He has been suspected by
Smart of denying referentiality even to the subject terms
('Critical Notice', p. 618), but it seems more likely that he
regards these as not specifically mental.
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or each to its particular physical location. It does not,
therefore, capture our sense of the unity of a person.
This possibility of redescription with respect to different
subject terras seems a fundamental component of the descriptive
scheme. It reappears in the failure of description to bestow
anything more than a conventional unity over time on the entities
that it distinguishes. I have already gone into this problem at
length in section xii of my first chapter. If my conclusions
there are accepted, they show clearly how the unity of the self
over time - if it is not entirely illusory or conventional - cannot
be accounted for in descriptive terms. If the reality underlying
this constantly changing object, my body, is to have some principle
of unity, this must be primarily revealed to us through the
continuity of mind rather than through any perceptual categorization.
This unity may also be reflected in the organization of the living
body; but it is not that which gives us such assurance as we have.
The process of fusion does not, therefore, reach a satisfactory
conclusion when interpreted in a materialist fashion. There is
some truth in it, for the terms which would be fused such as
'after-image1 and 'experience' are, as it suggests, non-referential.
The same, however, is true of the subject terms into which all
else was to be fused. The word 'I', and such words as 'you' and
'he' when used as its counterparts, do not descriptively indicate
any entity. The feeling that fusion is appropriate can therefore
be seen as reflecting the general cohesion of a form of language
that is entirely non-descriptive. It is my intention in the next





In my first chapter I argued that descriptive language is
essentially connected with perception, and hence that the language
of mind must be non-descriptive, because there is no internal
analogue to perception such as the notion of introspection pre¬
supposes. Wishing to preserve the ontological force of mental
language, I have, in my second chapter, prepared the way for the
presentation of a genuine alternative to description. In
criticizing the Identity Theory, I have tried to show that our
lived-through experiences do have a representable character though
this does not consist in descriptive properties. They therefore
escape the unified objective scheme of science not by being
irregular or unassociated descriptive entities but by falling
outside the scope of material language as a form of language.
This would imply that nothing that can be described need be left
out by an account of man in purely objective terms, and I suggested
that Central State Materialism provides the required sort of
linguistic formula. In so doing it must completely fail to capture
the notion of mind, while Putnam's version of Punctionalism does
come close to achieving this, providing it is not thought of as a
descriptive theory and providing the possible limitations of computer
simulation are recognized. Its recognition of the linguistic
content of mental states is valuable, but the language it introduces
has to be genuinely used by the being to represent his own condition.
What that language, alternative to description, may be, I must now
consider.
183
As the title of this chapter suggests, I intend, to base my
account of the language of mind on the notion of quotation. The
first thing that I should make clear, therefore, is that I do not
mean to suggest that the language of mind is to be identified with
quotation as we ordinarily understand it. Quotation is the
comparatively limited procedure by which we report what others
have spoken or written, and as such it has several fairly obvious
differences from the language in which we speak of our own and
others' mental lifeo What I do want to suggest, however, is that
quotation forms the most superficial part of a much wider form of
language that includes nearly all of what would naturally be taken
to fall within the language of mindo Dealing, as it does, with
matters which lie on the surface in contrast with those that mental
language deals with, quotation is much more easily comprehended.
This has not prevented its being misinterpreted, for even quotation
has fallen within the influence of the general movement to conceive
of all language as descriptive. Properly understood, however, it
provides a model of a non-descriptive language which can be
extended to take in the language of mind. Certainly that language
does have complexities which do not arise with quotation, just as
quotation has features that are peculiar to itself; but these need
not prevent us from recognizing a common organization that is
inherent in all, from the most evident to the most obscure. In
view of the elucidatory role that quotation can therefore play, it
seems fair to speak of this wider form of language as "quotation",
using scare quotes to indicate that a much greater linguistic
complex is being spoken of. By the time a proper study of "quotation"
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in all its roles had been carried out, quotation itself might
appear in a different light, as just a small part of the system
to which it gave the clue0 We must start, however, with what we
are familiar with and our current understanding of it.
II
Quotation generally takes either of two distinct forms, and
is accordingly called 'direct' or 'indirect'. These two forms are
distinguished by the linguistic constructions employed, oratio
recta in the case of direct quotation and oratio oblicua in the
case of indirect quotation. In the former case, an exact
replication of what someone has said or written is placed within
quotation marks, as thus:
A: The cat is dreaming of fish.
B: A said 'The cat is dreaming of fish'.
The oi'atio oblioua form does not, however, employ quotation marks,
but prefaces the replication, which in this case is typically not
exact, with the word 'that', as thus:
B: A said that the cat was dreaming of fish
or, to show an example of the free variation that is possible:
B: A said that Possum was dreaming of fish
where 'Possum' is the name of the cat that B takes A to have been
referring to.
It is oratio oblioua that provides the first foothold for the
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notion that quotation might he assimilated, with the language of
mind in a wider "quotation", for it is an obvious fact that this
construction is commonly used in speaking of mental states. Thus,
in the place of 'A said that x', we may have 'A thought that x',
"A hoped that x' and so on through a long list of psychological
verbs. It is my contention, though, that the connection between
quotation and mental language extends well beyond this use of the
oratio obliaua construction to speak of the so-called "propositional
attitudes". Direct quotation may be quite as relevant as indirect
quotation is, and indeed may have some priority in relation to the
language of mind as it seems to have in quotation itself.
Let us begin, therefore, with direct qtiotation as the simpler
of the two forms. I have said that this involves the replication
of the words that someone has spoken or written. Thus, in my
example, B does to all appearance repeat A's words; that is, produce
further tokens of the type words of which A uttered tokens. It
has not always been accepted, however, that this is what is taking
place. Even in my formulation, it is not obvious that the word
'replicate' must be used with this sense; for 'replica' does rather
suggest a derivative copy with a status different from that of the
original. l>et us look, therefore, at the features of the situation
which have led some to place a different interpretation on it.
B seems to repeat A's words; but, if he does, it appears as
if these must suffer a change of function in many, if not all,
cases of the repetition. We may take it that, in his original
utterance, A spoke of a cat and spoke .'of it as dreaming of fish.
The function of B's utterance is not nearly so obvious, however.
186
It may be a straight report of what A said, but with a different
inflection B might make it clear that he scorned A's assertion.
'How could anyone know what the cat is dreaming about?' he might
seem to be saying or, going further, 'A is raving; there's no cat
about'. In this latter case, B is clearly not referring to any
cat and in neither case does he refer to a cat as one that is
dreaming of fish. If, then, he is not speaking of some cat or its
dreams, what is he referring to when he utters the words which, in
my example, are enclosed in quotation marks? One possible answer
to this question is 'nothing'; but it is understandable how one
might be drawn into saying that B is here speaking descriptively of
A or of A's utterance. A is, after all, what the subject term of
B's statement indicates, and A or his utterance is what B is
scornful of. Why should we net interpret B's utterance, including
the part within quotation marks, as a description of A?
This could, of course, be a most embarrassing suggestion; for
what would become of my planned exposition of a non-descriptive
language of mind if my chosen model could itself be shown to be
reducible to description? He must therefore give this proposal
careful attention to determine whether there is any truth in it or
whether it is, as my earlier discussion would suggest it might be,




Quine is one writer who has strongly urged that quotation
should be treated as reducible to description, and he represents
well the tendency to deny the quoted words their normal meaning
and to involve them entirely in a characterization of the original
speaker.. For Quine, indeed, any quotation is not made up of what
are apparently its component words but has, in its entirety, the
status of a single word® This contrasts with the more widely
held view, typified by liege's account, in which particular words
within a quotation designate their counterparts in the quoted
utterance®'' In Quine's view, however, quotation marks enclosing
any expression produce a singular term "naming, as it happens, the
2
expression inside". Thus E's remark, in my example, would have
the form 'A said x', where x is a name for the words 'The cat is
dreaming of fish'.
This procedure should recall the close of my last chapter.
The elimination of words within quotes, one would say, is surely
analogous to the process of fusion by which Identity Theorists
and others seek to disarm unwanted mental terms. Frobably, however,
the former inspired the latter, a debt to Quine being explicitly
3
acknowledged in at least one case. Quine's target is quotation
1 'On Sense and Reference', p. 58.
2 'Word and Object', p. 143" In taking Quine as a representative
of those who would assimilate quotation to description, I do
recognize that he wishes eventually to expurgate description
itself from his system: but that is at a further stage with
which I am not concerned.
3 Dennett, 'Content and Consciousness', p. 7«
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and theirs is mental language, but both see the weakness that is
to be eradicated as an apparent, but inauthentic, referentiality.
The policy in both cases is to amalgamate the offending terms into
meaningfully indivisible blocks, and the criterion of success is
that these blocks are sufficiently well-behaved to function
descriptively.
It is not only a general model for materialism that can be
found in Quine's treatment of quotation, for in its different
aspects it parallels the varied degrees of fusion which have been
employed in relation to mental language. In his treatment of
direct quotation there is a resemblance to Smart and all those
who accept that identification can be carried out after limited
fusion. A statement such as 'I have an experience of a yellowyt-
orange after-image' reduces, in their view, to 'I have X', just as
the quotation reduces, in Quine's view, to 'A said x'. Quine is
quite prepared to accept direct quotation into his ideal descriptive
language once the expression within quotes has been reduced to a
single word, just as Smart is prepared to accept particular
experiences into the material scheme onoe they are recognized as
single entities. It is a different matter, however, with indirect
quotation. In this case Quine is to be compared with the theorist
who, unsatisfied with the immediate results of fusion, is driven on
to limit referentiality to the subject term only. Thus Quine thinks
that a three-term analysis of 'A said that . . .' is undesirable,
but he is prepared to consider the form 'A y', where 'y' is a general
1
term representing what A did: while Nage1 considers that Smart's
1 Op. cit., p. 216.
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'I have X' should be further reduced to 'I Y', where 'Y' is again
a general term. Quine despairs, however, of incorporating indirect
quotation into his descriptive scheme even through this austere
reformulation. He thus allows us to extend the analogy still
further, for this surely parallels the tendency, exemplified by
Dennett, to reject mental language out of hand when once it has
been fused into its subject terms.
This parallel between Quine's treatment of quotation and
various reductions of mental language is of obvious interest,
suggesting as it does that there must be some strong degree of
resemblance between quotation and mental language. This will not
help me, however, if there proves to be justification for Quine's
coalescing everything that appears between quotation marks into
singular descriptive terms. What, then, are his reasons for this
move? It can most easily be understood as a result of his
logician^ desire to constrain a particular linguistic form within
a single set of rules. There is, in this case, a feature of
indicative sentences containing singular terms which has a key role
in his intended systematization of such sentences; and the auth¬
enticity of any apparent exceptions has therefore, justifiably it
is hoped, to be impugned.
The feature that Quine wishes to regard as essential to such a
sentence is the preservation of its truth or falsity when a singular
2
term is replaced in it by another that designates the same object.
1
2
Op. cit., p. 221.
Op. cit., p. 142.
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That this is a genuine feature of descriptive sentences cannot be
denied. Let us suppose, for instance, that the name of the cat to
which A referred really was 'Possum*. Then the truth or falsity of
'Possum is dreaming of fish' would vary in accord with the truth or
falsity of A's original assertion, 'The cat is dreaming of fish'.
'Possum' is thus substitutable for 'The cat' with preservation of
truth value; but this substitutability does not carry over into
quotation. Were B to remark "A said 'Possum is dreaming of fish'",
this would not be acceptable because A did not in fact use the
word 'Possum'.
The generally permissible substitution therefore fails; but
Quine regards its success as the criterion for the genuine presence
of a singular term. He has, therefore, to contend that, all
appearances to the contrary, the singular term, 'The cat', does not
really occur in "A said 'The cat is dreaming of fish'". Prom this
point there is then only a short step to the denial that any of the
words appearing between the quotation marks are present in anything
but their graphical shape. Thus 'cat' is, in his view, no more a
distinct word in this context than 'can' is as it appears in 'canary';
the whole quotation is an opaque whole, which is to count as a single
term.
There is something strange, however, about this demand that
substitution must be possible if something is to count as a singular
term that indicates an object. Let us agree that substitution is
essential to the notion of linguistic indication, in contrast to the
1 Op. cit., p. 142.
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notion of linguistic characterization. One sign can pick out an
object only on the principle that the same object can in theory be
picked out by another sign. Once, however, we possess such signs
as have an established capacity to pick out objects, why should we
not employ them in contexts that demand one of these terms rather
than another?
Strangely enough, Quine employs a terminology that seems to
confirm this very picture. Wishing to express conditions for the
genuine occurrence of singular terms, he speaks of "a~ purely
1
referential position" where "substitutivity of identity" holds.
This pure referentiality coincides happily with the basic use of
singular terms through which they gain their indicating role; and
the insistence on the purity of their role in this context would
apparently allow, by contrast, a use of these terms elsewhere
that was not purely referential, and yet still referential. hot
purely referential positions would be those where the terms were
used under more selective conditions, and hence where they were
used for additional purposes without surrendering their original
2
indicating function. The expression "not purely referential"
makes, however, only a brief and ineffectual appearance in 1 Word
and Object*. Quine explains that he will omit the adverb in
3future for the sake of brevity. Unfortunately, "non-referential",
which then takes the place of "not purely referential", is apparently
1 Op. cit., p. 142.
2 This point is made by David Eoldcroft ('Asserting and Referring',
p. 112)o ,
3 Op. cit., p. 143.
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used to mean precisely what it says; terms do not keep their
1
reference in non-referential position.
Certainly there are cases where indicating words are quoted
in such a way that they lose their original function. This occurs
when the quotational form is used merely to report which words a
speaker or writer used, without any concern for what he meant hy
them or whether he meant anything by them at all. If he did in
fact intentionally and successfully refer to some object, the words
will have lost this function in the quotation, in no longer being
used to indicate that object. This is, however, a degenerate form
of quotation, for there is no reason to suppose that the mere
repetition of words as words is any more typical of quotation
than the mere production of words as words is typical of original
utterances. One might suggest, indeed, that the only words that
can correctly be quoted as inert examples are those that have
1 Op. cit., p. 143« It is perhaps worth quoting Quine's
explanation of 'not purely referential' in full: "Example (2)
('The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital
board' - but not for the dean, though he is the same man), even
if taken in the not purely referential way, differs from (1)
(•'Tully was a Roman' is trochaic') in that it still seems to
have far more bearing on the chairman of the hospital board,
dean though he be, than (l) has on Tully. Hence my cautious
phrase 'not purely referential', designed to apply to all such
cases and to affirm no distinction among then. If I omit
the adverb, the motive will be brevity." (Op. cit., p. 142).
What the first of Quine's sentences seems to say is that the
chairman of the hospital board is referred to but that Tully
is not. It does at least assert that there is some difference
between the two cases, but this is apparently denied in the
next sentence (through Quine's use of 'to affirm no' rather than
the better justified 'not to affirm any'). If there is no
difference, all cases must presumably tend either to the case
of the chairman or to the case of Tully. Quine's third
sentence effectively decides this question in favour of Tully.
The resultant gains to Quine's system, if not to understanding,
are such as to make one doubt the professed motive.
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originally been produced as such examples. If the words were
originally functional, this must be conveyed by a genuine quotation
of them. Consider, for example, B's quotation of A" s utterance
when he thought there had been no cat for A to refer to. However
scornful B may have been, he did allow that the utterance at least
purported to indicate a dreaming cat. Indeed his scorn would be
incomprehensible if the quotation did not convey this.
This sort of case seems to suggest that quoted terms retain
their original sense even when the new speaker does not intend
to refer to anything by means of them; but, interesting as this
is, altogether too much weight has generally been placed on the
fact that someone who quotes a statement need not believe in it.
He need not, but he may; and, if he does, there does not seem to
be any good reason why he should not use the quotation to make
the same statement. Suppose, for instance, that B is speaking
to someone who is rather deaf. "A said 'The cat is dreaming of
fish' ", he says, loudly and with emphasis. Does not the quotation
in this case serve the same purpose as A*s original utterance,
though possibly more effectively?
The way in which quotation may retain the original force of
the words is made particularly clear, perhaps, by the case of
commands. Consider, for instance, a father saying to a child,
"Your mother said 'Go to bed!.'". If we imagine the tone of voice,
we shall surely not doubt that this too is a command; and wrho would
deny the propriety of one of the parents adding, rather later,
'You've been told twice'.'? If commands can survive in quotation
as commands, this should encourage us to think that assertions
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about cats can survive in quotation as assertions about cats. It
seems evident that B's quotation, if it serves the purpose of A's
assertion, must itself involve a reference to the cat. It is
surely implausible to suggest that our hard-of-hearing individual
must cope not only with deafness but also with working out that,
if A spoke the words mentioned by B, A must have been referring
to the cat. He understands the words in the same sense whether
spoken by A or by B. Words in quotation are therefore capable
of indicating directly the same objects as were indicated by the
words that are quoted.
Words that appear in quotations can with advantage, therefore,
be regarded as the same words as those that are quoted, rather
than as an entirely new set of -words which function only as names
of the original words. This point constitutes a criticism of
the negative side of Frege's position and, by implication, of Quine's
single term theory; that is, of their denials that -words within a
quotation have their usual, or any, referential powero It does
not of itself, however, constitute a strong criticism of the
positive side to their views, that these words singly, or yoked
together to form a single unit -, designate the original words° All
that it affords is a puzzle as to how words can point referent! ally
in two directions at once, to both the quoted words and their
indicated objects.^ Apart from this one slight doubt, the criticism
offers nothing that might affect the central question whether quotation
1 Even this doubt would not apply to Quine's account, if we
suppose that suitably modified to meet the criticism above;
for then the unified whole would point to the quoted words and
individual words to their indicated objectso
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should itself be regarded as descriptive. Any indicating function
which words possess in both the original utterance and in quotation
is clearly independent of the distinctive function of quotation®
That, seemingly, is to report the words that someone has uttered®
Why then should a quotation, consisting of the same words though
it does, not be used to name the original utterance?
Accounts of direct quotation can be found that correspond
well to what one would imagine Frege's and Quine's theories would
look like if modified to meet the criticism that the same words
appear in quotations as in what is quoted. Corresponding to
Prege's, for instance, is the account that Geach gives in 'Mental
Acts'. He argues that the mention and use of expressions are not
mutually exclusive, and therefore that the same (type) expression
can be used in the quotation as it mentions in the original
utterance."' He suggests that a quotation should consequently be
read word by word "as describing the quoted expression in terns of
2
the expressions it contains and their order". There is much,
though, that is puzzling, even in this brief expression of his
theory. Certainly one does want to agree that the word tokens
that are used in the quotation are of the same types as the word
tokens that are "mentioned" - and perhaps this can be guaranteed
by their being used also in their normal sense, though Geach does
not mention that; but what is to count as a token of the same word
type? lire we to accept that one word type can both descriptively
1 Ibido, pp® 81-82o
2 Op® cit®, pp. 82-83. 'Describing' is a word that I might well
wish to emphasize in disagreement, but the italics are Geach's
own©
196
indicate a cat and "describe" another word token of the same type?
The real difficulty here arises from Geach's use of the word
"describing". Clearly he does not mean by it the same as I mean
by 'describing'. What then can he intend? The best indicator
of this is probably his inclusion of the words' order as part of
what is described. Since this order cannot be included in the
meanings of the separate words out of which he insists the quotation
is built, it seems that Geach must have in mind a form of picturing:
the arrangement of the words in the quotation pictorially
representing the arrangement of the words in the original.'' Nov;,
whatever one may think of this as an account of the way that
quotation functions, it is clear that it does not make of quotation
a form of description such as we have been concerned with. Geach's
account does not, therefore, constitute a threat to my contention
that quotation is - in my sense of 'description' - essentially non-
descriptive.
If Geach's account can be seen as a modification of Rrege's,
one presented by Goddard and Routley offers a parallel modification
of Quine'so They are, like Geach, strongly critical of the notion
that words within a quotation are not being used. Unlike him,
however, they make the point, which I have stressed, that in this use
3
the words are understood in their ordinary sense. Goddard and
1 This interpretation fails to make a coherent whole of Geach's
account, particularly when he wishes to apply quotation to
thoughts; but I cannot see what other interpretation is
possible.
2 'Use, Mention and Quotation', pp. 14-23»
3 Op. cit., pp. 16—17•
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Routley completely reject, therefore, Quire*s notion that a
quotation forms an indissoluble whole in which particular words
cannot be read. They do, however, provide as close an approximation
to his theory as could well be possible once this sizable part of
it had been set aside. Despite their recognition of separate
words within a quotation, they see a quotation functioning as a
quotation through groups of words rather than word by word, as
Geach would have it. It is true that they do not go so far as
Quine in extending these groups to whatever falls between a.- pair
of quotation marks. They consider, instead, that quotation
operates on whole sentences or rather on whole statements, but this
- in its first version at least - is probably something that Quine
could accept.
What Quine could not accept would be Goddard and Routley's
notion of "semantical mention". This they contrast with "syntactical
mention", within which they would include the repetition of words
2
as mere verbal examples without concern for their meaning.
Semantical mention, on the other hand, is concerned with the mentioned
expressions in so far as those are meaningful. Goddard and Routley
regard the genuine quotation of someone's meaningful utterance as a
case of semantical mention; for, to understand such a quotation,
"it is essential to read inside the quote marks and to take into
3account the meaning of the quoted expression". Since the meaning
1 A singular term could as well be lost within a sentence as
between a pair of quotation marks.
2 Op. cit. , pp. 14-15.
3 Op. cit., p. 16.
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of an utterance belongs to it as a whole, rather than being
scattered among the separate words that make up the utterance,
their belief that quotation operates on whole statements then
follows irnmediatelyo
The difficulty with Goddard and Routley, as with Geach, is
to know just what they mean by the crucial expression they use to
cover the relation between the quotation and what is quoted. They
argue that semantical mention is to be distinguished from syntactical
mention as not approximating in function to a naming; and they
therefore insist that a quotation is not a name for what is
mentionedo On the other hand, however, they make use of the
same invented system of species-names to express both syntactical
and semantical mention. In this system the class of tokens of the
English word 'red', for example, is referred to by the species-name
2
'd.e.r '. They then translate '"It is red" implies "it is coloured"'
by 'D.e.r-s.i-t. is imply d.e.r.u.o.l.o.c-s.i -t. 5s'^ but the only
possible interpretation of this, in direct contradiction to the view
of theirs I mentioned above, is surely that quotations are names
after all. One would generally gather from the article, however, that
this is not Goddard and Routley's real intention, but that they mean
to confirm their earlier assertion.
We should take them, therefore, to be suggesting that quotations
"mention" statements, and that there is nothing of description or
1 0p» cit., p. J1 o
2 Op. cit., pp. 23-24»
3 Op. cit., p. 33»
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naming in this mentioning. How could we determine whether it is
true that quotations as wholes do not name anything, whether
statements or expressions? The answer is provided by Quine, with
his insistence that genuine names must be intersubstitutable if
they stand for the same object. Let us, therefore, see how well
Quine's contention that quotations are singular terms stands up to
his own criterion. Is it possible to produce an alternative
expression that will single out the same object in the same way
as it is singled out by a quotation?
Some would say that nothing could be easier. We may write,
for example, 'A said George', where 'George' is introduced as a
name for the words'The cat is dreaming of fish'. More elaborately,
we can use a device such as Goddard and Routley's reversed
spelling or Quine's own version of spelling: 'tee aitch ee space
1
see ay tee space . . .'. There can be no doubt in the first case
that we have been presented with a name, even if we may need
Quine's assurance in the second that he has presented us with the
names of letters rather than the letters themselves in an uncon¬
ventional graphical form. Setting this misgiving aside, however,
it is certainly not to be contested in either case that a reader
could gain from these expressions all that he might gather from a
normally expressed quotation; he only needs to know what 'George'
stands for, or to understand Quine's convention. Can there be any
grounds, then, for denying that quotation operates in the same way -
or ways?
1 'Word and Object', p. 143•
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A first suspicion should arise from the fact that the two
illustrations, though they both provide names, do in detail function
quite differently from each other; so their seemingly achieving
the sane purpose as quotation should not unduly impress us as a
reason for saying that quotation must function in the same general
way. In fact, they do not achieve the same purpose as a quotation;
for, in gathering from them what he might gather from a quotation,
the reader has first to convert them into a quotation. What is
happening here may be most clearly apparent in terms of Quine's
spelling device. This provides a way of reconstituting the words
contained in the original utterance. When we understand the
convention, we can combine the named letters into the words 'The
cat o . .'.1 These words can then be read; but it is only this
second process that makes us conversant with what A said. The
first move, when we reconstitute the words by use of the names of
their letters, does not carry us that far; for we might carry it
out knowing Quine's convention but not one word of English. We
must not be misled, therefore, by any psychological merging of the
two operations, for logically they are quite independent.
It should be obvious that the same considerations apply to
the name 'George'. In its naming of the sentence 'The cat is
dreaming of fish', it does not carry out the purpose of quotation.
It merely enables us, if we know its meaning, to produce the 'words
that do constitute a quotation. 'George' is thus a name both for
1 If we do not believe Qpine's assurance that he has provided us
with the names of letters, we can leave out this stage and -
with practice - read the words directly.
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the originally uttered sentence and for the sentence that appears
within quotes; for each is a token of the same sentence type,
consisting of words of the same word types. These words have to
he read as themselves; it is impossible, therefore, to replace
them with names of themselves. The only possible replacement is
by functionally equivalent words through translation into another
language; but this clearly does not produce a further set of
names for the original English words.
Here the insistence of direct quotation on exact reproduction
of the original words may make us hesitate over allowing its
translation. Such hesitation is unnecessary, however, for this
insistence, while it potentially makes the verbal repetition very
clear, can also be misleading. It can be taken, as wo have seen,
to point to the words in their original physical manifestations.
The purpose of quotation, is, however, to convey a person's meaning
rather than to indicate the actual words that he used. The
distinctive value of direct quotation, acquired by the restriction
it imposes, is that it cannot itself distort the person's original
meaning. The use of exactly the same words excludes the distortion
that can arise from the use of different words which are more or
less synonymous with the original ones. That some reservation
should be felt at the translation of direct quotation is therefore
correct, for translation inevitably introduces just this sort of
distortion. There is no justification, however, for lamenting the
failure of translated direct quotation to describe the original
utterance, for that was never its purpose as quotation.
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By Quine's own criterion, therefore, the role of a quotation
has been shown not to be that of a unitary name; for possible
substitutes for it are restricted to verbal expressions already
having equivalent functionso We can consequently recognize the
error in Quine's notion that what he calls "picture writing" -
the reproduction of the original in the quotation - is a merely
incidental feature of the way that quotation conventionally achieves
1
its purposeo The reproduction is not just a picturing, one way
out of many of indicating the original expression, but a fully
functional replication of it.
There is, however, a fruitful analogy to be drawn between
quotation and representational pictures; only the relevant
pictures are not originals but reproductions of originals. A
picture that is a replica of another represents the same objects
as does the original. Further, each object is represented by the
part of the replica that corresponds to the part that represents it
in the original. In just such a way, I have argued, particular
words in a quotation indicate the same objects as the corresponding
words in the original utterance. At the same time, however, it is
the role of the replica, to represent the original picture; but this
must be a different form of representation from that by which it
represents the objects. Those are indicated by two-dimensional
projections of their surfaces; the original picture, on the other
hand, is re-embodied in its replica. The analogy is therefore
completed, for both the quotation and the reproduction represent
1 Op. cit., p. 189.
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their originals by being further tokens of the same type rather
than by satisfying certain conventions, whether descriptive in
the case of the quotation or pictorial in the case of the reproduction.
There is a further feature of quotation, however, for which no
satisfactory analogue can be found in the case of pictures. This
arises from the double manifestation of language in speech and
writing. In the same way as an original utterance, a quotation can
be spoken or written; and there is the added complication that
speech can be quoted in writing, or writing in speech. This does
provide considerable additional problems for a descriptive theory of
quotation'' ; but, if quotation is taken to involve the production of
a functional equivalent of the original, no problem arises - for
writing is a functional equivalent for speech, and speech for
writing (now that the latter is so well established).
The original dependence of writing on speech may indeed suggest
the idea that writing itself may not be altogether unlike a system
of quotation. Whether or not the original writers always spoke
the words, or had them dictated, before -writing them down seems
unimportant in comparison with the general principle that these
marks were intended as a substitute for what they had, or might have,
spoken. Now that the practice is established we can, of course,
express ourselves in writing as directly as in speech; but the
1 Unless it is hinted, mysteriously, that quotation is descriptive
of words independently of their physical manifestation,
quotations would have entirely different senses according to
whether they referred to speech or to writing. Suppose, however,
that I am informed, "A tells me 'The cat is dreaming of fish'".
If I take it that A spoke (when, in fact, he wrote) this
information, I surely do not misunderstand the actual quotation,
even if I do in some small degree misunderstand the word 'tells*.
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functional equivalence and the substitutivity remain. The
relation of writing to speech is certainly not that of descriptiono
It might also be said that this relation is not that of quotation
either; but this should not be expressed with the same degree of
conviction. Certainly writing has lost, if it ever had, the
element of repetition, and more specifically the element of
repetition of others' words, which may seem essential to quotation.
On the other hand, it does bear this relation of functional
equivalence to speech in conveying meaning; and this may well
make it seem proper that writing, in its relation to speech, should
be brought with quotation under some wider, unifying concept. We
may have here an outlier of that wider notion of "quotation" that
I propose should be built up to cover the language of mind.
These speculations take us too far, however, from our present
purpose. I have argued in this section that direct quotation
cannot be regarded as a naming, whatever the object of that naming
might be0 I have also begun to indicate what I take to be the
actual mode of operation for quotation; but unfinished business
includes Goddard and Routley's not altogether clear notion that a
direct quotation mentions an original meaningful statement, without
this mentioning resting on any naming. Their stress on meaning
brings us very close, however, to what has generally been regarded
as the province of indirect quotation. I shall now, therefore,
turn to that, before attempting to draw all the threads together
in a discussion of quotation in general.
Indirect quotation does not use quotation marks, but introduce
(though not invariably) the word 'that' between the verb and the
words reflecting the original utterance. As I have already
remarked, these words may take another form than the original
utterance, either in accordance with certain regular transformations
or in a fairly free translation of the originalo What these
changes seem to contribute to is a take-over by the new speaker,
who makes the words in some degree his own. The free translation
is clearly arranged to suit his purpose, but the regular alterations
are also designed to make the expression appropriate to his context
rather than the original speaker's® Thus, in a report of a past
utterance that was then in the present tense, the verb is con¬
ventionally changed into the past tense which is appropriate to
express the new temporal relation with what the utterance was about,
as in 'A said that the cat was dreaming of fish1; or, the
implication of futurity is removed from an utterance originally
in the future tense, as in 'A said that the cat would be dreaming
of fish tonight'. Similar considerations apply to the standard
changes in pronouns. Indeed, the change from 'I' in the original
to 'he' in the quotation displays with particular clarity the
words' adoption by the new speaker and their alienation from their
original utterer.
These changes, and the freer type of variation as in 'A says
that Possum is dreaming of fish', have always rendered implausible
the suggestion that indirect quotation names the actual words that
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were originally uttered. Those, therefore, who have adopted the
view that direct quotation does perform such a naming find themselves
under a requirement to provide an account of indirect quotation
quite different from the one they had provided for direct
quotation.. They may be so attached, however, to the ideas of
naming and of reference that they will feel that the relation of
the words in an indirect quotation to whatever they represent in
the original cannot be essentially different in kind. They are
therefore obliged, if they are to make any sense of indirect
quotation at all, to find an alternative object for these words
to name.
The area in which such an object might be sought is defined
by what the indirect quotation is thought to convey of the
original. ^t does not preserve the original words, but it should
preserve the meaning of the original. The changes I mentioned
above are designed to achieve the same meaning in the new context,
and the main standard for a satisfactory indirect quotation is that
it should have succeeded in this preservation of meaningo We
therefore find Frege, for instance, proposing that in indirect
speech "words do not have their customary reference but designate
what is usually their sense".'' This designation, which he calls
the words' "indirect reference", clearly brings the function of
indirect quotation into line with that of direct quotation as he
conceives it to be, but only at the cost of introducing a new kind
of object: the sense of an expression.
This is not the only way, however, of reacting to this problem
1 'On Sense and Reference', p. 59«
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within a general approach that relies on names and reference.
The sense of an expression or its alternative, a proposition, seems
a highly artificial object called into being to satisfy the needs
of the descriptive scheme, rather than an independently existing
one that must be fitted into any account. We may well sympathize
with Quine, therefore, in his rejecting any such objects.^ Since
he has the same general attitude, however, this means his functionally
discarding the words that were the potential names of those objects.
As I have already mentioned, he feels compelled to fuse any indirect
quotation into the word indicating the original speaker as the only
genuine referring expression, and even then he despairs of fitting
2
it into his ultimate scheme.
These approaches share a common view of direct quotation,
which makes its purpose quite distinct from that of indirect
quotation. This supposed difference is conveniently expressed by
Austin. Having distinguished between "phatic" and "rhetic" acts -
the one the production of words as belonging to a certain vocabulary
and conforming to a certain grammar, the other the use of those
words with a certain sense and reference he suggested that direct
quotations report phatic acts and that indirect quotations report
3
rhetic acts. I have argued, however, that direct quotation does
succeed in reporting what he calls a "rhetic act", if that is what
has provided its occasion. The distinction that Austin wished to
draw has to be limited therefore to direct quotation's suitability and
1 'Word and Object', pp. 206-9«
2 Op. cit., pp. 216-21.
3 'How To Do Things with Words' , p. 95.
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indirect quotation'-s unsu.itabi3.ity to report a phatic acto
Indirect quotation is therefore to be distinguished from
direct quotation rather for its obvious dependence on the meaning
of the original utterance than for its bearing some relation to
that meaning that direct quotation does not achieve. With direct
quotation, it is true, what is reported might, for all that appears
on the surface, be a merely phatic act; but an original assertion
equally fails to bear on its surface any indication that it is
other than phatic. Indirect quotation is unusual, therefore, in
that it brings to our attention the meaningfulness of the words that
it reports. As I have said, the new speaker adopts the words as
his own. This does not involve him in a commitment to their truth
or even to the existence of what they purport to indicate, but it
does engage him in a commitment to their sense. Even if he disagrees
with the original speaker, he must have grasped what his meaning
was and must convey this, however different the words he uses may be,
if it is to be a successful quotation.
The need for the new speaker to understand the original is a
demand placed on him by his freedom to use other words, rather than
by his trying to achieve an end that could not be achieved by direct
quotation. It is true that he may succeed, through indirect quotation,
in explaining to an audience the meaning of an utterance which was
incomprehensible to them in the original speaker's words. It is
clear that, in this situation, direct quotation would not help them,
iiixs u.0ti s no ir snowj now0v0x*^ Lncio curuc 0 cjno ^0. txon no o el »vsry 0u
conveying meaning. The audience, it must be stressed, does not
understand the direct quotation; therefore, the quotation's failure
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does not display any"limitation in its natural function, but
rather stresses a function that it possesses but which this
audience is unable to make use of.
If, then, indirect quotation has essentially the same function
as the direct quotation of a rhetic act, these cannot be distinguished
by the one referring to a meaning whereas the other does not. The
complete implausibility of the suggestion that a direct quotation
might refer to a meaning indicates that it is indirect quotation's
claims to such a reference that must give way. The absence of a
meaning to be referred to cannot explain, therefore, indirect
quotation's unsuitability for the reporting of phatic acts.
Certainly phatic acts do lack meaning, and this lack is, moreover,
crucial to the inapplicability of indirect quotation. This lack
is displayed, however, not in the absence of an object to be
referred to but in the impossibility of providing any substitutes
for the original expression according to the customary standards
of indirect quotation. Nothing will count as a satisfactory
translation of that expression. The new speaker cannot adopt
the words and adapt them to a new context, because the original
speaker never ma.de them his own by using them with some particular
meaning. Unlike direct quotation, indirect quotation does not
offer a possible setting for the indifferent display of words
that have not been put to work.
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V
Several writers have teen exercised by the problem of whether
the word 'that1, as it appears in indirect quotation, should be seen
as going with the verb or with the words that follow it. The idea
that 'that1 forms a unit with the words which follow was associated
by Arthur Frior with the idea that this unit then names the original
1
proposition« His dislike for the latter idea then led him to
avoid it by rejecting the former. He suggested instead that
'that' goes with the preceding verb to form an expression "which
is like a predicate at one end (because at that end it hitches on
to a name) and like a sentential connective at the other end
(because at that end it hitches on to a sentence)".
Donald Davidson is equally keen on linking 'that1 with the
preceding verb, but sets about it without introducing so curious
a hybrid expression. Davidson regards 'that' as a simple demon¬
strative. He pays for this simplicity, however, by dividing the
statement into two separate utterances so that 'that', as a
3
demonstrative, can point on to the second. Thus 'A said that the
cat was dreaming of fish' would become on his interpretation, first,
'A said that: ' which is supposed to suggest the question 'What?'
to be answered by, second, 'the cat was dreaming of fish'. The
purpose of the latter utterance, he says, is to convey the content
4
of what was originally said.
1 "Oratio Obliqua', p. 116.
2 Op. cit., p. 126.
3 'On Saying That', pp. 142-3.
4 Op. cit., p. 143.
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In favour of this suggestion by Davidson, curious as it may
seem at first sight, is the accredited theory of how the oratio
obliqua form actually developed. According to this, 'that', as
it appears now in indirect quotation, did at least start life as a
demonstrative pointing to some clause that had been, or was to be,
1
introduced. Interesting as origins may be, however, they do not
determine present organization or function. What one would expect
from this history would be an expanded form of direct quotation
with 'that1 inserted between the verb and the expression within
quotes. The latter would, too, exactly reproduce the original;
but what in fact we have are the variations on the original that
are both permitted and demanded by the oratio oblicua form. These
variations can also provide some embarrassment for Prior's theory
for, as Bede Rundle has pointed out, the resuhs do not always
2
look like self-sufficient sentences.
We can discover exactly what is wrong with Davidson's theory,
however, if we consider the possibility of transposing the parts
of certain oratio obliqua expressions. 'He admitted that he was
guilty' can, for example, be rearranged in the form 'That he was
guilty, he admitted'. In itself this inversion seems to attach
the 'that' firmly to the following expression rather than to the verb;
but I think we should allow Davidson to argue at this point that this
rearrangement, which is after all neither common nor all that
comfortable, may have arisen only through a lack of understanding
1 Op. cit., p. 142.
2 'Transitivity and Indirect Speech', p. 189.
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of the actual demonstrative role of 'that'. He should therefore
be allowed to make a different rearrangement to create a form which
seems to suit his theory better: 'He was guilty: that he admitted'.
Unfortunately for Davidson, this does not seem to have quite the
same meaning as the previous form. This difference is confirmed
if we ask what the man had admitted, what in fact the 'that' is now
pointing to; for the answer is not, as Davidson would have it, 'He
was guilty' but 'That he was guilty'. It seems evident, therefore,
that the conventionally placed oratlo obllqua 'that' cannot be a
demonstrative because, if it were, the expression it introduces
would start with a suppressed 'that' of another kind: the very
kind that we had always taken the expressed 'that' to be.
Davidson cannot escape this criticism by restricting his theory
to 'saying that' as against the oratio obliqua construction in
general. Admittedly, 'That he was guilty, he said' is not
allowable; but the criticism does not depend on that. Much more
importantly, 'He was guilty: that he said' is allowable; and the
answer to the question 'What did he say?* is again 'That he was
guilty'. Another possible answer could be 'I am guilty', but that
moves firmly into the area of oratio recta and is thus irrelevant.
My criticism does apply directly, therefore, to 'say' as well as to
'admit' and other verbs.
It does seem, therefore, that the oratio oblioua 'that' does
attach itself naturally to what follows. This does not mean
however, as Prior feared, that together they then form a name.
'That' does introduce a transformation of the original utterance
according to the rules and freedoms of oratio obiiqua. It therefore
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seems to indicate to lis that this expression, in which we
instinctively include the 'that', conveys the meaning of the
original. As I have already argued, though, this does not show
that it names the meaning, or any vehicle for the meaning such as
a proposition. The meaning might equally well have been conveyed
in oratio recta. The apparently greater concentration on meaning
in the oratio oblique, case is indeed an effect of our not having
the exact words, but it is not a case of our having the meaning
instead of those words. The answer to the question of what the
'that' attaches itself to is therefore far less important than
Prior thought.
About one thing, however, Prior is right. The verb in the
oratio obliqua construction is not transitive in the conventional
sense; nor, I might add, is the verb in the oratio recta con¬
struction. Neither introduces a noun or a noun-substitute. They
may both be ranged alongside a case such as Searle's 'The sound
made by a Californian Jay is . . •' where "what completes the
1
sentence is a sound, not a proper name of a sound". If that
example's verb is to be regarded as transitive in a sense wider
than the conventional grammatical definition, then so are they;
2
but this is an unimportant decision. They do not introduce mere
1 'Speech Acts', p. 76.
2 Rundle has suggested that verbs introducing oratio oblioua
can be placed on a continuum from transitive to intransitiver
('Transitivity and Indirect Speech', p. 206.). He instances
'confirm' as a transitive verb because we can say, for
example, 'She confirmed his statement that he was guilty'
(Op. cit., p. 202). 'That he was guilty' is not, however, a
name for his statement but appears as an exemplification of it.
'Confirm' is not conventionally transitive, therefore, in 'She
confirmed that he was guilty'.
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sounds, of course, but meaningful words. These are inserted as
repetitions, however, in just the same way as the imitation of the
1
bird song. As direct quotation includes a meaningful repetition
of an original sentence, so indirect quotation includes, if not a
sentence as Prior suggests, a substitute for a sentence. This
substitute carries out the same function as the sentence might have
done, but, as I have said, it is adapted to the new context and
possibly in addition to the understanding of its audience.
An attractive reformulation of 1 said that' is provided by
2
Geach's 'said something tantamount to'. Me should be suspicious,
however, of the material implications of 'something', and of the
same word's seeming to make 'said' into a conventionally transitive
verb after all. The latter reason may have weighed with Anthony
Kenny in his substituting the translation 'uttered a form of words
I
tantamount to', in which 'a form of words' may be taken to be
3
internal to the translation of 'said'. Kenny's rewording re¬
inforces, however, the suggestion, implicit in 'something' in the
original, that material word tokens must be intended. His version
seems to be hauled up on to the quotational level only by the words
'tantamount to', with their clear implication that the equivalence
intended is in terms of meaning. It would be best, therefore, to
1 Me might think it a sign of grace in Quine for him to say
that "when we quote a man's utterance directly we report it
almost as we do a bird call" ('Word and Object', p. 219); but
he says it for the wrong reason, stressing the emptiness of
meaning rather than the repetition.
2 'Mental Acts', p. 87 •
3 'Oratio Obliqua', p. 145*
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remain with Geach's original formulation.. In its favour we may
remember that one can also be said, to 'mean something' even when the
talk is of sense rather than of reference.. If we adopt this
explication of 'said that', however, we must take 'something' not
as an objective indicator but as a place-holder.. The place it
holds could be filled by the meaningful direct quotation of the
original utterance. Thus "A said that Possum was dreaming of
fish" might be interpreted first as "A said something tantamount
to 'Possum was dreaming of fish'", and then as "A said 'the cat
is dreaming of fish' (which is) tantamount to 'Fossum was dreaming
of fish'". This latter interpretation is, however, one which
imports more information. It fills in what the 'something' quite
properly failed to specify because it was not actually exemplified
in the original indirect quotation.
VI
Quotation, direct or indirect, reproduces original meaningful
utterances either in the same or in a modified form. In neither
case does it include names of the original words, of the original
statements or of propositions expressed in the original statements.
So much I have argued; but quotation does also refer the utterances
back to their original utterers. This is something that is not
made evident by meaningful reproduction, for that does not itself
include an indication of the source. Eowcver much I may mistrust
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Goddard and Routley's use of the word 'mention', therefore, in
speaking of a quotation mentioning an original statement, I have
to offer some explanation of how quotation connects the reproduction
with the source of its original.
My attention has been directed heretofore mainly to what
follows the verb, whether in direct or indirect quotation. It is
necessary now, however, to concentrate on'-.the subject term and the
verb itself. It might seem that the subject-term in particular
should raise no particular difficulty. When B said 'A said that
the cat was dreaming of fish', did he not simply refer to the
person indicated by'A'? That he did refer, I must agree; but I
am not so sure about the 'simply'. A features here, after all,
not as an object for description but as a subject for quotation.
If there any significance in this implied distinction, or
is 'subject' only a fancy term for an object? If A's words are
sounds emitted from one particular physical body, then it is surely
that body, or some rather more complicated object of which we see
the physical aspect, that we must be referring to when we say 'A
said . . .'. Certainly; but recall my insistence that quoted
words still indicate what they were originally used to refer to.
It is possible, therefore, for words both to indicate and to
function in some other mode at one and the same time. Indeed, I
suggested cases where quoted words are at the same time used to
refer. I need not deny, therefore, that 'A' is being used to
refer to A's body - or to A as a body -, if I wish to suggest
that it is also being used for some other purpose.
What I am here working my way towards is the suggestion that,
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when someone is quoted, his name also is used in a manner close to
quotation; and further, that this use is, in that context, his
name's primary use, and that its function of indicating the person
as an object is only subsidiarily involved. We would move even
further away from Davidson's attempt to split quotation into two
safely descriptive parts, not because the truth conditions of the
first part are fatally infected by the synonymy requirements of the
1
second , but on the stronger grounds that the first part is itself
inherently "quotational" rather than descriptive. The effect of
this would be, of course, that we could justifiably understand
the full expression of the quotation as a well integrated whole.
We would avoid the abrupt conjunction of descriptive reference and
quotational repetition, such as produced the syntactical monstrosity
in Prior's account of indirect quotation.
I can understand that an immediate reaction might well be that
this would be a small return for so implausible a theory. Third;,
therefore, of the analogy that I drew between quotation and the
reproduction of pictures. Suppose that a picture of which we
have a replica was signed by the artist, Paul Klee. When he wrote
'Klee', he formed the characters in the same way as he painted the
picture. What that way is I do not now propose to analyse, but
words such as 'conscious' and 'intentional' will naturally come to
mind. The important point, though, is that both the painting
and the signing are activities that are the artist's own, activities
1 R. J. Eaack, 'On Davidson's Paratactic Theory of Oblique
Contexts', pp. 358-60.
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that he originates and to which he would give his own name, as
by the signing he has in fact to the painting. He bears no such
relation of responsibility, however, to the reproduction of his name
in the replica. That still serves, though, as a sign that the
original picture was created by him. It is a quotation of his
attestation, parallel to the replica's near-quotational status
in relation to the original.
What is the point, though, of this analogy? It will be
objected that people do not sign their utterances and that, even if
they did, this would not be relevant to the ascription to them of
quoted utterances. If A said 'A says: the cat is dreaming of
I
fish', then A could be quoted as saying in part 'A says'; but the
use of 'A* that we are interested in is the one in which it occurs
outside the quotation marks, as when B says "A said '. .
Imagine, though, that we have a reproduction of another picture
that was not signed. In this case the words 'Paul Klee' are printed
beneath the replica in a way which corresponds much more closely
to the apposition of the speaker's name to his quoted words in a
conventional quotation. How different, though, is the function of
these printed words from the replicated. 'Klee' in the first
reproduction? Of course, there are differences; but these do
not necessarily stretch to a reinterpretation of the relation
between the man and his work. Reproducing his signature seemed
to allow that Klee had both created the work and, out of the same
being, had avowed it to be his own creation. With the other
picture we lack the avowal; but being able only to print the
artist's name does not force us to abandon the concept of the artist
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as one who bears such a relation to his worko The name is still
the name for himself of the artist who created the painting. It
does not introduce a complete change in conceptual register9 so
that we would have to think in terras of the body, called Paul
IClee, operating with paints and paint-brushes in such a way that
this pattern of colours resulted. The printed words 'Paul Flee'
are a poor substitute for the reproduction of a signature, but they
still seek to acknowledge the creator.
According to my analogy, thererore, when we say "A said
we are using 'A' rather as if we were quoting A's utterance of his
own name. For the A that we are speaking of is the A who is the
source of his own utterance. A, the speaker, would normally
introduce himself with the word 'I'; but that is quite naturally
transformed, according to the procedure which we are acquainted with
from indirect quotation, into a term appropriate to the new context,
into 'he' or into some name by which A is known. This substitution
does not change the representation from a quotational to a descriptive
one. We are accepting A as someone who has spoken to us, just as
we accept his words as meaningful and meant. We display this
acceptance of his utterance, by reproducing it either exactly or
in a modified form. Similarly we display our recognition of his
being as a speaker by reproducing, in a modified form, his
verbalization of himself. This we do whether or not he has prefaced
the utterance we are quoting with the word 'I'; for it is not that
which determines whether we treat him and his utterance as fit
subjects for quotation.
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If the subject tern of a quotation has now joined the
words that actually appear between quotes under a wider concept of
"quotation", that leaves only the verb to be brought within the same
systemo What would be required to achieve this? Anything that is
to count as a quotation from someone should reproduce his intended
meaning. One need only mention this condition, though, to see
how easily the verbs of direct and indirect quotation satisfy it.
A speaker does utter his words as a meaningful communication. In
other words, he knows he is saying something and intentionally does
so. Thus, when we introduce a quotation with 'said', we do not
impose an external category on what occurea, but re-employ a concept
that was inherent in the original.'' The same is true of verbs
such as 'deny' or 'explain', for again these manners of speech are
merely understood as they are conceived by the original speaker;
and it can be further applied to those oratio obliqua introducing
verbs which are not so directly connected with utterances, like
•think' and 'believe'. In their dependence on the occurrence or
condition they represent, these verbs all display the essential
feature that differentiates "quotation" from description; they borrow
their meaning from an active original rather than imposing it on a
passive entity.
It might be thought that failure of substitutivity, that
familiar feature of quotation, would not apply to these words that
1 Clearly a child does not have to understand the word 'say'
before we can credit it with saying any tiling. The problem
of extending "quotation" to those who do not provide a
proper basis for it is one that I must leave to the sequel
of this work.
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precede quotations proper. But consider "Hominoid 102 said
'The cat is dreaming of fish'". Now, 'Eominoid 102' may be
offered as a name for the creature referred to (our old friend
A, we may suppose) to use as his own; but its tone suggests
that it is intended entirely for the classifying purposes of the
speaker® In the latter case, though, the classifier's continuation
in terms of 'said' is quite out of key. He may properly char¬
acterize the descriptive entity, Eominoid 102, as emitting
certain sounds; but he cannot, without inconsistency, suggest
1
that these sounds have meaning for it. That suggestion is carried
by the use of 'said' and by the accompanying use of quotation marks.
Therefore, •*Hominoid 102', as a mere descriptive referring term,
cannot be substituted for the name 'A' in this context. Similarly,
a descriptive term for the speaking process cannot be substituted
for 'said'. To quote someone is to make ourselves, in Davidson's
2
phrase, "a samesayer" with him. It involves an imaginative
acceptance of him and his utterance as equally creative of meaning
with one's ovm being and one's own speech.
1 This is not the case of the machine simulation enthusiast. If
he regards the computer's output as meant bv the computer, he
treats the computer, as well as its output, as worthy of
quotation.
2 'On Saying That', p. 140.
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VII
Much of the previous section might seem high-flown in
relation to that poorly regarded, activity, quotation.. It should
have been evident, though, that my arguments there were converging
on those that I presented in the previous chapter. The extension
of the role of quotation to take in the speaker and his activity
opens the way to a general amalgamation of quotation with the
language of mind. If that should take place, quotation would
no longer deserve its lowly reputation. The self that is not a
descriptive entity, the "colourfulness" of experiences that does
not consist in descriptive properties, the processes and conditions
that are expressed in further uses of oratio obliqua, offer a
rich field for a non-descriptive language. I have argued that
quotation itself already contains a full recognition of this self
as a source of meaning that can be shared. It is this shared meaning
that it is the purpose of the language of mind to convey. That
language is far wider than quotation; but quotation provides
its most convenient exemplar, as being the part of it concerned
with the reproduction of that meaning as it appears in open
communication.
I have been highly critical of Quine; but it must be
recognized that he is thoroughly consistent. He does wish to
banish indirect quotation along with mention of the "propositional
attitudes" from the ultimate account of reality. My inter¬
pretation of direct quotation would bring it, too, under his ban.
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We share, thereforeT in a general division of language and in a
high estimate of its importance<> The great difference between
Quine and myself lies in our assessments of reality and the
demands it places on language. In contrast with his contention
that what exists is what satisfies the language that supersedes
description, I have argued that there are aspects of reality that
can be represented in language but not in any descriptive language.
The words that express the multifarious character of our lived-
through experiences cannot be fused in descriptively referential
terms. There is a genuine ontological role therefore for a
language that does not function by indicating entities and
characterizing them.
What is needed, therefore, is an account of this language that
is as consistent in eschewing description as Quine is in eschewing
anything that does not fit into his linguistic scheme. It is not
enough, as Danto has done,"' to play with quotation as a model for
one small part of mental language. It must be amalgamated with
mental language as a whole, for any move in this direction is only
justified if it corresponds to a general theory of mind as reality
apprehended in a manner other than perceptual and therefore to be
represented linguistically by some other method than description.
It is therefore a double account, of mind as non-objective reality
and of the language of mind as "quotation", for which this work
prepares the ground.
1 Panto argues ('Analytic Philosophy of Knowledge', pp. 86-9?)
that beliefs are quotable sentential states. His purpose,
however, is to contrast belief with knowledge, which may merely
involve a sentential state. He also claims that his theory is
empirical; and his use of the word 'state' is not just incautious,
for he thinks that sentential states can be discovered through
scientific investigation.
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